Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MOSCOW806
2008-03-25 04:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIA'S EXPECTATIONS FOR NATO SUMMIT DEPEND ON

Tags:  PREL NATO MARR PARM KCFE UP GG RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0806/01 0850443
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 250443Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7270
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000806 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2018
TAGS: PREL NATO MARR PARM KCFE UP GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S EXPECTATIONS FOR NATO SUMMIT DEPEND ON
MAP FOR UKRAINE AND GEORGIA

REF: MOSCOW 265

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel A. Russell, reasons 1.4 (
b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000806

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2018
TAGS: PREL NATO MARR PARM KCFE UP GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S EXPECTATIONS FOR NATO SUMMIT DEPEND ON
MAP FOR UKRAINE AND GEORGIA

REF: MOSCOW 265

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel A. Russell, reasons 1.4 (
b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. According to the head of the NATO section
at the MFA, Putin's swan song at the NATO Summit in Bucharest
was envisioned to be "constructive" and to call for more
NATO-Russia cooperation, but recent U.S. statements of
support for a Membership Action Plan offer for Ukraine and
Georgia at Bucharest have put not just the nature of Putin's
statement at Bucharest, but his attendance, in question.
Underscoring that the Kremlin would make the final decision
on Putin's attendance and tone of his remarks, the official
told us that if MAP were offered, it was very unlikely that
Putin would attend the Summit, and Russia could cut off
cooperation in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). Assuming Putin
does attend the summit, Russia is working to have the transit
agreement for Afghanistan ready to be signed; believes the
tax and compensation issues may prevent adoption of the Air
Transport Agreement in time; contends the Public Forum idea
is not yet ready; is enthusiastic about continuing the
Domodedovo Center counternarcotics training for Afghan
officials, but would like to see it expanded to include
counterterrorism and border security training; and would like
to have a Joint Declaration, but not if the language is not
right. Defense Experts concur that MAP is key to Bucharest.
End Summary.

"Positive Tone" at Bucharest in Jeopardy Over MAP
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Andrey Rudenko, head of the NATO section at the MFA's
Department of European Cooperation, told us March 21 that
President Putin "had intended" to go to Bucharest and to be
constructive and "give a positive signal" that NATO and
Russia should cooperate further. His speech, which the MFA
was drafting, was not going to be "another Munich," Rudenko
said, because Putin did not want to leave a "legacy of

confrontation," but to show that Russia would look outward
and work with NATO to "face global risks together." Rudenko
added that Russia wanted to "break the current impasse"
between Russia and NATO and between Russia and the U.S. and,
while not avoiding the difficult aspects of the relationship,
focus instead on what we have done together in a positive way.


3. (C) However, the mid-level official said, all this has
been put in jeopardy by recent statements by the U.S.
signaling U.S. support for a MAP offer for Ukraine and
Georgia at Bucharest. Stressing that the Kremlin would make
the final decision on Putin's participation and speech,
Rudenko reiterated Russia's strong opposition to MAP, saying
that it was seen as ignoring Russian security and strategic
concerns. Despite U.S. arguments that MAP was not
membership, the GOR, he said, viewed MAP as "a point of no
return," which would have very negative consequences for
relations between Russia and NATO and the U.S., as well as
seriously affecting Russia's relations with Georgia and
Ukraine. What point would there be for Putin to go to
Bucharest to discuss issues, he said, if Russia's "most
important issue" was decided against Russia. He added that
the GOR had asked the NATO Secretariat to let it know if MAP
would be offered, so as "not to embarrass Putin."

Deliverables: Some on Track, Some Not Quite Ready
-------------- --------------


4. (C) "Assuming that all goes well," Rudenko said, the GOR
was hoping to finalize the transit agreement for ISAF, and
continuation of the Domodedovo counternarcotics training for
Afghan officials in time for Bucharest. He said Russia
recognized the ball was in its court on the transit
agreement, and Russia was working hard to get it approved.
He expressed confidence that it would be done in time for
Bucharest. Rudenko envisioned no problems with finalizing the
agreement on continuation of the Domodedovo training, noting
that the French had told him March 20 they had dropped their
insistence on keeping the word "pilot" in referring to the
project. He added that Russia was interested in expanding
cooperation with NATO on Afghanistan, including possibly
expanding the Domodedovo training to encompass
counterterrorism and border security training for ANA and law
enforcement officers.


5. (C) Rudenko was less sanguine about the Air Transport
Agreement being completed in time for Bucharest, noting that

the issue over taxes would require the GOR to present a
request to the Duma to be exempt from the legislation
requiring the taxes be paid, and that would slow down the
process. But, he added that he hoped that if the Agreement
was not ready by Bucharest, it could be mentioned in the NRC
Joint Statement, if there was one.


6. (C) Russia supported the idea of issuing an NRC Joint
Statement "in principle," Rudenko said, provided we could
find mutually-acceptable language. But, if the language
"separates us," it would be better not to have a Statement at
all. This would not be a tragedy, he added, though Russia
would prefer to have a "good Statement."

Interest in Expanding Mil-Mil Cooperation
--------------


7. (C) Rudenko said the Defense Ministry was continuing to
plan to participate in Operation Active Endeavor, though he
could not say how many ships they would provide. He said
Russia believed the Search and Rescue and emergency planning
exercises had been very successful, and the GOR wanted to
continue -- and even expand on -- such cooperation.


Experts Say MAP is the Key to Bucharest
--------------


8. (C) Defense and security experts note that NATO
enlargement is one of the few security areas where there is
almost complete consensus among Russian policymakers, experts
and the informed population: they are strongly against NATO's
enlargement eastward, particularly to Ukraine and Georgia.
Aleksandr Belkin, Deputy Executive Director of the Council on
Foreign and Defense Policy, said Ukraine was the "line of
last resort." If Ukraine becomes a member of NATO, "Russia's
encirclement will be complete." He said there was almost
universal agreement among Russia's political elite that
NATO's attempt to bring in Ukraine was an "unfriendly act."
While NATO was no longer perceived an open adversary, it was
still seen as a potential threat. Echoing FM Lavrov's
comments after the 2 2, he said Russia had to look not at
intentions, but at potential. He anticipated that if MAP
were offered to Ukraine and Georgia at Bucharest, the GOR
would feel obligated to cut off cooperation with NATO. Putin
did not want this, he added, because Putin did not want to
leave a negative heritage to his successor or leave his post
"as a loser." He added, however, that the situation was not
the same as in the late 1990's during the first round of NATO
enlargement. Russia was in a much stronger position to
oppose NATO membership now, and Russia would not "get over
it."


9. (C) Vitaliy Shlykov, Founding Member of the Council on
Foreign and Defense Policy, argued that Russia was much less
concerned about Georgian membership in NATO, but that Putin
would be forced to respond to Russian nationalist feelings
opposing membership. He argued NATO could offer MAP to
Georgia, but should hold off on Ukraine. Ivan Safranchuk,
Director of the World Security Institute, said the Russian
military was interested in deepening cooperation with NATO
and believed it could learn a great deal from such
cooperation. Safranchuk concurred that such cooperation
would likely be cut back or out if MAP were offered to
Ukraine and Georgia.
BURNS