THE ISLAMIC FACTOR IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000630

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON KISL PINR SOCI RS
SUBJECT: THE ISLAMIC FACTOR IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

REF: A. MOSCOW 346

B. MOSCOW 282

C. MOSCOW 390

D. MOSCOW 184

E. 07 MOSCOW 4447

F. 07 MOSCOW 5681

G. 07 MOSCOW 5734

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns for reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary: Expanding Russia's ties with the Islamic
world has been a priority for Putin and an important factor
in his efforts to revitalize Russian foreign policy. The GOR
has increased bilateral diplomacy with Muslim states,
ratcheted up involvement in the Middle East peace process
(MEPP) and fora such as the Organization of Islamic
Conferences (OIC),and strengthened its public diplomacy.
The payoffs for Russia have been an enhanced diplomatic role
in the Middle East and Asia with attendant opportunities for
trade and investment. GOR outreach to the Muslim world has
also helped make Russia more secure by limiting foreign
support for Chechen separatists and possibly by deflecting
Islamic extremists who have not targeted Russia as they have
the U.S. and Europe. Finally, GOR efforts may have struck a
positive chord with the country's large Muslim minority,
although most working level MFA officials and experts
discount the role and importance of Russia's Muslim
population in the GOR's foreign policy calculations. End
summary.

Russia's Islamic Offensive
--------------


2. (C) Russia initiated a diplomatic offensive under Putin to
improve relations with the Islamic world, a goal that has
factored into numerous foreign policy decisions, including
the GOR's active role in the MEPP, its relations with "rogue
states" such as Iran and Syria, and diplomacy toward far
flung Muslim countries from the Persian Gulf to Southeast
Asia. Russia's Islamic offensive marked a significant aspect
of the reorientation of Russian foreign policy under Putin,
who sought to reassert Russia's international role by moving
away from what many Russians consider the "discredited"
Western orientation of Russian policy in the 1990s and
restoring the nation's "global reach." Russia seized an
opportunity in the tarnished U.S. image among Muslims as a
result of the "War on Terror" and invasion of Iraq. Although
Russia shared the U.S. goal of defeating terrorism and
securing Afghanistan, GOR opposition to Iraq and its more
conciliatory approach to settling the Iranian nuclear issue
allowed Russia to present itself as a partner to Muslim
states and counterbalance to the U.S.


3. (C) Russia also highlighted its considerable Muslim
population to underscore a "natural and special relationship"
with the Muslim world. Russia's significant Muslim minority,
estimated at 15 percent, or 21 million of its 142 million
people, allows the GOR to play up Russia's "special status"
as a multi-denominational country located somewhere between
the West and Islam. The GOR seeks to straddle the Christian
and Muslim worlds much the way it positions itself a Eurasian
power balancing the West and the East. Russia is attempting
to play the role of "bridge" or "mediator" in international
affairs, including in the MEPP where it maintained
communications with Hamas while other countries isolated the
Palestinian faction, and used its relationship with Damascus
to ensure Syria's participation in the Annapolis summit (ref
A).


4. (C) Russia saw its claim to be a multi-denominational
country vindicated when it was granted observer status in the
OIC in 2005. The GOR was also able to convince the Saudis to
increase significantly the annual quota for Russian pilgrims
to Mecca (possibly by inflating the true number of Russian
Muslims),thereby enhancing the Russian presence in the
Middle East and satisfying Russia's Muslim leadership.
Domestically, GOR efforts helped convince Muslim leaders to
back Putin politically, but also emboldened Muslims whose
increasing use of "Muslim Russia" alarmed non-Muslims and may
have contributed to a nationalist backlash against Muslims'
increased public profile.

A Dialogue, Not a Clash of Civilizations
--------------


5. (C) Russia's Islamic offensive has been a mix of official
diplomatic efforts and quasi-official public diplomacy. In a
January address to Muslim diplomats, Foreign Minister Lavrov
highlighted recent Russian diplomacy by citing Putin's 2007
trips to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar, the UAE, and Indonesia
as evidence of the "close interaction" between Russia and
Islamic states. "There are no political, ideological or
other controversies in our relations," said Lavrov, who also
spoke of Russia and the Islamic world as "partners" fighting
terrorism and settling regional crises. Also in January, the
current Chairman of the Russian Mufti Council, Sheik Ravil
Gaynutdin, went to Malaysia to meet Prime Minister Badawi and
told an international conference on Islamic civilization that
Malaysian society presented an example for Russian Muslims
how to combine modernization with Islam while rejecting
extremism.


6. (C) Russian public diplomacy uses a variety of tools to
reach the Muslim world, including cable TV channel Russia
Today's Arabic service begun in 2005. Moscow also
established the Russia-Muslim World Strategic Vision Group in
2006 to bring together representatives of Russia and Islamic
nations. Although the first meeting was held with great
fanfare under former Prime Minister Yevginy Primakov,
participants complained that the organization was just
another talking shop and the initiative appears to have
"fizzled out," according to RIA Novesti political commentator
Marianna Belenkaya, who told us that Russia's Islamic
offensive produced real results in the realm of politics and
trade but little when it came to settling the "clash of
civilizations."


7. (C) The "Dialogue of Civilizations" (DOC) has been a more
lasting effort to promote ties with Muslims, thanks in part
to the salutary impact on the business interests of its
founder, Russian Railways President Vladimir Yakunin.
Established in 2002 as a Russian answer to Davos that offers
an "alternative model of globalization" and promotes
dialogue, this ostensible NGO is tied to the Kremlin through
Yakunin, a close friend of Putin who was considered for a
time a possible presidential successor. Offering a variety
of programs, the DOC remains focused on providing Russian
officials a platform to further relations with the Muslim
world by holding seminars and presenting awards to figures
such as former Iranian President Khatami and Jordanian King
Abdullah. Yakunin most recently led a large Russian
delegation to Bahrain in January for a conference on
religious dialogue. He was accompanied by Deputy Foreign
Minister Saltanov, who used the opportunity to promote the
GOR's idea for a security and cooperation organization in the
Persian Gulf (ref B).

Russia's Gain: Political and Economic Ties
--------------


8. (C) Putin's historic trips to Muslim states, followed by
other GOR officials' visits, were reciprocated by
representatives of Muslim states, ranging from Saudi princes
to Bangladeshi ministers and Lebanese parliamentarians, who
have become a regular presence in Moscow. The real payoff
for Russia has been the possibility of energy deals and arms
sales. Trade and investment were high on the agenda during
recent visits by Algerian President Boutefilka and Jordanian
King Abdullah, as well as FM Lavrov's December trip to Libya
(refs C and D). Yakunin has seen particular benefits, with
Russian Railways winning a $800 million contract to build a
new rail line in Saudi Arabia, a $500 million contract to
modernize rail lines in Algeria, and interest from Jordan and
Libya.


9. (C) In Southeast Asia, Russian diplomacy has been
particularly focused on trade: Putin's 2007 trip to
Indonesia saw the signing of contracts for Russian companies
to invest $4 billion in Indonesian energy and mining projects
and an arms deal worth $1 billion (ref E). In 2008, Russia
delivered the latest consignment of Sukhoi fighters to
Malaysia as part of a $900 million contract. Russian goals
were not simply economic, according to Russian and Asian
diplomats, who said the GOR was also anxious to enhance
political ties with Indonesia and Malaysia, two large and
influential Muslim nations that helped Russian entry into the
OIC.

Russia's Gain: Enhanced Security?
--------------


10. (C) Improved political relations with Muslim states have
strengthened Russian security to a certain degree. After
improving ties with the Gulf States, the GOR convinced the
Saudis and Kuwaitis to stop funding Chechen separatists,
while better monitoring aid that helps Russian Muslims build
mosques and educational centers (ref F). Moscow has also
seen Middle Eastern states embrace Chechen President Kadyrov
and promise support for reconstructing his war-torn republic
(ref G). Moscow analysts disagree to what extent Russia's
relations with the Muslim world have also helped shield it
from international Islamic extremists. Some argue that to
accomplish this, Moscow significantly toned down its public
support of U.S.-led anti-terrorism efforts, although Russia
still supports their goals. Both Carnegie Moscow Center
analyst Aleksey Malashenko and Muslim expert Ruslan Kurbanov
disagreed with this assessment, and said that Islamic
radicals have not forgotten Moscow's early and vocal support
of American anti-terrorism measures, which, combined with
Russia's repressive Caucasus policy, demonstrated to
extremists Russia's "real" views on Islam.

Are Russia's Muslims a Factor?
--------------


11. (C) How Russia's Muslim population factors into the GOR's
Islamic diplomacy remains unclear, although it most likely
plays only a nominal role. Some working-level MFA officials
and diplomats from Muslim countries have said that
maintaining equanimity with domestic Muslims was a goal, and
pointed to GOR support for increased contacts between
Russia's Muslim leadership and visiting Muslim officials as
evidence. However, others dismissed this idea, including
Jordan Desk Officer Andrey Vavilov, who said he doubted the
Kremlin thought of domestic Muslims when making foreign
policy, beyond immediate implications for Chechnya. Fadi
Ziadeh of the Lebanese Embassy added that Russian Muslims had
little sense of solidarity with Muslims overseas, as
evidenced by the lack of demonstrations by Russian Muslims
against the war in Iraq or Israeli military action against
Hezbollah or Hamas, which one typically saw in Muslim
countries.

Domestic Implications
--------------


12. (C) Discerning the domestic impact of Russia's Islamic
offensive was difficult, admitted Middle East expert Georgiy
Mirskiy of the Institute of Higher Economics. While for
typical Russian Muslims, like their Slavic/Orthodox
compatriots, Russia's foreign policy is not a priority, they
feel a growing "sense of solidarity" with the larger Muslim
world. This trend, however, did not translate into a need to
improve Russian relations with far flung Islamic states, but
meant that Russia could not appear indifferent to the Muslim
world, or, even worse, appear to ally itself with the
"anti-Islamic West," argued Mirskiy. To avoid this problem
and satisfy Russian Muslims, the GOR could point to its
healthy relations with Islamic states and observer status in
the OIC. RIA Novesti commentator Belenkaya took a similar
view, and added that GOR "Islamic diplomacy" was meant to
provide "insurance" against the growth of extremism within
its own borders. Boris Makarenko of the Center for Political
Technologies stressed that Russia's centralized political
system precludes domestic Muslims' influence over Kremlin
foreign policy, but the GOR was mindful of the reaction of
Muslims to policy toward the Islamic world.


13. (C) Muslim expert and political affairs editor of the
magazine "Smisl" Ruslan Kurbanov told us he did not believe
the GOR's Islamic offensive had been effective with Russia's
practicing Muslims, who viewed Russia through the prism of
its violent history in the Caucuses. Kurbanov estimated that
only ten percent of Russia's Muslims could be considered
religious, most of whom lived in the Caucuses and were at the
greatest risk of extremism. Kurbanov observed a significant
"misunderstanding" between devout Russian Muslims who saw
Russia as an enemy of Islam and foreigners who considered
Russia an historical ally with the Arab world since the USSR
era. Russia's enhanced Islamic diplomacy might appeal to
foreign Muslims, but failed to persuade Russia's religious
Muslims. Kurbanov believed that GOR foreign policy had
little impact on secular Muslims who did not identify
strongly with Muslims overseas; only domestic policies
helpful to Russian Muslims would appeal to this segment of
society.

Comment
--------------


14. (C) On balance, Russia's Islamic offensive seems to have
yielded positive results for the GOR as an aspiring global
actor. Russia's deepened contacts with Muslim states will
allow it to play an increasing, and at times, decisive, role
in regional conflicts and on the world stage.
BURNS