MEDVEDEV MENDS BELGRADE FENCES, AFFIRMS CONTINUITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000539

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2018
TAGS: PREL SR KV RS
SUBJECT: MEDVEDEV MENDS BELGRADE FENCES, AFFIRMS CONTINUITY
ON KOSOVO

REF: A. MOSCOW 50

B. MOSCOW 251

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells: reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary: In the wake of scandalous comments by a
Russian TV commentator calling the assassination of former
Serbian PM Djindjic "well-deserved," First Deputy PM Dmitriy
Medvedev and FM Lavrov traveled to Belgrade on February 25 to
mend fences, reiterate Russia's support for Serbian
territorial integrity, and affirm the continuation of Russian
foreign policy in the Balkans during Medvedev's (presumed)
presidency. The MFA insisted that Medvedev's brief meeting
with Republika Srpska PM Dodik in Belgrade focused on support
for Dayton. During the visit, Gazprom signed an agreement
with Serbian gas company Srbijagas to start performing
studies for the South Stream route. Analysts viewed this as
an easy foreign policy "solo" for Medvedev, given the Russian
political consensus on the illegitimacy of Kosovo's
independence. Russian officials and press remained hostile
to U.S. policy towards Kosovo, harshly criticizing U.S.
characterizations of Russian policy and predicting an
increase in separatist movemen
ts and related terrorism. Russian NATO envoy clarified that

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Russia would not use force in Kosovo. End Summary.

Medvedev and Lavrov Mend Fences in Belgrade
--------------


2. (C) On February 25, First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitriy
Medvedev and FM Lavrov visited Belgrade, in the first "solo"
foreign policy outing by the Russian presidential heir
apparent. Serbian Embassy Political Counselor Boris Sekulic
described the visit to us as hastily arranged, coming in
response to scandalous comments by Russian reporter
Konstantin Semin during a February 21 broadcast on a
state-owned television station, to the effect that the
Western-leaning Serbian former PM Djindjic's assassination
was a "well-earned bullet" for "selling heroes of the Serbian
Resistance to the Hague." Calling Djindjic a "Western
puppet," who dismembered the Serbian Army, Semin went on to
insinuate that Tadic was following Djindjic's legacy of
selling out to the West.


3. (C) The Serbian Foreign Ministry demanded a formal
apology from the state television channel, calling Semin's
comments "offensive" and "justifying the murder of a
democratically elected leader." MFA Serbia Desk Chief Denis
Kuznedelev told us that Serbian FM Jeremic called Lavrov to
complain and received an apology, as well as Lavrov's public
statement that Semin's comments were "nonsense and his own
opinion." (Note: Semin is also author of several attacks on
the U.S., including the documentary "Empire of Good," which
equated the promotion of democracy with the extension of U.S.
hegemony.) Sekulic told us that Serbian officials were
skeptical that Semin's comments could air on a state-owned
channel and not be "someone's" position, if not the official
government line. He told us that the Serbian Embassy has
submitted a formal note of complaint to the television
station asking for an apology, but had not received an answer
and that no action had been taken against Semin. Russian
media widely reported th
e outrage in Serbia provoked by Semin's comments.

Medvedev Burnishes Foreign Policy Credentials
--------------


4. (C) According to reports from the Kremlin press pool,
Medvedev faced a frosty first session with President Tadic,
who was not on hand at the airport for Medvedev's arrival and
who kept Putin's successor waiting for his first meeting.
Medvedev did the needful, apologizing for Semin's comments
and reaffirming Russian support for Serbian territorial
integrity. Kuznedelev told us the Medvedev reassured both
Tadic and PM Kostunica that Russia would continue to
recognize Serbia's "internationally recognized borders,"
obstruct Kosovo's entry into international organizations such
as the OSCE and Council of Europe, and support stability in
northern Kosovo. He told us that Medvedev's visit signaled
that Russian foreign policy towards Serbia would remain
consistent under his presumed presidency. Kuznedelev
confirmed that Medvedev met with Republika Srpska PM Dodik as
well, but said only that they "talked about upholding the
Dayton Accords." Russian press reports contrasted Tadic's
aloofness with PM Kostunica's
effusive welcome of Medvedev.


5. (SBU) During the visit, Gazprom chief Alexey Miller and
his counterpart from Serbia's state-owned gas company
Srbijagas signed an agreement to start the process of
performing feasibility studies for a proposed extension of
the South Stream gas pipeline through Serbia. The agreement

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follows up on an "Umbrella Intergovernmental Agreement" on
the same project, signed during Tadic and Kostunica's visit
to Moscow last month, but does not yet establish the company,
to be 51% owned by Gazprom, that would own and operate the
pipeline on Serbian territory. The deal is related to a
separate agreement paving the way for Gazprom Neft to acquire
51% of Serbia's national oil and gas monopoly, NIS. Visiting
Hungary after Serbia, Russian officials reportedly reached
agreement on the transit through Hungarian territory of the
South Stream pipeline, which is expected to be signed in
Moscow in the coming week. Both agreements, however, still
appear very preliminary in nature, and the Serbian Embassy
here has taken pains
to emphasize to us that the terms of the deal can be
revisited.


6. (C) Analysts we spoke to emphasized that, notwithstanding
the alleged frosty atmosphere with Tadic, this was an easy
foreign policy venture for the president presumptive, given
the unanimous Russian official and public support for Putin's
rejection of Kosovo's independence. Director of the
Kremlin-friendly Center for Political Technology Igor Bunin
reiterated that Medvedev's visit answered the Russian
public's demand for continuity on this foreign policy issue.
The liberal editor of "Russia in Global Affairs" Fyodor
Lukyanov dismissed the notion that the visit reflected
Medvedev's status as a "puppet" of Putin, arguing that "the
trip does not tell you anything about Medvedev's future
strength as president, but tells you everything about
Russia's views on Kosovo."

Russia Accuses U.S. of Cynicism
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7. (U) Russian commentary on western recognition of Kosovo
remains harsh. In a February 24 press statement, the MFA
responded harshly to U.S. criticism of Russia's stance,
labeling the U.S. policy "cynical." The statement charged
that the U.S. "openly humiliates the Serbian people," tied
"Belgrade's Euro-Atlantic prospects...to Serbia's
dismemberment," and resulted in 100,000 Serbs being driven
into modern-day ghettoes. It denied that Russia was isolated
on Kosovo, noting that "most countries" would prefer a legal
solution based on compromise. The statement also rebutted
doubts on Russia's contributions to Kosovo's settlement,
noting that Russia withdrew peacekeepers in 2004 because of
"principled disagreement with the unilateral tilt in Kosovo
affairs."

Russian Officials Foresee More Separatism
--------------


8. (SBU) Presidential Envoy for Counterterrorism Safronov
stated that Kosovo's independence had the potential for
"setting in motion dangerous trends" and foresaw an increase
in separatist movements and terrorist acts. Likening the
West's support of Kosovo to the 1938 Munich Agreement,
Safronov warned that Kosovo could "unleash a powerful force
of destruction" with unforeseen consequences. He said that
"the trigger has been cocked, and nobody knows what kind of
short will be fired and when." MFA Special Envoy for the
Balkins Botsan-Kharchenko said that the current situation in
Kosovo "may lead to the isolation of the Kosovar Serbs" which
"could lead to the actual division of Kosovo."


9. (SBU) Russian media continues to worry about the opening
of "Pandora's box." News listed some of the "200" possible
trouble spots, ranging from Republika Srpska to Scotland, and
some presenters have posited that "world order may be
collapsing." Commentators argue that fewer countries have
recognized Kosovo than the U.S. planned, noting specifically
that no CIS country, including allies such as Georgia, have
recognized Kosovo. Even liberal publications continue to
refer to Kosovo as the "mutinous region."


10. (SBU) Liberal Democratic Party leader Zhirinovskiy,
known for his hyperbolic statements, said on February 25 that
the "U.S. will try to separate Russia," using the precedent
of Kosovo. As reported in Russian press, Zhirinovskiy said
that the U.S. will "urge" Russia to recognize Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, and then support the independence of the North
Caucasus republics of Russia. Zhirinovskiy supported Russian
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but worried that
would cause retaliation in the form of Western recognition of
Chechnya and Kabardino-Balkaria.

Rogozin Clarifies: No Force in Kosovo
--------------


11. (C) Russian envoy to NATO Rogozin "clarified" his
comments from a February 22 press conference, stating that
Russia "would never use force" to solve the Kosovo problem.

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Rogozin's statements had been widely interpreted in the press
as advocating the use of force to restore international law.
Sekulic told us that Kostunica asked Putin last year, at a
meeting in St. Petersburg, if Putin would provide
peacekeeping forces "if the situation in Kosovo grew
violent." While Sekulic said that he did not know Putin's
reply, MFA officials have previously ruled out the
possibility in meetings with us.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) While Russia's stance towards the frozen conflicts
in the wake of Kosovo's independence remains shrouded in
ambiguity, its support for Serbia's territorial integrity is
unambiguous. This was an easy foreign policy turn for
Medvedev, designed to show that he can fill Putin's shoes on
the international stage and operate beyond his Gazprom brief.
BURNS