PUTIN'S HUMAN RIGHTS ADVISER ON "FROZEN"

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000378

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR RS
SUBJECT: PUTIN'S HUMAN RIGHTS ADVISER ON "FROZEN"
DECISIONMAKING

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: Reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: In her February 11 meeting with the
Ambassador, Putin's human rights adviser, Ella Pamfilova said
the Duma elections had been a "turning point," leading her to
"divorce" herself from GOR actions and adopt a low public
profile. While she welcomed FM Lavrov's engagement with the
NGO community, she said decisionmaking was "frozen" during
the presidential transition and no actions were contemplated
to amend the NGO registration law. While the law had not
been used to persecute NGOs, it remained open to abuse, and
Pamfilova's efforts to petition Putin had been foiled by the
Ministry of Justice. Pamfilova said objective factors, such
as an increasing and increasingly self-confident middle
class, left her optimistic over the longer-term, and was wry
-- but positively inclined -- about the "aura of liberalism"
emanating from Medvedev. The situation in Dagestan was
"awful," but on a positive trajectory; whereas Ingushetiya
President Zyazikov simply was not up to the task of
administering his republic. Pamfilova did not see a trend
emerging in psychiatric detentions, and outlined her
intervention on behalf of Yukos VP Aleksanyan. She was
ambivalent about her future in government, but urged the U.S.
to deepen its engagement with Russia on areas of overlapping
interest. Although demoralized, Pamfilova has pushed her
Council to its limit as an establishment critic. End Summary

NGO Law
--------------


2. (C) During their February 11 meeting, the Ambassador
asked the Chair of the Presidential Council on Promoting the
Development of Institutions of Civil Society and Human Rights
Ella Pamfilova about FM Lavrov's November 5 meeting with
Russian NGO representatives and the status of civil society
efforts to modify the NGO registration law. Pamfilova
welcomed the Foreign Ministry's outreach, noting that the
fact of the third annual meeting represented some small
progress, particularly since the MFA invited all of the human
rights community's heavy weights. While attendance was mixed
(with Moscow Helsinki Group Alekseeva ill, For Human Rights
Ponamarev boycotting, and Human Rights Institute Gefter
unavailable),there was now a "circle" of NGOs that engaged
with the Ministry, and Lavrov had appointed a "liberal type"
to head the department that oversaw outreach.


3. (C) In response to the Ambassador's query on prospects
for modification of the NGO registration law, Pamfilova was
pessimistic, arguing that not only was there no progress, but
that authorities were not focused on the issue, with
everything "frozen" during the extended period of political
succession. Despite a worsening situation, she commented,
there was no GOR reaction. Her Council's strategy had been
to monitor the situation and to assess the law's
implementation. On the one hand, "everyone -- Memorial's
Djibladze included," recognized that their worst fears over
the legislation had not materialized: the law was not being
used as a blunt instrument to repress politically sensitive
NGOs. On the other hand, only 36 percent of Russian NGOs had
registered, with the vast majority simply ignoring the GOR
requirements. A vulnerability existed, and while there had
not been persecution of organizations, there were localized
instances of NGOs facing pressure, and the potential for
abuse remained. Pamfilova stressed that the GOR did not need
the registration law to target NGOs and didn't, for instance,
need it to close down the Russian Chechen friendship society.


4. (C) Pamfilova told the Ambassador that on several
occasions she had raised her concerns directly with Putin,
but that divisions within the bureaucracy had stymied any
response. While the Ministry of Economic Development and
Trade was a liberal ally in supporting the work of NGOs, the
Ministry of Justice remained a bastion of conservatism. The
end result was the equivalent of "split memos" being sent to
Putin, which were bounced by the Presidential Administration
for further coordination. Until there is a new
administration, Pamfilova said, the logjam will remain,
emphasizing again that "everything is frozen." Despite the
clear absence of impending orange revolutions in Russia, she
noted, the same bureaucratic tension remained between those
who wanted to facilitate the work of NGOs and those who saw
them as a fifth column.

Will Medvedev be any Better?
--------------


5. (C) Pamfilova was frank about her discomfort over the
Kremlin's manipulation of the Duma elections, stating that
she had "divorced" herself from GOR actions over the last
several months. Decrying the "gross violations" that had
occurred, she concluded that this had been the least

effective period of her tenure in office. She said it was
difficult to predict whether Medvedev would usher in change.
There were positive "beacons," she acknowledged, while noting
wryly that the "aura of liberalism" surrounding Medvedev had
helped contribute to a change of mood. The President sets
the tone, she stressed, and just as Putin had played to fears
of Western manipulation, Medvedev would have the chance to
put Russia on a different course and to blame the previous
harshness on Putin himself. There was a logic to this
evolution, she stressed, noting the pent-up demand among
businessmen, in particular, for a more moderate line.


6. (C) While Pamfilova predicted that a more measured
policy course was the likely outcome of a Medvedev
presidency, she hedged her bets, noting that international
events -- an economic downturn, or backlash generated by
Kosovo's independence -- could complicate this scenario.
Objectively, she noted, the Russian trajectory was positive:
the middle class was growing and becoming more secure,
self-confident, and active. With this increased
self-confidence would come greater community mobilization.
They won't need guarantees from the West, she added, but will
be driven by the objective facts of modernization in a
globalized world. Moscow was not Beijing, Pamfilova
stressed, and the Chinese model of societal control did not
exist in Russia. A new generation had grown up ignorant of
Soviet norms and accustomed to greater personal freedom, and
their role model was Europe. Pamfilova said she was more
concerned that hawks in both the U.S. and Russia were angling
for a confrontation; certainly flames were being fanned by
conservative elements in both systems.

Caucasus: Differentiating Ingushetiya from Dagestan
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Pamfilova agreed with the concerns expressed by the
Ambassador over developments in the North Caucasus, but
distinguished between the situations in Dagestan and
Ingushetiya. While the status of Dagestan remained "awful,"
Pamfilova argued that overall the local leadership was
competent. It was dealing with a Soviet legacy of enshrined
corruption, where resources had been dedicated to a single
clan, with the remaining ones disenfranchised. While it was
a difficult multi-ethnic situation, the leadership was
engaged and former Presidential Representative Kozak had done
a good job in bolstering local efforts. The longer-term
trendline, she insisted, was positive.


8. (C) In contrast, Pamfilova despaired over Ingushetiya,
where "nice guy" President Zyazikov simply was not up to the
task of administering the Republic. Pamfilova noted her
Council's good relations with republic officials, frequent
exchanges of views on human rights issues, and estimation
that Zyazikov cared about international opinion and shared
Western values (in contrast to the "uncivilized" Chechen
President Kadyrov). While Ingushetiya was poor, and the gap
between rich and poor too large, Pamfilova judged it was the
clan political battles that most threatened its stability.
There was a level of "unpredictability," with Zyazikov's
assurances to Putin pure "demagoguery."


9. (C) Pamfilova agreed with the Ambassador's criticism of
the political process that produced 98-plus percent turnout
for the ruling party in the North Caucasus in the December
2007 parliamentary elections, and predicted exactly the same
outcome during the presidential race. While manipulation was
not required in a system that was driven by clan loyalties,
the excessive measures of Zyazikov and the subsequent "I did
not vote" internet petition could have political consequences
further down the road. In contrast, Putin's recent visit to
the Dagestan village of Botlikh (where the second Chechen war
was launched) was a tremendous boost to the leadership that
would bring political dividends for Medvedev in March.
Pamfilova warned that the "Caucasus is the Caucasus" and the
"more I learn, the less I know." The nuances are so profound
and the point of view and logic so specific to the region,
she argued, it was very difficult to make judgments from
Moscow.

Psychiatric Abuse
--------------


10. (C) The Ambassador expressed strong concern over the
recent incidents of political opposition activists being
involuntarily committed to psychiatric institutions, noting
the cases of Larissa Arap, Aretem Basyrov, and Roman
Nikolaychik. Pamfilova characterized the abuses as
election-motivated, but said she did not think a "trend" to
abuse psychiatric care was emerging. She noted the
successful efforts by HR Ombudsman Lukin and herself to free
Arap, who (she asserted) suffered from real psychiatric

issues, but who had been wrongly committed. Pamfilova
predicted that the abuses would end with the presidential
elections, and again despaired at the excesses committed by
hard-liners on the basis of an "orange revolution" threat
that did not exist.

Yukos VP Aleksanyan
--------------


11. (C) Noting media reports that former Yukos VP
Aleksanyan had finally been transferred to a civilian
treatment facility for HIV/AIDS, the Ambassador asked
Pamfilova how her Council had been involved in urging the GOR
to provide appropriate medical treatment. Describing the
case as "monstrous," Pamfilova said she had complained
"loudly," sending three letters to the courts, which had left
the prosecutors and General Procuracy "very offended." The
GOR lawyers had briefed the Council, with Pamfilova again
expressing her concern over the conduct of the case. The
Ambassador praised her direct participation, noting the
Council's potential to sway GOR policy.

Council and Pamfilova's Future
--------------


12. (C) Pamfilova agreed with the Ambassador's assessment
that the change in president would have implications for the
community of human rights defenders. She noted candidly that
she had wanted to quit her post months earlier, because she
had become ineffective, but had listened to the arguments of
prominent human rights activists such as Moscow Helsinki
Watch Director Alekseeva and had remained. The Duma
elections, Pamfilova reiterated, had been a turning point.
Pamfilova said she was not looking for an "artificial"
position, but wanted to effect change -- if that meant
shifting to the private sector or NGO world, she was prepared
to leave government office, but would make her decision in
the March-May transition period.


13. (C) Medvedev's appointees and their staff would set the
tone for Russia's commitment to human rights and civil
society, Pamfilova noted, and would be the bellwether of
whether the Council could prove more effective in the next
administration. Noting that she would be happy to spend more
time with her granddaughter and had several lucrative job
offers, Pamfilova stressed that she was not driven to remain
in the orbit of the presidential administration. "In the
end, I have to respect myself." Witnessing the obvious
mistakes and the unfounded actions of the Putin
administration had been very difficult, as was watching
bureaucrats employ Putin's name for their own financial or
bureaucratic interests. Having fought with the siloviki,
Pamfilova said that she could not paint a rosy picture of
Russian civil society, but retained a certain optimism that
over the next 20 years Russian views of institutions and rule
of law would be reshaped. Public opinion continued to matter
in Russia, she noted, and as the public evolved, so too would
its government.

U.S. Relations and H.R. Report
--------------


14. (C) The Ambassador briefed Pamfilova on Embassy efforts
to ensure that the upcoming human rights report was accurate
and provided a foundation for an on-going dialogue.
Pamfilova concluded the session underscoring that more issues
united the U.S. and Russia, and urged continued efforts to
deepen the bilateral relationship in these critical strategic
areas. The Ambassador urged Pamfilova and her Council
members to continue to play a watchguard role and to help
provide an environment in which Russian civil society could
strengthen.

Comment
--------------


15. (C) A clearly demoralized Pamfilova put the best face
on her limited influence, which has dwindled even further
during the extended period of political succession. While
Pamfilova has been noticeably missing in action over the last
several months, her behind-the-scenes but establishment
criticism of GOR excesses in the cases of psychiatric abuse
and the denial of treatment to Yukos VP Aleksanyan may have
played a useful role in reversing some policy wrongs. Her
support from influential NGO leaders appears to attest to her
well-meaning intentions, even as her more strident critics
portray her as having sold out to the Putin administration.
BURNS