Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MUSCAT235
2008-03-26 11:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Muscat
Cable title:  

SULTAN'S ADVISOR SPEAKS ON IRAN

Tags:  PREL EFIN IR MU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4963
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMS #0235/01 0861158
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261158Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9415
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000235 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2018
TAGS: PREL EFIN IR MU
SUBJECT: SULTAN'S ADVISOR SPEAKS ON IRAN

REF: 07 MUSCAT 904

Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo per 1.4 (B and D).

Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000235

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2018
TAGS: PREL EFIN IR MU
SUBJECT: SULTAN'S ADVISOR SPEAKS ON IRAN

REF: 07 MUSCAT 904

Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo per 1.4 (B and D).

Summary
--------------

1. (C) Iran is taking advantage of America's misperceived
weakness in the region in order to court the Arab street and
fill the resulting power vacuum in the region, according to
Special Advisor to the Sultan for Cultural Affairs, Abdul
'Aziz al-Rowas. In a meeting with the Ambassador March 25,
the once powerful Information Minister, who also has served
occasionally as the Sultan's special envoy to Iran, also
pointed out the differing political agendas of Iran's Supreme
Leader Khamanei, who wants to protect the Islamic revolution
and ensure the Iranian nation's survival, and President
Ahmadinejad, who seeks to create the conditions for the
return of the mahdi. He urged, therefore, that the U.S.
consider addressing the Supreme Leader's concerns, "which you
have the power to do," as opposed to Ahmadinejad's, "which
are impossible." Al Rowas advised the next U.S.
administration to concentrate on "reestablishing America's
reputation and prominence" in the region, starting with a
reenergized campaign to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and a concerted effort to strengthen the U.S.
dollar. End summary.

Divide Khamanei and Ahmadinejad
--------------

2. (C) Al Rowas stated that the Supreme Leader and the
Iranian president have differing agendas. The former seeks
above all to preserve the Islamic revolution and ensure the
survival of Iran and the revolutionary government.
Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, is looking to sow discord and
instability "wherever he can" in order to hasten the coming
of the mahdi. Their agendas coincide now only because both
feel threatened by the U.S. Address the interests of one,
said al Rowas, and the U.S. can effectively turn one against
the other and "change the character of Iran."


3. (C) Al Rowas dismissed the possibility of anyone
realistically coming to terms with Ahmadinejad and his
ideological mentor, Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi. "It's
impossible," he asserted, as only an insane person would seek
instability "for any reason." However, the former minister
argued, the U.S. and its western allies can address

Khamanei's concerns. "You have the power," he reasoned, to
convince Khamanei that the U.S. is not a threat to either
Iran or the Islamic revolution. It might require direct and
protracted dialog between the two governments but once
successful, the U.S. would effectively marginalize
Ahmadinejad and end Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. Both
Iranian leaders see the acquisition of nuclear weapons as
serving their purposes. If Khamanei can be convinced that
his agenda can be achieved without nuclear weapons, according
to al Rowas, then he would agree to terminate Iran's military
nuclear program.

Iran: Riding the Crest
--------------

4. (C) Al Rowas said that the Iranians see the U.S. as
weakened in the region. They tell people in the region that
anyone supported by the Americans, e.g., Abu Mazen, Fuad
Siniora and others, faces declining fortunes. In their
distorted logic, American influence in the region is in
decline, presenting Iran with an historic opportunity to
reassert itself. Moreover, he emphasized, the U.S. should
not underestimate Iran's use of misinformation, outright
fabrication and intimidation to convince the region that
"it's Iran's turn." This is part of Shi'a "taqia," the
authority to employ whatever means necessary )- even those
normally considered immoral -- to achieve ends consistent
with the faith. He pointed to the standard examples where
their efforts have been successful: Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and
Palestine. "They're riding the crest of a wave," he said.


5. (C) As is often the case, mused al Rowas, the Iranians
have miscalculated. He said that he had told the head of an
Iranian delegation which recently visited Muscat for
political talks with the Omanis, that while indeed their
fortunes are somewhat better, they are misreading the region
and the staying power of the U.S. and the West and losing an
opportunity to achieve major concessions from them. He told
the Iranian that the West is prepared to offer strengthened
economic cooperation, greater trade opportunities, technology
transfer and, most important for the Iranian psyche,
recognition as a major player in the region. "You are
foolish," he reportedly told the Iranian delegation head, for
sacrificing all of that and more "for weapons the U.S. and
the West will never allow you to acquire anyway." He further

MUSCAT 00000235 002 OF 002


warned the Iranians that "no one will join you in your
isolation."

Advice for the Next U.S. Administration
--------------

6. (C) Al Rowas expressed considerable interest in the
ongoing U.S. presidential campaign. He said the next
president would face more challenges in the Middle East than
any previous administration. In addition to the obvious
issues )- the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq, Iran,
Afghanistan, Pakistan and terrorism )- the next president
will have to take up the matter of America's damaged image in
the region. "We are more concerned about this," he advised,
"because if America isn't respected in the region, it's an
invitation for misbehavior by Iran and others."


7. (C) He cautioned that it is not a question of American
military might. The U.S. must again be seen to wield
political and economic power too in order to bring peace and
stability to the region. The region has seen too much U.S.
military action in the last few years and not enough
diplomatic and economic effort, where "you can exercise
leadership no one else can." The first place to start, he
suggested, was the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a solution
to which would "transform" the region and the U.S. image.
Secondly, he advised, the U.S. needed to act to strengthen
the U.S. dollar. "Arabs won't respect a power whose currency
is so weak."

Comment
--------------

8. (C) For someone out of the mainstream of the Omani
government and whose portfolio hardly requires it, al Rowas
appeared surprisingly well informed about Iran. He referred
often by name to a number of prominent Iranian opinion
leaders and recent Iranian political activities, suggesting
that he continues to follow regularly and in some detail
events in Iran. Al Rowas has not traveled to Iran since
Ahmadinejad's election victory two years ago -) he was
tapped by the Sultan to personally deliver the Sultan's
congratulatory message to the newly elected president )- and
expressed a clear wish never to return. Nevertheless, he is
someone whom the Iranians know and continue to seek out. He
noted that the above referenced Iranian delegation had
requested the meeting with him.
GRAPPO