RUSSIAN DEPUTY SECURITY COUNCIL NAZAROV ON IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000859

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNDP RS IR
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN DEPUTY SECURITY COUNCIL NAZAROV ON IRAN
AND "123"

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns for reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: In a March 21 meeting with SFRC Staff
Member Puneet Talwar and DCM, Russian Security Council Deputy
Secretary Nazarov praised P5 1 unity on Iran, but argued that

SIPDIS
a lack of a roadmap, the failure to lay out positive
inducements for Iranian action, over-reliance on sanctions,
and the absence of a trusted intermediary complicated
progress. Nazarov said it was "incorrect" to expect Iran to
completely halt its enrichment activity, and argued for full
transparency, adherence to the Additional Protocol, and a
full accounting of past activities as the basis for Iran's
reemergence as a "normal state." Nazarov urged the U.S. to
address Iranian concerns over regime change, and to engage
more broadly on Iran's role in the region. Nazarov conceded
that different threat perceptions made Iran a lower priority
for the GOR than U.S. Nazarov expressed concerns over
congressional legislation that could block a future "123" and
underscored the importance Russia attached to its relations
with the U.S. End Summary

Iran
--------------


2. (C) In a two-hour meeting on March 21 with Senate
Foreign Relations Committee Senior Staff Member Puneet Talwar
and DCM, Russian Security Council Deputy Secretary Vladimir
Nazarov stressed that the most significant accomplishment of
the P5 1 was maintaining a common front in demanding Iranian
compliance with UN and IAEA demands. Noting that he could
speak freely as a non-diplomat (hailing from the security
services),Nazarov added that the greatest failure of the
P5 1 was in failing to craft a roadmap that charted a clear
path towards its strategic goals. Nazarov argued that,
unlike the Six Party process, the P5 1 lacked an effective
intermediary with Iran. While China brought energy and
initiative in its behind-the-scenes encouragement of North
Korea, no P5 1 interlocutor enjoyed both the trust of Iran
and the confidence of its P5 1 partners. Noting that EU
Solana lacked the authority and "weight" to engage
successfully with Iran and explicitly ruling Russia out as an
alternate, Nazarov saw few opportunities for a near-term
breakthrough, but speculated that new EU structural reforms
might bring forth a new personality.


3. (C) Continuing his comparison of the P5 1 to the Six
Party format, Nazarov argued that Iran needed a positive
vision of its reintegration into the international community
laid out in explicit terms. Nazarov said it would be
"incorrect" to think that Iran will give up its enrichment
activities entirely. In return for "utter transparency,"
adherence to the Additional Protocol, and a full accounting
of its past activities, Iran needed to understand that it
will be treated as an "absolutely normal" state, with the
full rights of any other NPT member. Nazarov sidestepped a
detailed discussion of which Iranian nuclear activities would
cross Russian red-lines. Stressing that this was his
personal view, Nazarov maintained that Iran would insist on a
level of enrichment activity commensurate with its existing
centrifuges, and that transparency would be critical to
assuaging international community concerns.


4. (C) Nazarov recapped Putin's failed effort to convince
Ahmedinejad and the Supreme Leader to "declare victory" in
demonstrating to the world its mastery of enrichment
technology, while accepting Russia's offer of reprocessing
services. While Putin had argued that this would create the
diplomatic space for a direct dialogue, Iran "turned a deaf
ear" to the presentation. "We see no evidence," Nazarov
concluded, that Iran is ready to forego enrichment in favor
of the services of international fuel centers. Nazarov
attributed former National Security Adviser Larijani's
departure to his unhappiness over this decision.


5. (C) Reiterating the need for a positive agenda with
Iran, Nazarov argued that Ahmedinejad had mastered how to use
international sticks to rally internal support. The more the
international community wielded sanctions, he maintained, the
greater the likelihood of Ahmedinejad's reelection. While
threats and drastic actions sounded better to the average
voter, Nazarov commented, "all responsible politicians"
understood that inducements would be required to change
Iranian behavior. Nazarov maintained that the U.S. should
seek to engage Iran more broadly on regional security, since
"chasing Iran into the corner" had exacerbated its bad
behavior. In Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Iraq, more
responsible Iranian behavior could be induced, particularly
if Iran's disquiet over its own security was assuaged. In an
aside, Nazarov noted that Iran's anti-narcotics policy was
more effective than that of the EU, Pakistan, or U.S./NATO
when it came to Afghanistan.

MOSCOW 00000859 002 OF 002




6. (C) Up to now, Nazarov insisted, Iran remained
suspicious of U.S. efforts to engineer regime change, with
nonproliferation concerns interpreted as a euphemism for a
broader political agenda. Iran needed to believe that its
security interests were being taken into account, which --
over time -- would lead to changes in the calculus of its
regional policy. Just as Iran had to earn the trust of the
U.S. (and international community, writ large),the U.S.
needed to gain the confidence of the Iranians. Only then,
Nazarov maintained, would a roadmap defining the parameters
of Iranian nuclear activity, transparency, and regional
behavior be possible. Conceding that the difficulty of
working with Iran made bilateral relations a low priority for
the GOR, Nazarov again attributed some of Iran's
unpredictability to an exaggerated sense of insecurity fueled
by U.S. threats of military action.


7. (C) Nazarov agreed that Russia gave a lower priority to
Iran than the U.S., due to substantially different threat
perceptions. Tapping the table sharply for emphasis, Nazarov
twice repeated that "no one knows that Iran has made a
political decision to acquire nuclear weapons," adding that
it was "unlikely" that such a decision had been taken.
Citing Russian and other international experts, Nazarov
maintained that Iran faced broad technological challenges,
not limited to its enrichment activities. In a best case
scenario, he said, Iran could develop a nuclear device in
five years, but realistically that accomplishment was "much
further down the road." In any event, he stressed, Iran's
nuclear advance would not come as a "bolt from the blue," but
would be presaged by increasing evidence of nuclear activity,
a withdrawal from the NPT, and abrogation of its IAEA
commitments. Strict sanctions would only embolden Iranian
radicals, who argue for a preemptive withdrawal from both
international regimes.


8. (C) Pushed on whether Russia would support additional
sanctions at the same time that inducements were proffered,
Nazarov insisted that there already was an "imbalance" in the
P5 1 strategy. Rather than the EU3 and Russia playing good
cop to America's bad, Nazarov argued, the U.S. should adopt a
more constructive tone, redress Iranian concerns over
security, and align its strategy to reflect more of its
approach to North Korea. Reiterating that sanctions were
ineffective, if popular electorally, Nazarov said that U.S.
unilateral steps (and the possibility of additional EU
measures) could jeopardize the unity of the P5 1 and weaken
international resolve towards Iran.

Congress and "123"
--------------


9. (C) Nazarov expressed concern over draft U.S.
legislation that, among other things, called for rejection of
a "123" agreement with Russia, in the event of its continued
cooperation with Iran on Bushehr. Noting that the
Administration had praised Russia's approach to the delivery
of Bushehr fuel, which the Kremlin had consulted on in
advance, Nazarov questioned congressional motivations.

Keeping Bilateral Relations on Even Keel
--------------


10. (C) Nazarov began and concluded his comments by
emphasizing the importance that Russia attached to its
relations with the U.S. and characterizing the recently
concluded 2 2 dialogue as an important mechanism for ensuring
stability and continuity during a time of political
transitions. He urged that the accomplishments of the last
eight years be preserved and emphasized that Russia viewed
its relations with the U.S. as a key tool in maintaining
international stability.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) Under former Secretary Igor Ivanov, the Security
Council played an important role in managing Iran policy, due
to Ivanov's personal relations with many in the Iranian
leadership. With Ivanov's departure, the Security Council's
role on Iran has diminished; nevertheless, Nazarov's personal
comments that achieving a complete suspension is unrealistic
probably reflect the consensus of Russian senior officials,
even as Russia adheres to the P5 1 goal of full suspension.


12. (U) This cable was cleared by Puneet Talwar.
BURNS