Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MUNICH70
2008-02-14 11:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Munich
Cable title:  

FRIENDS OF BELARUS MEETING ON THE MARGINS OF THE

Tags:  MARR NATO PARM PREL GM BO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8070
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMZ #0070/01 0451155
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141155Z FEB 08
FM AMCONSUL MUNICH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4292
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK PRIORITY 0055
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQUSEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHRL/USDAO BERLIN GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUNICH 000070 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2018
TAGS: MARR NATO PARM PREL GM BO
SUBJECT: FRIENDS OF BELARUS MEETING ON THE MARGINS OF THE
MUNICH SECURITY CONFERENCE

REF: MUNICH 52

Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL ERIC G. NELSON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUNICH 000070

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2018
TAGS: MARR NATO PARM PREL GM BO
SUBJECT: FRIENDS OF BELARUS MEETING ON THE MARGINS OF THE
MUNICH SECURITY CONFERENCE

REF: MUNICH 52

Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL ERIC G. NELSON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: Lithuania organized a meeting of the
Friends of Belarus on the margins of the February 8-10 Munich
Security Conference. The meeting was characterized by
agreement that the U.S. and EU should maintain pressure on
Belarus for the release of political prisoners, and by a
commitment to U.S.-EU consultation on the way forward
thereafter. The participants also briefly discussed the gas
dispute between Gazprom and Ukraine. End summary.


2. (C) Lithuanian FM Vaitiekunas hosted a Friends of Belarus
meeting February 10 on the margins of the Munich Security
Conference. Representing the U.S. were EUR A/S Fried, Amb.
Stewart and EUR DAS Kramer. Latvia (Klava) and Sweden
(Lyrvall) were represented at the Political Director level,
as was Germany (Stanzel). The EU Council's Helga Schmid also
attended, and British Ambassador Arthur represented the UK.


3. (C) The Lithuanian FM began the meeting by giving a
readout on his recent bilateral meeting with Belarus FM
Martynov on the margins of the conference. Martynov said
Belarus wanted to pursue better relations with both the U.S.
and EU, but did not want to appear to be "giving in" to the
U.S. or Europe. Martynov reportedly noted that Belarus had
already released three political prisoners and, in accordance
with Minsk's commitment, would follow through in releasing
the rest. Asked specifically about Kozulin, Martynov did not
want to talk about names, but reiterated the Belarusian
commitment, and said that "six means six, not five." In
return, Martynov said Belarus is seeking progress from the EU
in three areas: 1) an end to the visa ban list; 2) EU
cooperation on energy issues; and 3) an end to economic
sanctions. Vaitiekunas shared his personal doubts about
Martynov's trustworthiness, but said that it was important to
keep pushing the regime to fulfill its commitments.


4. (C) A/S Fried and Ambassador Stewart pointed out that

progress up to now was the result of U.S.-EU solidarity and
that it was important to maintain this going forward. Fried
said one had to be prepared for Martynov and Lukashenka to
play games, such as releasing all the current political
prisoners, but then arresting new ones. If Minsk released
all the political prisoners unconditionally, the U.S. was
ready to suspend the expansion of sanctions, send a
delegation to Minsk (perhaps jointly with the EU) to engage
with the government (while also meeting with the opposition),
and consider revisiting parts of the travel ban and asset
freeze (at least not expanding the sanctions). We would
consult closely with EU partners. He noted that it was
important to keep Belarus "in play" to maximize its degree of
sovereignty vis-a-vis Russia.


5. (C) DAS Kramer pointed out that if Belarus drags the
release of political prisoners out until June, the U.S.
government might choose not to seek a waiver on
Jackson-Vanik, which would have the effect of cutting off
most U.S. trade with Belarus. It was important to maintain
U.S.-EU leverage to gain the unconditional release of all
political prisoners; it was also important to maintain
leverage afterwards as well, because there were many other
important goals beyond release of political prisoners.


6. (C) German PolDir Stanzel underscored the precarious
situation Belarus was in, squeezed by both the West and
Russia. He noted that MFA State Secretary Erler had also met
Martynov on the margins of the conference. Erler reportedly
had insisted on three preconditions for any movement by the
EU: 1) no repression of political demonstrations; 2) release
of all six political prisoners; and 3) a guarantee to hold
free and fair parliamentary elections this fall with outside
observers.


7. (C) Schmid said it was not in the West's interest to
abandon Belarus to Russia, but stressed that all six
prisoners had to be released before any concessions could be
offered. That was the minimum pre-condition for engagement
-- she thought Martynov and Lukashenka understood that.

MUNICH 00000070 002 OF 002


Schmid noted that the EU visa ban list comes up for revision
in March, an issue in which the Belarusian Ambassador in
Brussels was keenly interested. The EU would also be
watching whether the regime cracked down on the Feb. 18
entrepreneurs' demonstration. She noted that Belarus had
already released a statement welcoming ODIHR sending election
observers to the fall parliamentary vote -- this reportedly
had really irritated the Russians.


8. (C) British Ambassador Arthur agreed that EU-U.S. unity
had borne fruit and should be continued. The UK favored a
joint EU/U.S. delegation to Minsk once all the political
prisoners were released. Swedish Political Director Lyrvall
said that within the EU framework, Stockholm was examining
what it could do to reach out to Belarusian civil society at
the grassroots level, including through student exchanges.
It plans to upgrade its current "Embassy Office" into a
full-fledged embassy in the coming months and increase aid to
some 14 million Euros per year.


9. (C) Lithuanian MOD rep noted that the Lithuanian Embassy
in Minsk is the NATO contact point embassy for Belarus. He
suggested increased defense cooperation, including assistance
with MOD reform, civilian control of the military, etc., as
possible carrots for Belarus in return for releasing
political prisoners. A/S Fried and DAS Kramer thought this
could be a good idea, but that it should only be offered once
all the political prisoners have been released. Kramer also
noted that the U.S. would oppose an invitation to Bucharest
for FM Martynov; attendance should be kept at the ambassador
level.

Gazprom's Threat to Cut off Gas to Ukraine
--------------


10. (C) At A/S Fried's suggestion, the group briefly
discussed Gazprom's threat to cut off gas supplies to Ukraine
because of alleged debts. Participants agreed with A/S Fried
that it was best to be careful about being drawn directly
into the details of this matter, given the complicated
Ukrainian political landscape and murkiness of RosUkrEnergo's
(RUE) ties both to Gazprom and to Ukrainian political
figures. Schmid agreed that the rivalry between Ukrainian
President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Tymoshenko over the
fate of RUE was particularly complicated. Schmid reported
that she had already told the Russian Ambassador in Brussels
that the 2006 cut-off of gas supplies had damaged Russia's
credibility and it might be a mistake to repeat that
experience. A/S Fried said the episode pointed up the
benefits of the proposed Nabucco gas project, which would
make Western Europe less dependent on Russian-controlled gas
supplies.


11. (U) DAS Kramer and Ambassador Stewart cleared this
cable, which was coordinated with Embassy Berlin.


12. (U) For more information on the 44th Conference and past
conferences, visit:"http://www.securityconference.de".


13. (U) Previous reporting from Munich is available on our
SIPRNET website at www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/munich/.
NELSON