Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MUNICH62
2008-02-13 14:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Munich
Cable title:  

A/S FRIED'S MEETING WITH MONTENEGRIN FOREIGN

Tags:  MARR NATO PARM PREL GM MW 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7737
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMZ #0062/01 0441432
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131432Z FEB 08 ZDK
FM AMCONSUL MUNICH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4282
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHPOD/AMEMBASSY PODGORICA PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQUSEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHRL/USDAO BERLIN GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUNICH 000062 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/AGS, SECDEF FOR OSD RICHARD DOTSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2018
TAGS: MARR NATO PARM PREL GM MW
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED'S MEETING WITH MONTENEGRIN FOREIGN
MINISTER ROCEN

REF: MUNICH 52

Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL ERIC G. NELSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D
)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUNICH 000062

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/AGS, SECDEF FOR OSD RICHARD DOTSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2018
TAGS: MARR NATO PARM PREL GM MW
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED'S MEETING WITH MONTENEGRIN FOREIGN
MINISTER ROCEN

REF: MUNICH 52

Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL ERIC G. NELSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D
)


1. (C) Summary: Assistant Secretary Dan Fried met February 9
with Montenegrin Foreign Minister Milan Rocen. Rocen said
Montenegro was ready for Kosovo,s independence and would
control unwanted or destabilizing movement (e.g.,
paramilitaries) across the border while keeping it open for
legitimate traffic. In the longer run, Montenegro wanted to
move forward on recognition in coordination with the other
former Yugoslav republics: Croatia and Macedonia. Rocen
said Montenegro would be ready for Intensified Dialogue at
the April NATO Summit in Bucharest. End summary.

Kosovo and Serbia
--------------


2. (C) A/S Fried met with Montenegrin Foreign Minister Rocen
at the latter's request, on the margins of the Munich
Security Conference. Fried noted that Kosovo would become
independent very soon, and Rocen asked if the rumor was
accurate that a declaration of independence would occur
February 17. Fried said it was likely in February, but did
not enter into speculation about the exact date. Fried
underscored that the U.S. did not plan to press Montenegro to
recognize Kosovo immediately, for which Rocen said he was
grateful. Fried said that the U.S. did, however, want
Montenegro to keep the shared border open, while ensuring
that no radical Serbs or other troublemakers of whatever type
crossed through Montenegro into Kosovo. Further, we needed
to embrace and help pro-Western forces in Serbia. It would
be a difficult time, but the U.S. wanted to move NATO
relations with all the countries in the region forward.


3. (C) Rocen said Montenegrin authorities were ready and he
was confident upheaval could be averted. With respect to
recognition, Montenegro would proceed deliberately, consult
with the U.S. and European partners, and take a decision in
line with its desire to strengthen its partnership with the

Euro-Atlantic community. Rocen expressed the hope that
Croatia, Macedonia, and Montenegro would be able to move
forward together.


4. (C) He had spoken February 8 with Serbian President Tadic
and Foreign Minister Jeremic -- they realized Kosovo
independence would happen. It was possible that Kosovo Serbs
in the north would declare their unification with Serbia.
Tadic and Jeremic would not recognize such a declaration,
using the justification that all of Kosovo remained part of
Serbia.


5. (C) Rocen said there was likely to be a de facto
partition of Kosovo and asked Fried whether Kosovo would be
prevented from joining international organizations. Fried
said the Russians could block UN membership for Kosovo, but
they did not have the power to keep Kosovo out of the World
Bank and IMF. The international community would not
recognize separatist moves by Kosovo Serbs. Fried noted that
the U.S. and Europe would neither recognize nor tolerate
Kosovo Serb separatism. The border crossings would remain in
international hands, and hindrances to movement, such as
Kosovo Serb checkpoints, would be taken down. It might be
hard to prevent parallel Kosovo Serb institutions from
arising, but the international community would be ready to
prevent violence and respond robustly if necessary.


6. (C) Rocen highlighted the "arrogant" Serbian stance and
said Tadic had told him he would organize a referendum on
reunification of Montenegro with Serbia. Rocen agreed with
Fried that it was an outrageous idea and described it as an
expression of Serb weakness. Serbia might also encourage
separatism among Bosnian Serbs.

Euro-Atlantic Integration
--------------


MUNICH 00000062 002 OF 002



7. (C) Rocen said Montenegro hoped the three Membership
Action Plan (MAP) countries (Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia)
would be invited to join NATO together at Bucharest. This
would have a stabilizing impact at a critical time and would
be encouraging for the aspirations of other countries in the
region. Montenegro was working hard with NATO on its
Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). Rocen joked that
Montenegro really wanted a membership invitation at
Bucharest, too, but said Montenegro also would be ready for
Intensified Dialogue (ID). He said he wanted to ensure
Montenegro was not forgotten by NATO; this happened at times
(especially with some Europeans) because Montenegro was small
and did not have any pressing international problems. Fried
assured him that the U.S. would not forget Montenegro.
Intensified Dialogue for Montenegro would have an additional
benefit of demonstrating to Serbia that all the other
countries in the region were moving in the same direction.
This was integral to U.S. efforts to help Kosovo and
western-oriented Serbs move toward NATO and European
integration.


8. (C) Fried said a major problem related to NATO
enlargement was the Macedonian name dispute with Greece.
Rocen thought the U.S. would be able to influence Greece.
Fried said there was no guarantee - the Macedonians must work
with UN Special Envoy Nimetz The Macedonians had made some
mistakes, especilly on the airport name. Rocen agreed,
commenting that some Macedonians had told him that given achoice between the name of their airport and NATO embership,
they would choose the airport, an allor-nothing view he
considered short-sighted.

. (U) This cable was cleared by A/S Fried and coordinated
with Embassy Berlin.
NELSON