KEMEROVO OBLAST: KREMLIN LOYALTY IN SIBERIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000483

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2018
TAGS: PGOV KDEM SOCI RS
SUBJECT: KEMEROVO OBLAST: KREMLIN LOYALTY IN SIBERIA

REF: 07 MOSCOW 5796

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reason: 1.4 (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) In the ten years he has been governor in Kemerovo,
Aman-Geldy Tuleyev has garnered vast popular support and been
among the most successful of provincial leaders in tacking
with the prevailing political winds, delivering a
near-Caucasus turnout to the ruling party. During meetings
in the Kemerovo region February 13-15, interlocutors agreed
almost unanimously that Tuleyev is a seasoned politician who
has led the oblast with skill. Tuleyev came to power as a
Communist under Yeltsin, but has survived by migrating to
United Russia in 2005. He demonstrated his loyalty to the
Kremlin in the December State Duma elections by delivering
the vote for United Russia. Tuleyev has enhanced his public
support and Kremlin backing by latching onto the national
programs that are a national pedestal for presidential
shoe-in Dmitriy Medvedev. Some observers in the region
believe that Tuleyev's longevity as governor has been
purchased at the expense of programs, like coal safety, that,
recent accidents show, need to be addressed. End summary.

Overfulfilling the Plan
--------------


2. (U) Results from the December 2, 2007, Duma elections set
Kemerovo apart from its neighbors in Siberia. Turnout on
election day in Kemerovo was 77 percent, 14 percent higher
than the national turnout and significantly higher than in
other Siberian regions of Russia. Similarly, 77 percent of
the vote cast in Kemerovo Oblast went to United Russia, about
12 percentage points higher than the national average and
significantly higher than its neighbors in the region. Only
seven percent of the local vote went to the Communist Party,
4 percent below the national average and significantly below
the results in a region traditionally seen as a Communist
stronghold. Although turnout and support for United Russia
did not reach Caucasus-level proportions (reftel),the
significant deviation from surrounding regions raised
questions about possible election fraud or falsification.

Tuleyev: Powerful, Popular and Flexible
--------------


3. (C) United Russia leaders at the City and Oblast Councils
of People's Deputies, and even the local representative from
the Communist Party insisted that Tuleyev enjoyed the vast
public support suggested by the returns for United Russia on
December 2. Dmitriy Shagiakhmetov, Editor of the independent
Nasha Gazeta newspaper, disagreed and alleged that elements
in the oblast government had falsified the December election
results in an effort to "overfulfill the plan" for the
Kremlin's party. However, even without falsification, he
admitted United Russia easily received more than 50 percent
of the vote in the oblast.


4. (C) Our contacts said Tuleyev's success in concentrating
power in his office and his prominent public image presaged
Putin's cult of personality. Shagiakhmetov gave Tuleyev
credit for skillfully adapting to political necessity. In
1997, Tuleyev had cast his lot with Boris Yeltsin, who
appointed him to the then-vacant post of governor. In 2005,
Tuleyev abandoned the Communist Party for United Russia and
was again rewarded when Putin nominated him for another term.
Recently, Tuleyev has courted Medvedev by whole-heartedly
supporting the national projects that Putin's heir-apparent
has shepherded since 2005. All contacts with whom we spoke
considered him a successful and charismatic governor.


5. (C) Aleksandr Kurasov, Head of the Regional Executive
Committee of United Russia, suggested that more people in the
oblast cast their vote for United Russia in the State Duma
elections on December 2 because Tuleyev headed the local list
than because Putin headed the national list. Kurasov used
the same argument to explain why United Russia received a
substantially larger percentage in Kemerovo in neighboring
regions. He also provided a standard critique of the other
parties in the Duma: Zhirinovskiy's LDPR and the Communist
Party talk, he said, while United Russia delivers. He felt
that even with a minority position in the State Duma and the
Kemerovo Council of People's Deputies, LDPR and the Communist
Party could affect the outcomes of national and local
projects. However, he said they offer no alternative to
"Plan Putin."


6. (C) Yelena Surikova, Editor in Chief of the Sibirskaya
Voskresnaya Gazeta, likened the administration in Kemerovo to
the national government: the governor closely controls
political and economic activity in the oblast. Kemerovo's
media, like the national media, have been closely controlled
by the administration, although her newspaper, along with its
sister-paper Nasha Gazeta, provide an independent point of
view. Finally, she noted that the regional administration
runs a tight ship with little or no public discussion of
important political questions.


7. (C) Sergey Birukov, a professor of regional political
science at Kemerovo State University, said that the governor
dominates all spheres of politics in Kemerovo but added that
the people seemed to like this dominance. Over the past ten
years, the oblast has experienced stability and economic
growth like much of the rest of Russia. According to him,
the voters are reluctant to disrupt the status quo. Recent
electoral successes were less an endorsement of the governor
or Putin but more a vote for continued prosperity.

No Serious Opposition To Tuleyev...
--------------


8. (C) Viktor Artemov, leader of the local Communist Party
and member of the Kemerovo City Council of People's Deputies,
in a February 14 conversation was more enthusiastic about
Tuleyev than about Communist Party Chairman Zyuganov.
Zyuganov had antagonized the governor while the Communist
Party in the region had worked well with Tuleyev in
developing social programs, improving roads and enhancing
veterans' benefits. The Communist Party's "shouting and
complaining," not fraud, had won it scant support in
December.

...But Quiet Unease With His Rule
--------------


9. (C) Shagiakhmetov noted, however, the downsides of
Tuleyev's grip on the region. The officials in Tuleyev's
administration "don't love him (the governor)" and talk ill
of him behind his back, but they all depend on him for their
positions. According to Shagiakhmetov, Tuleyev had gone
through three deputies in the past five years. He suggested
that these deputies were not incompetent or inexperienced but
had begun to oppose the governor's priorities or policies --
a situation the governor could not abide. The personalities
at the top of the political and party organizations have
reached and maintained their positions because they have been
able to adapt to changing political winds and have supported
the governor whatever the weather.


10. (C) In the present environment, Shagiakhmetov saw little
chance that an opposition would emerge. After so many years
in power and such firm control of the government institutions
and the media, Tuleyev had created a very potent public image
of himself as a providing father. Shagiakhmetov dismissed
the "opposition" Communist Party, saying that the local
branch often supports Tuleyev's administration. He also
dismissed the image of an effective administration presented
in the local press. Efforts to increase the housing stock
and improvements in health care were window dressing. In the
areas of worker safety (a pressing problem in the nearby coal
mines) and economic diversification, the oblast
administration had not developed any effective initiatives.

National Projects Trump Local Issues
--------------


11. (C) Tuleyev has skillfully curried favor with the
Kremlin by enthusiastically supporting Medvedev's national
projects, most notably "Affordable Housing." Many locals
told us about the construction of Lesnaya Polyana, a new
"satellite city" ten kilometers outside Kemerovo. The project
will provide housing for 30,000 people. New residents took
occupancy in September 2007. Medvedev has closely followed
the progress at Lesnaya Polyana and even visited the site in
the fall of 2007. Faina Konstantinova, Chairperson of the
Kemerovo Oblast Council of Peoples' Deputies, highlighted
this development as one of the reasons for Tuleyev's and
Medvedev's popularity. Shagiakhmetov dampened enthusiasm for
this project claiming, it had been built as a showcase for
Medvedev's affordable housing project and was not an adequate
response to the problem of affordable housing.


12. (C) In contrast to this high-visibility project, both
Shagiakhmetov and Birukov noted that serious local issues are
often left by the wayside. In particular they noted that
much talk was heard about mine safety after several coal mine
accidents; however, neither saw much progress on the issue.
On March 19, 2007, 110 miners died in a methane blast at the
Ulyanovskaya coal mine in Kemerovo. On May 24, 2007, an
additional 39 miners died in a similar accident at another
Kemerovo mine. In our discussions with Kemerovo Oblast and
City officials, however, none mentioned mine safety or worker
safety as a particular concern or problem.

Comment
--------------


13. (C) Our Kemerovo interlocutors described for us an
Oblast governor whose popularity and grip on power rivals
Putin's. Tuleyev's potent public image and the prosperity of
the region explain in part the December election results and
the continued support for United Russia. The governor has
skillfully used the Lesnaya Polyana project to gain favor
with the Kremlin and to tie his future to Medvedev's. Yet
Tuleyev's focus on his own future means that important local
issues such as mine safety do not receive the attention they
deserve and that money is instead diverted to show projects
like Lesnaya Polyana.
BURNS