Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MUSCAT262
2008-04-07 12:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Muscat
Cable title:  

OMAN REVEALS LOW-PROFILE INITIATIVE ON

Tags:  PREL LE MU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9456
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000262 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2018
TAGS: PREL LE MU
SUBJECT: OMAN REVEALS LOW-PROFILE INITIATIVE ON
SYRIA-LEBANON

REF: A. MUSCAT 0223 (NOTAL)

B. DOHA 0279

Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo per 1.4 (B and D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000262

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2018
TAGS: PREL LE MU
SUBJECT: OMAN REVEALS LOW-PROFILE INITIATIVE ON
SYRIA-LEBANON

REF: A. MUSCAT 0223 (NOTAL)

B. DOHA 0279

Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo per 1.4 (B and D)


1. (C) Summary: Omani Minister Responsible for Foreign
Affairs Yusef bin Alawi told me that he has begun a
"low-profile" effort to bring the Syrians and Lebanese
together and help resolve the Lebanese leadership stalemate.
The Omani effort, reportedly in cooperation with Qatar, is
focused on getting Syria and Lebanon to open embassies in
capitals and agree on a border demarcation program. The
Omani initiative allegedly enjoys the support of Syria's
Bashar al Assad, and at least one attempt has been made to
reach out to Lebanese PM Siniora, who recently paid an
unannounced visit to Muscat. In the Omani view, bringing the
two sides together would not only address Lebanon's problem
but also bring Damascus back into the Arab fold and end its
political dependence on Tehran. End Summary.

Bringing Damascus and Beirut Together
--------------

2. (C) In our meeting April 6, bin Alawi told me he had
been specifically asked by Bashar al Assad to approach the
Lebanese and look for ways to address the Lebanese crisis,
"now that the Saudis are out of the picture." According to
the minister, the Syrians are not interested in picking the
next Lebanese president, only in solving the stalemate and
getting a president acceptable to the various Lebanese
factions. Qatar is also playing a role (ref B),albeit
unspecified. Following bin Alawi's return from Damascus and
his meeting with the Syrian president (ref A) -- but prior to
the Arab League summit -- Lebanese PM Fuad Siniora paid an
unannounced and unofficial visit to Muscat )- even the
Lebanese ambassador was not informed -) for "relaxation" and
separate discussions with the Sultan and bin Alawi.


3. (C) In his discussions with Siniora, bin Alawi laid out
the same plan he had previously raised with al Assad for
mending Lebanese-Syrian relations, i.e., open embassies in
capitals and agree on a border demarcation plan. With
respect to the latter, bin Alawi proposed the same approach
Oman had employed in demarcating its borders with Yemen and
Saudi Arabia, and more recently with the UAE. The two
governments need only agree on a third-country civilian

contractor, who would employ GPS survey technology to mark
various border points. Using a contractor removes the
"political issues" involved when governments undertake such
projects. (Note: The Omanis used a German firm to demarcate
its border with the UAE. End Note.)

The Israeli Connection
--------------

4. (C) Siniora was non-committal on the Omani proposal but
pointed out it would likely face opposition in the Lebanese
cabinet. However, he suggested a way to strengthen his
position -- disarm Hezballah. To do that, as the Syrians
would not attempt it, a way had to be found to get the
Israelis out of Sheba'a farms, including the surrounding
hills occupied by Israeli observation and communication
posts. With the Israelis out of Sheba'a, Hezballah would
lose its justification for arming itself. Bin Alawi surmised
that a theoretically disarmed Hezballah would give Siniora
the leverage he needed to move forward in the Lebanese
cabinet on the Omani proposal regarding embassies and
borders. In any event, nothing was decided during the
Lebanese PM's visit, and bin Alawi will give the Lebanese
more time before going back for a response. However, he
asked for the U.S. view on Israeli withdrawal from Sheba'a.

Damascus Serious... Again
--------------

5. (C) The minister said that the Syrians, and specifically
al Assad, "are serious" about trying to repair their
relations with the Arabs after the "failure at Damascus."
Bin Alawi explained that the Syrians ultimately want to bring
the Israelis to the negotiating table but understand that
they must have the support of the Arabs to begin, and most
especially conclude, any negotiations with Tel Aviv. Equally
important, the Syrians want a strong Hezballah to strengthen
their own hand in negotiations with the Israelis. Therefore,
said bin Alawi, Damascus will not compromise Hezballah over
Lebanon, i.e., attempt to get in the way of Iranian weapons
and supply flows to Hezballah. However, he underscored, the
Syrians have no illusions about where Hezballah's loyalties
lie, "east of Damascus." Similarly, Iran only cared for
Syria as a connection or conduit for Hezballah. Therefore,
Damascus had to find a way to get back into the good graces
of critical Arab states, i.e., Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan

MUSCAT 00000262 002 OF 002


and the GCC. Working constructively on Lebanon, argued bin
Alawi, was the best way to begin mending Syria's tattered
Arab ties.


6. (C) I reminded bin Alawi that the Syrians had been
serious before )- with us, the Saudis, Lebanese and others
-) and each time had been exposed as duplicitous and
untrustworthy. Why did he think they were playing straight
with the Omanis? "They have no options left," he said,
especially after both Riyadh and Cairo had "washed their
hands of the Syrians." The embarrassment of the summit and
"unnatural" estrangement of key Arab states had made them
realize that their current course would only lead to a dead
end with an unreliable Tehran, "who would not hesitate to
sell out the secular Ba'athists in Damascus as long as it
didn't jeopardize Hezballah."


7. (C) I also told bin Alawi that his grandiose plan
sounded more than a little improbable )- Israeli withdrawal
from Sheba'a, Hezballah disarmament, serious Lebanese-Syrian
negotiations, subsequent Arab support for the negotiations,
resolution of the Lebanese presidency crisis, Syria's
re-entry into Arab good graces, and even Syrian-Israeli
negotiations. He jokingly acknowledged, "It is a very
complicated chain," but allowed that the Omanis will take it
"one step at a time." For now, he concluded, the Omanis will
give the Syrians and Lebanese some time to think it over. No
action was expected before the GCC foreign ministers
gathering preceding the mid-year GCC summit in Dammam in May.

Comment
--------------

8. (C) Bin Alawi seemed genuine in his hope of trying to
start something between the Lebanese and Syrians that might
lead to resolution of the Lebanese presidency question. The
Omani horizon appears to end there, however, although
Syrian-Arab rapprochement is also on the Omanis' mind. The
rest is probably Pollyannaish even to the most optimistic
Omani. While bin Alawi appears realistic about prospects, it
was not clear that the Omani idea has translated into an
actual working plan. End Comment.
GRAPPO