Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MOSCOW434
2008-02-15 14:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

DFM LOSYUKOV ON IRAN, PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN,

Tags:  PREL PARM MNUC KNNP PINR AF IN JP IR RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000434 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2018
TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC KNNP PINR AF IN JP IR RS
SUBJECT: DFM LOSYUKOV ON IRAN, PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN,
SIX-PARTY TALKS AND JAPAN

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (B/D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000434

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2018
TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC KNNP PINR AF IN JP IR RS
SUBJECT: DFM LOSYUKOV ON IRAN, PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN,
SIX-PARTY TALKS AND JAPAN

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary. In a February 14 meeting with Ambassador,
DFM Losyukov expressed frustration with the Iranian regime's
arrogance and inflexibility. Considering Iranian domestic
politics, the GOR foresees no serious political discussion
occurring prior to its March 14 parliamentary elections.
Losyukov expected that the Year of Russia declared for 2008
in India would bring the two countries closer, as was the
case in China in 2006. Although the bilateral relationship
is improving, he said India was in no hurry to push forward
joint work in areas such as civilian nuclear cooperation. He
stressed Pakistan's fragility and questioned whether the U.S.
democracy agenda might be courting destabilization. Losyukov
underlined that Russia was constrained by its past in
Afghanistan when it came to military assistance, but was
considering aiding certain groups in the North. He said that
he remained skeptical of the DPRK's willingness to submit a
complete declaration of its nuclear program. Losyukov
indicated that the territorial issue would keep relations
with Japan on hold for the foreseeable future. In March,
Losyukov will leave the MFA to join the state nanotechnolgy
company. End summary.

Iran
--------------


2. (C) DFM Losyukov told the Ambassador February 14 that the
GOR was disappointed with the Iranian regime, which reacted
to all U.S. and Russian proposals with the same inflexibility
and arrogance. The GOR's continuous engagement policy had
made no difference, he said. Although there are different
groups in Iran willing to engage in dialogue, the domestic
atmosphere precludes serious discussion of Iran's nuclear
development plans.

India and Pakistan
--------------


3. (C) After a brief description of PM Zubkov's visit to New
Delhi this week, Losyukov said he hoped the Year of Russia in

India in 2008 would boost the bilateral relationship,
including the current, low USD 10 billion annual trade
volume. He sensed the Indians were cautious about nuclear
cooperation with Russia, mindful of the need to balance other
players, such as the U.S. Losyukov reported that the Indians
were watching events in Pakistan closely and were worried
that their bilateral relationship would be spoiled by
continuing uncertainty. Losyukov was most worried that the
Pakistan government was not in total control. He worried that
USG democratization efforts in such a "fragile country" might
risk destabilization. The Ambassador pointed out that
Pakistan's state of affairs complicates the situation in
Afghanistan. Losyukov agreed, arguing that most Pakistanis
considered Afghanistan no more than a "special" province of
Pakistan. An additional complicating factor is the disharmony
between the Pakistani military and intelligence communities,
he added.

Afghanistan
--------------


4. (C) Losyukov seconded the Ambassador's emphasis on
coordinating international efforts in order to combat the
narcotics trade in Afghanistan. He suggested further efforts
to monitor and stop terrorism and narcotics along the porous
Afghan borders. Losyukov noted that the Afghans, unlike
earlier in the year, were producing "good quality," processed
narcotics, which meant that the necessary ingredients were
being transported in bulk from Iran, Pakistan or Uzbekistan.
The ease with which raw ingredients and final products
migrate across borders demonstrated the urgency of
coordination among the U.S., Russia, Iran, Pakistan and
Central Asian countries. Losyukov suggested the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization as one mechanism, perhaps in
informal coordination with NATO. To the Ambassador's question
on a possible Russian offer of military assistance to
Afghanistan, Losyukov responded that Russia, motivated by
fear of the Taliban's return, may be willing to support
certain groups in the North -- despite the suspicions this
may provoke. Its past experience had made Russia wary of
geopolitical games in the region, however.

Six-Party Talks
--------------


5. (C) Losyukov likened working with the DPRK to walking
through a jungle, machete-ing a path, but getting scratched
and cut regularly in the process. He sympathized with A/S
Hill, but was pessimistic on the future of the talks. He had
predicted that the DPRK would be reluctant to submit a full

list of its nuclear programs and since then had heard
directly from the North Koreans that they would not include
military programs in the list which, according to Losyukov,
was the whole reason for the Six-Party Talks. Although he had
no knowledge of what the DPRK shared with the U.S. team, he
understood that the North Koreans had a different
understanding of what was to be disclosed. Losyukov said that
the GOR backed the USG desire to make the DPRK nuclear-free
but the Six-Party nations must act together. The Ambassador
said that the U.S. shared the GOR's frustration with the
DPRK, but patience and persistence had to prevail. Losyukov
suggested that the U.S. could remove the DPRK from the
"lists" or halt the process as a tactic if there is no
progress in sight.

Japan
--------------


6. (C) Per Losyukov, the bilateral relationship has improved
steadily, while the search for a resolution of the
territorial dispute remains on the agenda. With the long and
unfortunate history of confrontation still fresh in the minds
of many in both countries, the issue could move forward only
with time, when the public is prepared for a compromise. The
GOR would be willing to return two islands according to the
1956 agreement, a proposal that had been rejected by the GOJ.
The GOR was examining the possibility of creating a common
economic development zone, where former Japanese residents of
the islands could return and work. What is clear, Losyukov
warned, is that the return of all four islands was out of the
question. Losyukov said that the GOJ had rejected the GOR's
suggestion that FM Komura visit Moscow March 20-21 and was
seeking a PM Fukuda meeting with the outgoing or incoming
Russian president before the G8 Summit in Hokkaido. That
would be difficult to arrange during the transition, Losyukov
thought.

Losyukov to the Private Sector
--------------


7. (C) Losyukov regretted to the Ambassador that the meeting
would likely be their last in his current capacity. He plans
to leave the MFA in March for a state nanotech company.
BURNS