RUSSIA ON UNSC DISCUSSIONS ON CHAD, KENYA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000392

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR ZF XW RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA ON UNSC DISCUSSIONS ON CHAD, KENYA,
ETHIOPIA/ERITREA, DARFUR

REF: A. MOSCOW 281


B. ADDIS ABABA 352

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary. The MFA told us that it would send four
helicopters and 200 personnel to Chad, and was concerned over
growing tensions on the Ethiopia/Eritrea border, but would
take a "wait and see" approach to further UNSC involvement in
conflicts in Kenya. The GOR believed that international
pressure had played a critical role in bringing Kenyan
leaders to the negotiating table and supported and were
optimistic about Annan's efforts. The MoD has still not
decided whether to send helicopters to Darfur. End Summary.

Chad
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2. (C) In a February 12 meeting, MFA International
Organizations Principle Counselor Vitaliy Liplinskiy told us
the GOR had decided to send four MI-24 helicopters and 200
personnel to Chad (reftel A). He noted that the GOR shared
the U.S.'s position in the UNSC, and felt that "some
progress" had been made on the ground. He reiterated GOR
appreciation of French aid in evacuating diplomats' families
from N'djamena.

Kenya
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3. (C) The MFA issued two statements, on February 1 and 5,
condemning the violence in Kenya, calling on political
leaders to restore peace, and noted with satisfaction the
decision of the two parties to search for a negotiated
solution. While the GOR supported the February 6 UNSC
Presidential Statement, East Africa Section Chief Aleksei
Filipov told us Russia did not believe that accusations of
election fraud should be mentioned, as such claims are a
matter of "internal politics and not the province of the UN."
He said Russia viewed the situation as stemming from a
political crisis that had now turned into a tool for personal
gain through ethnic violence by the population and through
political hardlining in the elite. Filipov told us that the
GOR supported Annan's call for a political settlement, but
with an emphasis on immediately stopping the violence.


4. (C) Liplinskiy said the GOR was "optimistic" about
Annan's chances, owing to his popularity in Kenya, but that
the GOR would "wait and see" what, if any, actions would need
to follow in the Security Council. He noted that the GOR at
this time was reluctant to consider the specter of sanctions
or peacekeeping. Filipov added that Kenyan parties had
resisted negotiations, but concerted pressure from the
international community had brought them to the negotiating
table.

Ethiopia and Eritrea
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5. (C) MFA International Organizations Counselor Albert
Sitnikov told us the GOR was watching the situation with the
UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) in the Horn of
Africa with concern (reftel B). The GOR believes that
Eritrea must end fuel restrictions to UNMEE and end troop
restrictions in the DMZ immediately, Sitnikov said. He told
us that the GOR proposed to demarche Asmara in concert with
P-5 members, but Beijing believed that it was "not time" yet.
Consequently, Sitnikov said the MFA would prepare a letter
from Lavrov to Asmara warning it of possible consequences for
its actions. Sitnikov told us that the GOR was very
concerned about the situation and felt that, combined with
military buildups on both sides, any provocation could
re-ignite conflict.

Darfur
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6. (C) Liplinskiy apologized that our request for
helicopters for Darfur was still "languishing" with the
Russia Ministry of Defense, and told us he would contact us
when a decision has been made.
BURNS