MEDVEDEV: WHAT HE SAYS, WHAT HE DOES

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000589

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PINR RS
SUBJECT: MEDVEDEV: WHAT HE SAYS, WHAT HE DOES

REF: MOSCOW 431

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: During the two months that separate Dmitriy
Medvedev's election March 2 from his inauguration, much will
become clear about his power-sharing arrangement with
outgoing President and incoming Prime Minister Putin.
Following keynote speeches by Medvedev before fellow lawyers,
civil society representatives, and Siberian elites, an
extended magazine interview, and comments to the press and
voters at various venues around the country, Medvedev the
President is beginning to come into focus. The local media
have been filled with articles --some hopeful, others
dismissive-- that make reference to the "thaw" experienced
under then-General Secretary Khrushchev in attempting to
frame a Medvedev presidency based on the scant information
available. Dramatic change seems unlikely, but some of
Medvedev's comments suggest a different vector for Russia
after May 7. What follows is a partial list of possible
changes to watch for after Russia's third President takes
office. End summary.

Rule of Law
--------------


2. (C) Medvedev has scored the importance of an independent
judiciary in his frequent references to the dangers posed by
"legal nihilism." His remedies for the problems posed by
Russia's dysfunctional court system have ranged from sweeping
social change, which would have citizens become more
law-abiding, to ending the practice of "telephone law," to
urging judges to restrict their contacts with the business
world. He has also proposed that citizens be compensated for
losses incurred through judicial error and mis-application of
the law. In possible anticipation of a Medvedev presidency
the Head of the Federal Prison System proposed this week
measures that would allow prisoners convicted of less serious
crimes to serve their sentences outside prison.


3. (C) With the judiciary --along with the absence of a free
press, and a hamstrung civil society-- acting as a drag on
the development of democracy and providing an environment in
which corruption can flourish, any steps Medvedev would take
to insulate judges from outside pressure and increase the
transparency of the legal process would be important. A
first such step might be seeing through to passage a bill,
that has already passed its first reading in the Duma, that
would increase the transparency of the judiciary by
facilitating citizen access to court hearings and documents.
Medvedev's legal background would make this a natural
stepping off place.

Bureaucrats Out of Business
--------------


4. (C) In addition to the specific economic measures promoted
in his February 15 Krasnoyarsk speech (reftel),Medvedev has
argued that the practice of unqualified civil servants
simultaneously working in state corporations should come to
an end. Measures taken to end the institutionalized conflict
of interest would be an important development in the battle
against corruption.


5. (C) Medvedev in Krasnoyarsk returned twice to the subject
of small businesses, noting that the opportunity cost of
starting a small business should be reduced, and calling for
a "radical simplification of tax responsibilities."

Bureaucrats Out of the Bureaucracy
--------------


6. (C) Medvedev has argued that functions currently
accomplished by the bureaucracy be privatized, where
appropriate. As he said in Krasnoyarsk: "A significant part
of the functions performed by the government must be
transferred to the private sector." As important, has been
Medvedev's repeated assertion that the balance of power
between government and society must change, with civil
servants understanding that they are accountable to Russian
citizens, and not the other way around. This theme has run
through Medvedev's comments on the judiciary, regulations
governing business start-ups, and taxation. On Putin's
watch, the number of civil servants has grown by leaps and
bounds, as have the benefits they enjoy. With the growing
size and influence of the civil service has come a shift
among young job seekers. Polls regularly show that they
prefer a career in the civil service to one in the private
sector. Reversing the trend of more public sector employees
and doing more --another Medvedev desirable-- to simplify job
creation in the private sector, would help indirectly restore
the balance of power between the state and its citizens.

Civil Society
--------------


7. (C) In comments while in Nizhniy Novgorod on February 27,
Medvedev touched on the subject of non-governmental
organizations. Unlike Putin, who has routinely issued harsh
warnings about foreign financing of NGOs, Medvedev tone was
considerably more moderate. He told his audience that NGO
funding should not come "only" from abroad, by way of urging
greater philanthropy and the development of civil society in
Russia. Reduced pressure on existing NGOs and an effort to
suspend some of the more onerous reporting provisions of the
current NGO, along the lines detailed in Human Rights Watch
recent 2008 report on the NGO sector, would be a step in the
right direction and would respond to calls by the Human
Rights Ombudsman and Chairwoman of the President's Human
Rights Council.

Corruption
--------------


8. (C) Medvedev has spoken often of the need to root out
corruption, which has worsened significantly on Putin's watch
and is acting as a significant drag on the economy. On
February 27, he promised that a plan for fighting corruption
would be ready "in a few months," and would include not just
legislative measures, but also measures intended to create an
"atmosphere of no tolerance" for corruption. The plan
Medvedev was likely referring to was the package of measures
being prepared by an intra-governmental team headed by Viktor
Ivanov to implement Russia's adoption of the UN COE
conventions against corruption. Any comprehensive effort to
attack corruption would be welcome after months of piecemeal
attacks, many of which seemed to have more to do with
settling political scores than reducing corruption itself.

Less Brezhnevian Television
--------------


9. (C) The television news under Putin has not become the
"dog-walking hour" it was during the Soviet period only
because urban Russians now have DVDs to watch and the
internet to scour for the news. Loosening the reins on tv,
to allow a wider spectrum of viewpoints would send an
important signal. Medvedev opened his key Krasnoyarsk policy
speech with a paean to "freedom," and elsewhere in the speech
spoke of the necessity of "the real independence of the mass
media, in order to create a channel of communication between
society and the authorities." Allowing on television even
moderate critics of the current administration would be an
important first step, as would be fewer news hours devoted to
the doings of the President.

Less Putinesque Rhetoric
--------------


10. (C) It has been frequently pointed out the Medvedev comes
from a different social stratum --what used to be called the
"technical intelligentsia"-- than Putin, whose more working
class background shows in his fondness for earthy
expressions. The difference in upbringing alone should
produce a difference in tone with Medvedev at the helm,
including less vilification of Russia's "enemies" abroad, and
less recourse to instruments like "Nashi" and the extravagant
use of special forces troops to deal with groups like Other
Russia domestically.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) As critics have noted, Medvedev's calls for greater
freedom, two-way channels of communication between society
and government, reduced corruption, tamed bureaucrats, strong
civil society, and a less cumbersome tax regime were
frequently issued by Putin during his two terms as President
to little effect. The initial months of a Medvedev
presidency should allow observers to take the measure of his
seriousness. Although Medvedev and Putin during the
succession have been at pains to suggest that they will work
as equals as President and Prime Minister, in one revealing
comment during his "Itogi" interview, Medvedev insisted that
Russia will remain a presidential republic with the decisive
power in his hands after May 7. Meaningful change in some of
the areas sketched above, after years of regression or
stagnation under Putin, would suggest that Medvedev is
serious about realizing the vision of Russia he has sketched
during the campaign.
BURNS