DFM SALTANOV ON MOSCOW CONFERENCE, SYRIA, IRAN,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000848

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS IR IQ MEP
SUBJECT: DFM SALTANOV ON MOSCOW CONFERENCE, SYRIA, IRAN,
HAMAS, IRAQ

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: In a March 20 meeting with visiting Senate
Foreign Relations Committee Senior Staff Member Talwar, DFM
Saltanov reviewed Russia's position on a range of critical
issues in the Middle East, underscoring strong U.S.-Russian
cooperation in the lead up to and following the Annapolis
Conference. Saltanov commented on the challenges of
organizing the Moscow conference, citing the "divided rule"
of the Palestinian territories and the reluctance of many key
players, including Israel, to hold the conference as the most
formidable hurdles. He supported focusing the Moscow
Conference on the multilateral track, but strongly advocated
adding to the agenda the Israeli-Syrian track, and in general
greater international engagement with Syria, Iran, and Hamas.
Saltanov also stressed Russia's interest in ratcheting up
its involvement in Iraq, but would be conditioned on U.S.
willingness to focus more on national reconciliation and the
establishment of a realistic timetable for troop withdrawal.
End summary.

Annapolis Conference Instrumental
--------------


2. (C) In a one and one-half hour meeting with visiting
Senior Foreign Relations Committee Staff Member Puneet
Talwar, DFM Anatoliy Saltanov highlighted the overlapping
interests and sustained cooperation between the U.S. and
Russia in the Middle East. Saltanov pointed out that the
cooperation intensified "leading up to, during, and following
the useful Annapolis Conference," and assured Talwar that
Russia was ready to continue such engagement with the U.S.
with the outgoing and future U.S. administrations.


3. (C) Saltanov noted that the main obstacle to reaching a
comprehensive peace agreement was the lack of trust between
the Israelis and Arab countries, but stressed that Annapolis
made an important contribution in the settlement of the
conflicts in the region, and in particular, the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He confirmed that FM Lavrov
traveled to Syria on March 19 and was en route to Israel on
March 20 to follow up on Annapolis and encourage all parties
to reach "concrete agreements." Saltanov observed that PM
Olmert and PNA President Abbas suffered from "narrow
political space in which to maneuver," but was encouraged
that both leaders seemed committed to "do their part" to
reach a settlement.

Moscow Conference: An Organizational Nightmare
-------------- -


4. (C) When asked about GOR plans for a possible
post-Annapolis conference in Moscow, Saltanov admitted that
the organization of the conference "was becoming very
complicated" and was reluctant to speculate on timing. He
cited as the most formidable hurdles the "divided rule" of
the Palestinian territories (between the PNA and Hamas) and
the reluctance of many key players, including Israel, to hold
the conference in the next few months.


5. (C) On the substance of the conference, Saltanov argued
that the Moscow conference should focus on the multilateral
track, noting that discussions with the Arab countries on
"critical issues" like economic development, water, and
energy resources could boost the Arab world's "respect" for
Israeli concerns. Following his trip to region, Lavrov would
consult with the Secretary and Quartet on timing and content,
and the Quartet would make a final decision.

But We Need to Engage Syria...
--------------


6. (C) Saltanov echoed Lavrov's views that the
Israeli-Syrian track should also be incorporated into the
agenda of the Moscow Conference. Saltanov underscored the
importance of pushing Israel and Syria to at least start a
dialogue, which could later lead to substantive negotiations.
Saltanov argued that the international community would
observe a shift in its relationship with Iran and a dramatic
change in Syria's activities in Lebanon and Iraq, if Israel
agreed to engage on Golan Heights. He stressed that a
"policy of pressure and isolation" toward Syria is not only
"useless, but destructive."


7. (C) Talwar inquired about Russia's views on the upcoming
tribunal examining the assassination of former Lebanese
President Hariri. Saltanov stressed that Putin has
consistently stated publicly and privately that the tribunal
should get to the bottom of the assassination, even it means
implicating Syria, as long as the process is not politicized.

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Saltanov positively assessed the work of the previous and
current tribunal commissioner.

...And Iran
--------------


8. (C) Saltanov strongly advocated for the international
community's engagement with Iran, stressing that Russia finds
Iran a "complicated but necessary" partner. Saltanov
asserted that Iran was also interested in a stable and
unified Lebanon, Palestinian state, and Iraq, but only by way
of peaceful and comprehensive negotiations. On Iraq,
Saltanov commented that, "obviously," Iran was guided by its
own strategic interests and those interests "needed to be
tempered," but argued that Iran was careful not to exacerbate
tensions with Sunni-majority Arab countries by meddling too
much in Iraq. Saltanov added that Iran has also exercised
restraint in its relations with Shiite enclaves in Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, but acknowledged that
Iran's continued restraint hinged on further developments in
the region and in Iran itself.


9. (C) Commenting on Iranian domestic politics, Saltanov
argued that the outcome of the March 14 Majles elections
demonstrated the negative effects of strong international
pressure on Iran. He posited that the conservatives won the
lion's share of parliamentary seats mainly because the
Iranian people, perceiving that the international community
"was bent on regime change and isolating Iran," rallied
around the conservatives. "More international pressure
equates to less popular support the reformists," he argued.
Thus, dialogue with Iran was a fundamental element of Russian
foreign policy, and Saltanov called on the U.S. to adopt a
similar position.


10. (C) When asked to what extent Russia was prepared to
block Iran's nuclear ambitions, Saltanov said that the
international community should wait to see how Iran responds
to the positive elements in the P5 1 Ministerial Statement
that accompanied the latest UNSC resolution on Iran.
Categorically rejecting a "military solution" to the Iranian
nuclear problem, Saltanov said Russia favored more clearly
laying out for the Iranians the concrete benefits of
cooperation with the international community in exchange for
suspension of uranium enrichment.

...And Hamas
--------------


11. (C) Saltanov observed that there were many "skeptics in
Israel, Arab world, and other places" who doubt that PNA
President Abbas lacks the authority to negotiate an enduring
political settlement, underscoring that Hamas' control over
Gaza has significantly weakened his mandate. Saltanov agreed
with Talwar that Abbas was particularly concerned that
engagement by the international community with Hamas would
mean the further weakening of Abbas' authority, but argued
that Hamas represented a significant part of the Palestinian
"political spectrum" and thus had to be engaged.


12. (C) Recognizing the radical elements in Hamas, Saltanov
claimed that Russia's sustained contacts with Hamas revealed
that some elements of the Hamas leadership were "secular,
pragmatic, and generally not hopeless." He cited as an
example Hamas' willingness to agree to a cease-fire with
Israel in exchange for GOI assurances of no future military
operations in the Palestinian territories. However, Saltanov
argued that Israel, not Hamas, "undid" the agreement, which
was mediated by the Egyptians, when it recently launched
another surgical strike in Gaza. Saltanov commented that
continued pressure on and isolation of the Hamas leadership
only strengthened the hand of the radical elements.

Russia Willing To Play a Greater Role in Iraq
--------------


13. (C) In the event the next administration took a
"fundamentally different" approach to Iraq, Saltanov stressed
Russia would be willing to play a more active role in Iraq.
He noted that a stable Iraq was in Russia's national
interests -- Russia did not want terrorist activities in Iraq
to infiltrate Russian territory and Russia had significant
economic interests in the country.


14. (C) However, Saltanov stated Russia would
"unquestionably and enthusiastically" step up its involvement
in Iraq if two conditions were met. First, greater emphasis
must be placed on efforts to achieve national reconciliation.
Saltanov noted Russia's sustained efforts to encourage the
opposition forces in Iraq to reach a compromise with the

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Maliki government. Second, a timetable for the withdrawal of
foreign troops must be established. He argued that
opposition forces insist on such a timetable as the basis for
serious negotiations with the Iraqi government. Saltanov
reiterated the GOR position that the timetable should be
"realistic," which meant that troop withdrawal should not be
immediate.


15. (U) This cable was cleared by Puneet Talwar.
BURNS