Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MUSCAT180
2008-03-02 11:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Muscat
Cable title:  

DEMARCHE IN ADVANCE OF ARAB LEAGUE MINISTERIAL:

Tags:  PREL LE SY KV AL IZ MU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ6821
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMS #0180/01 0621158
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021158Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9325
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MUSCAT 000180 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2018
TAGS: PREL LE SY KV AL IZ MU
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE IN ADVANCE OF ARAB LEAGUE MINISTERIAL:
OMAN WARNS OF PENDING DISASTER OVER LEBANON

REF: A. STATE 19473

B. MUSCAT 118

Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (B and D).

Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L MUSCAT 000180

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2018
TAGS: PREL LE SY KV AL IZ MU
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE IN ADVANCE OF ARAB LEAGUE MINISTERIAL:
OMAN WARNS OF PENDING DISASTER OVER LEBANON

REF: A. STATE 19473

B. MUSCAT 118

Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (B and D).

Summary
--------------

1. (C) Pointing to Lebanon as the critical issue, Omani
Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusef bin Alawi
offered a gloomy forecast for the Arab League (AL) foreign
ministers meeting scheduled later this week in Cairo and
potentially for the AL Summit later this month. The
Ambassador called on bin Alawi March 2 to deliver ref A
demarche in advance of the March 5 AL ministerial. Bin Alawi
offered a quick summary of discussions at the March 1 GCC
foreign ministers meeting in Riyadh, calling attention to an
unusually harsh presentation on Syria and Iran by Saudi FM
Sa'ud Al Feisal. Oman has not yet decided who will represent
the Sultanate in Damascus, but it will not be Sultan Qaboos.
The minister also reported that the GCC had issued a
statement following yesterday's foreign ministers meeting in
support of Kosovo independence; Oman, however, will withhold
its decision at least until after the OIC Summit later in the
month. End Summary.

Lebanon: A Test for the Arab League
--------------

2. (C) Bin Alawi described Sa'ud Al Feisal's argument on
Syria at the March 1 GCC FM gathering in Riyadh as "unusually
tough." Essentially, the Saudis are looking to force
Damascus to choose whether "it is with Iran or the Arabs,"
using Lebanon and the AL Summit as the test. The Saudi
reportedly characterized the Lebanon crisis in terms of
Iran's attempt to establish hegemony in the Arab world, which
(quoting the Saudi FM) "is unacceptable." According to bin
Alawi, FM Sa'ud Al Feisal called on the GCC and broader AL to
"fully isolate Damascus" if the Syrians are unwilling to back
down and allow the Lebanese presidential election to proceed,
with Sleiman the expected winner.


3. (C) Bin Alawi said he was struck by not only the gravity
of Sa'ud Al Feisal's words but also the apparent attempt to
cast the Lebanon issue now in terms of "the Arab world versus
Iran." "We are not ready to accept that," said the Omani

minister. Instead, he said, the AL must break down the
problem and look for interest groups prepared to compromise.
In his view, Michel Aoun is the most intransigent, bent on
throwing up as many obstacles to the election as possible in
the vain hope of getting himself elected. However, bin Alawi
opined that March 14, Amal and even Hezballah might be ready
to strike a deal in the interest of avoiding the chaos of
Lebanon without a president for an indefinite period of time.
Therefore, he argued for one last AL attempt at bridging
differences among these groups before giving in to the Saudi
argument. He said that at the AL ministerial he and others
would make one final push for this approach.


4. (C) Bin Alawi stated that even if there is a Lebanese
president, the Saudis are unlikely to send anyone higher than
their ambassador to Damascus to the March 27 Summit, "if it
happens." He would not hazard a guess on the level of
representation of other Arab governments, but predicted it
would not be well attended. Oman has not decided on its
representation, but the Sultan would definitely not attend.
Concluding his discussion of Lebanon, the Omani minister
commented that Lebanon and the threat of a canceled summit
presented the Arab League with its "most difficult test in
years," one with the real possibility of seriously
undermining the credibility of the AL and Arab unity.

Kosovo: GCC Support May Not Mean Recognition
--------------

5. (C) Bin Alawi said the GCC had issued a statement
following the GCC FM meeting in Riyadh March 1 in support of
Kosovo independence. However, GCC governments reportedly
agreed to delay individual decisions on recognition and any
subsequent announcement until after the OIC Summit later this
month. He avoided clearly stating whether any GCC states,
including Oman, had reached a decision, deferring to the OIC
Summit and, in Oman's case, the traditional approach of
withholding such decisions until there was an exchange of
ambassadors.

Iraq: Foreign Fighters Exacerbates Saudi-Syrian Rift
-------------- --------------

6. (C) Bin Alawi agreed with our point on Syria's
tolerance, if not open facilitation, of movement of foreign
fighters through its territory into Iraq. However, he could
not explain the apparent contradiction between the fact that
almost all the foreign fighters are Sunnis with Al Qa'ida
connections and the claim that they are backed by Shi'a Iran.

(Comment: Despite previously provided background
information from us on Iran's support for both Al Qa'ida and
the Taliban, bin Alawi appears wedded to the view that Shi'a
Iranians would not support Sunni terrorists. End comment.)
The larger concern, however, was that this is yet another
issue stoking Saudi animus toward Damascus. He did not
expect significant attention to be devoted to this issue in
Cairo, given the looming matter of Lebanon and attendant
Saudi-Syrian feud.

Comment
--------------

7. (C) Per ref B, the Omanis see Lebanon )- and
concomitantly, the Arab League -- on the brink and
compromise, even capitulation, preferable to disaster. After
Sa'ud Al Feisal's reported apocalyptic assessment of the
Iranian challenge and Syria's estrangement from its Arab
brethren, bin Alawi seemed to cast the upcoming summit in
almost existential terms. Challenged to describe a viable AL
plan if, on the eve of the summit, there is no acceptable
Lebanese president, bin Alawi could only acknowledge the
"disaster for Lebanon and for the Arab League itself," not
only for having failed to address a problem entirely within
itself but also having to face the prospect of Saudi Arabia's
doomsday scenario of Iran as the common enemy of the Arabs.
GRAPPO