ENCOURAGING RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 000520

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2018
TAGS: MARR MCAP PGOV PINS PREL MASS RU AF
SUBJECT: ENCOURAGING RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN

REF: A. 07 MOSCOW 5208

B. 07 MOSCOW 5828

C. 07 MOSCOW 4929

D. 07 MOSCOW 5098

E. 07 MOSCOW 5735

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (c) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Russia is ready to do more to assist in
stabilizing and rebuilding Afghanistan - a key area of
overlapping Russian, U.S. and NATO interests. Absent
concerted U.S. effort, however, Russian attempts to
constructively engage with the Karzai government likely will
continue to founder on historical neuralgia and bureaucratic
difficulties, reinforcing the predispositions of those here
with less constructive instincts. At the same time, a
willingness by the U.S. and NATO to engage practically with
the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) could
provide the key to unlocking more productive Russian
assistance on counternarcotics, military equipment
grants/sales, counterterrorism, transport, terrorist finance,
and border security. We believe that a broad high-level
discussion, perhaps in the March 2 Plus 2 consultations
between Secretary Rice and Gates and their Russian
counterparts, should set the stage for expert level
understandings on how best to achieve shared goals in
Afghanistan, which are acceptable to the Afghan government.
The weakness of the still-evolving CSTO, the lack of trust
between Russia and Afghanistan, and equipment
interoperability are among the factors that will determine
the ultimate level of success. End Summary.

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Congruent Interests Drive Russian Cooperation
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2. (C) Russian officials at the highest levels tell us that
they want to cooperate on Afghanistan, bilaterally and
multilaterally. At the 2007 CSTO summit in Bishkek, Putin
stated Russia supports greater cooperation between the CSTO
and NATO in Afghanistan. First Deputy Prime Minister Sergey
Ivanov, speaking at Wehrkunde this year, underscored Russia's
position that on Afghanistan, the U.S. and Russia should be
partners and not competitors. According to Ivanov, Russia
viewed U.S. and NATO efforts in the areas of
counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and political stability
in Afghanistan as somewhat positive but insufficient.
Ivanov's public argument, which he has underscored in private
with the Ambassador, is that the U.S. and NATO have yet to
recognize that Russia's contribution in these areas was
essential. In a February 12 speech in Geneva, FM Lavrov
reiterated Russia's willingness to help NATO fight the
threats posed by terrorists and narcotics in Afghanistan, and
underscored how real these threats were to Russia. Russia's
new Ambassador to NATO, Dmitriy Rogozin - who hails from the
U.S. baiting, Russian nationalist camp -- told us before
departing that he was focused on finding more areas for NATO
and Russia to work jointly (ref A).


3. (C) GOR officials acknowledge that the U.S. is the main
player in Afghanistan, but stress they share our strategic
goal: a peaceful and stable Afghanistan that is not a
Taliban safe haven and narcotics exporter. Ali Mustafabeily,
Deputy Director of the MFA Second Asia Department, went so
far as to say that by working together in Afghanistan the
U.S. and Russia could form a collective "fist" to face down
our common enemies. This sentiment is shared by officials
from the GOR-backed CSTO, including Secretary General Nikolai
Bordyuzha, as well as by the Russian expert community, who
identify an unstable Afghanistan, and not the U.S. or NATO,
as the only major threat to CSTO member states. Along with
GOR officials, they note that there are no major areas of
dispute with the U.S. regarding goals for Afghanistan.
Anatoly Chuntulov, Counselor of the CSTO's Department of
Political Cooperation and Valery Dergachev, Deputy Head,
repeatedly stressed to us that the CSTO, the main vehicle for
which the GOR has chosen to funnel its aid to Afghanistan
(ref B),poses no threat to U.S. interests, and urged the
U.S. and NATO to engage with the organization, despite the
fact that its member-states are also members of the
Partnership For Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council.


4. (C) We assess that Russia is ready to do more in
Afghanistan, recognizing that there are a host of other
motivations at work as well. Russia seeks to maintain

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influence in Central Asia, make inroads into potential
commercial and energy markets, check Chinese influence, and
demonstrate that Russia has not ceded strategic space
permanently to the U.S. and NATO. What Russia does not seek
is a military presence in Afghanistan, which still conjures
painful memories of imperial defeat and the degradation of
the Soviet forces. The GOR recognizes that Russian
translates into Soviet in Afghanistan, where Soviets killed
and maimed over one million Afghan civilians.

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Talking Past One Another
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5. (C) Russia's inability to donate weapons to the Afghan
government is a case-study in why greater U.S. engagement
could help to lock in constructive Russian offers of
bilateral assistance. In March 2007, the GOR told the Karzai
government it was prepared to provide hundreds of millions of
dollars in donated weapons, which could be packaged with
additional sales on concessional terms, but requested a visit
by Defense Minister Wardak to work out the details. Eleven
months after the initial offer and amid mounting MFA
frustration, we called on Afghanistan's Ambassador to Russia,
the former Deputy Foreign Minister Zalmay Aziz, who
acknowledged that Wardak had rebuffed the Russian invitation.
Aziz attributed Wardak's refusal alternately to bureaucratic
infighting within the Afghan Defense Ministry or uncertainty
over the extent and composition of U.S.-origin military aid.


6. (C) Aziz stressed that because of the animosity and lack
of trust between Afghanistan and Russia, GOR aid is not
something many Afghans seek or desire; similarly, Russian
popular and business disinterest in Afghanistan is
illustrated in the scant "six or seven" visas the Embassy
processes weekly. Earlier GOR attempts to aid Afghanistan
have faltered, contributing to understandable Afghan cynicism
about Russia's effectiveness as a partner. For example,
Russia's 2002-2005 Afghan military assistance program ended
before the entire USD 200 million could be delivered (ref C),
and it took over two years for Moscow to dispatch a
long-promised official from its drug enforcement agency to
Kabul. While acknowledging Russia's commitment to rebuild
the Solang tunnel and road leading north, Aziz downplayed
Russian assistance and criticized Russia's refusal to turn
over Soviet-era feasibility studies for industrial and mining
projects. From Aziz's comments, it appears his Moscow
posting is a purgatory of sorts, with the Ambassador not
operating under any writ to capitalize on Russian concerns
over Afghanistan's stability. Aziz confirmed that he is not
brokering a solution to the Wardak-MFA standoff and has not
paid a call on CSTO headquarters.

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Possible Areas of Cooperation
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7. (C) In addition to the U.S. taking steps to facilitate
better communication and cooperation between Russian and
Afghan authorities, officials and experts here have
identified the following areas for Russia and the CSTO to
cooperate with the U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan. In so
doing, they have made clear that increased cooperation with
the U.S. and NATO to a large degree will hinge on our
willingness to work with the CSTO.

Counter-Narcotics
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8. (C) Reducing the influx of narcotics from Afghanistan into
Russia (estimated at 60 metric tons of heroin, which is
equivalent to 600 MT of opium, per year),with its
devastating societal and economic consequences, is a key
Russian priority. The most obvious place to begin expanding
cooperation with Russia on halting the flow of
Afghanistan-origin narcotics is to support the CSTO's
counter-narcotics efforts, including Operation Channel, in
which the U.S. has had observer status for two years. This
consists of two week-long interdiction blitzes each year in
September and December, during which extra personnel are
stationed at critical junctures along Afghan drug routes
through Central Asian states to search for drugs and
precursor chemicals. While the CSTO agreed in March 2007 to
make Operation Channel a year-round operation, it is unclear
when this will actually happen. CSTO officials have
suggested that ISAF forces could coordinate with the CSTO to

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patrol both sides of Afghanistan's border to aid Operation
Channel. The CSTO also announced on January 29 that it will
coordinate border guard activities in an attempt to create
anti-narcotics belts around Afghanistan.


9. (C) We could use a U.S./NATO offer of engagement with CSTO
to expand Operation Channel year-round, addressing its major
weakness of not being comprehensive. CSTO counter-narcotics
officers traditionally have been interested only in seizing
drugs, rather than in recruiting informants, allowing
"controlled deliveries" to track supply routes, or adopting
other tactics Western police departments use to catch "big
fish." NATO-CSTO cooperation potentially could improve CSTO
tactics.


10. (C) Given Operation Channel's current limitations, some
view the Central Asian Regional Intelligence Coordination
Center (CARICC) in Almaty, Kazakhstan, and Russian
involvement therein, as a more promising alternative to
combating narcotics trafficking along the "northern" drug
routes. CARICC is a USD 6.5 million UNODC project with
funding from multiple donors, including the U.S., which works
to develop and promote counter-narcotics efforts among
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
and Uzbekistan. Russia has indicated its intention to
participate, but thus far has not, despite the benefits
Russian membership would bring.

Military Assistance and Counter-Terrorism
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11. (C) Director of the MFA Second Asia Department Director
Aleksandr Maryasov and other GOR officials have reiterated
Russia is ready to work with the Afghan army, either
bilaterally or via the CSTO, to provide it weapons it needs
(ref D). This would include Kalashnikov rifles, T-55 and
T-62 tanks. The GOR and CSTO are also willing to train
Afghan soldiers and patrol along the Afghan border (but not
in Afghanistan).


12. (C) Mustafabeily pointed out to us that Afghans are
familiar with Russian weapons because they fought the Soviet
Army using mostly Soviet-made weapons, such as Kalashnikov
rifles. He said, however, Russia has yet to receive
information regarding what kinds of assistance would be
useful for the Karzai government, and no meeting between
defense ministers for Afghanistan to provide a list of
concrete requests seems likely anytime soon. Ambassador Aziz
told us that the Afghan MoD is waiting to see what military
kit it will receive from NATO before it contemplates taking
Russian equipment. The U.S. could encourage the Karzai
government to follow up on Russia's offer or perhaps propose
multilateral consultations on arms donations.


13. (C) Russia also offers training to the Afghan security
forces in both Moscow and Tajikistan. The All-Russia
Institute for Raising Qualifications for Employees of the
Ministry of Interior (MOI) at Domodedevo Airport in Moscow is
a Russian MoI facility, but is used to provide
counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics training to Afghan
police and border guards (ref E). This training is done
under the auspices of the Nato-Russia Council, but because
Russia is a CSTO member, the CSTO also tries to claim credit
for this. The CSTO has already secured the support of the
OSCE and Finland to train Afghan border guards in Tajikistan.
While CSTO members are invited to participate in this
training, so far this is a Russia-only affair. Russia is
also seeking German support for training at both locations.

Transportation Assistance
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14. (C) Counselor of the CSTO's Department of Political
Cooperation Anatoly Chuntulov and the Deputy Head Valery
Dergachev told us the CSTO is willing to assist in
transporting nonlethal goods for NATO forces in Afghanistan
from as far as Western Europe to the Afghan border via rail.
They told us rail would be cheaper than airlifting supplies
or sending them by ship. They asserted that, while
negotiations in the NATO-Russia Council and NATO Political
Committee are still ongoing, this was a promising prospect
for cooperation and hoped that negotiations would be wrapped
up prior to the Bucharest summit. While Russia dropped its
demand that such a deal be coordinated through the CSTO, it's
not clear whether the GOR will ultimately bend in allowing
military goods to also be included. The CSTO would also like

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to help improve the very limited rail infrastructure in
Afghanistan.

Terrorist Finance
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15. (C) Russia could use its leadership in the Eurasia Group
on Money Laundering, which includes China, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Tajikstan, to help build Afghanistan's anti-money
laundering and anti-terrorist financing capacity. We should
encourage greater collaboration between U.S. law enforcement
officials and Russia's SVR to help identify and interdict
potential terrorist flows to and from Afghanistan.
Opportunities to enhance cooperation between the U.S. and
Russia on UNSCR 1267 related issues should also be explored.

Border Security/Illegal Migration
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16. (C) In addition to enhancing border security through
efforts such as Operation Channel, CSTO Section Chief of the
MFA First CIS Department Andrey Shugurov told us, and experts
agree, that the GOR would like to expand efforts to halt
illegal migration throughout Central Asia, including
Afghanistan. The GOR and CSTO would like to strengthen
border protection through increased patrols and training of
Afghan border guards.

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Obstacles To Cooperation
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17. (C) Obstacles, however, stand in the way of Russian
cooperation in Afghanistan, which would need to be addressed
to effectively cooperate:

Contact With the CSTO
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18. (C) Most GOR aid to Afghanistan is funneled through the
CSTO, an organization with which the U.S. and NATO have been
reluctant to engage, given the organization's ambiguous aims
and relative inactivity. By Shugurov's own admission, the
CSTO is a relatively new and under-funded organization, but
is expected to become more robust. In March 2007, the CSTO
established a working group on Afghanistan and set up a
formal channel of communication with the GOA at the deputy
foreign minister level. Since this mechanism has been
established, the CSTO has implemented programs such as the
training of Afghan counter-narcotics officers in Russia. The
U.S. and NATO would have to be patient and deliberate in its
initial engagement with the organization, while underscoring
that working with the CSTO would not replace our bilateral
engagement with Central Asia, or our cooperation with these
countries through NATO programs.

Interoperability and Compatibility With NATO Efforts
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19. (C) It will require significant coordination to ensure
large-scale training and equipment provided by the CSTO and
Russia would complement, rather than duplicate or complicate,
NATO efforts in Afghanistan. Afghan police and military
units trained by the CSTO and NATO should be able to work
effectively together. Military kit such as radios provided
by the CSTO and NATO should ideally be interoperable. One
further caveat is that Russian counter-terrorist operations
in Beslan and the Nordost assault have demonstrated the
limits of Russian counter-terrorist training.

How Successful Does Russia Want Us to Be?
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20. (C) While the weight of official statements and views of
the expert community support U.S.-Russian cooperation on
Afghanistan, there are naysayers. Some experts such as Ivan
Safranchuk, Director of the World Security Institute, argue
that Russia neither wants the U.S. to succeed nor fail in
Afghanistan. Safranchuk argued that the GOR is concerned
that, if we succeed in Afghanistan, the U.S. will seek
greater control over trade and energy routes from Central
Asia to the Indian Ocean. If the U.S. fails, Afghanistan
will once again be a haven for the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and
instability and extremism could spread throughout the rest of
Central Asia. Similarly, Alexander Shumilin, Director of the
Center for Analysis of Greater Middle East Conflicts, said

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that Russia weighed its interest in cooperation with its need
to be seen as a counterbalance to the United States and would
not want to be too closely linked with American activities.

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Comment/Action
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21. (C) Given apparent Russian and CSTO interest in
cooperating constructively with the U.S. and NATO to
strengthen the Afghanistan government, we should consider the
benefits and scope for such engagement. An additional virtue
in drawing Russia and the CSTO more closely into our efforts
will be to reduce the temptation of Russia to go it alone
with its traditional partners in the North - which is the
direction that the MFA indicated the GOR was headed in the
wake of their inability to coordinate with Kabul over
military assistance. While we defer to Embassy Kabul on how
an enhanced Russian and CSTO assistance program might be
greeted by the Karzai government, a side-effect of creative
cooperation on Afghanistan could be a strengthening of
U.S.-Russian relations, at a time of significant strain. The
upcoming 2 Plus 2 discussions by the Secretary and Secretary
Gates would tee up more extensive expert level agreements on
how best to achieve shared goals in Afghanistan, which are
acceptable to the Afghan government.
BURNS