RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH OSSETIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003753

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS GG
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH OSSETIA

Classified By: Pol M/C Alice Wells for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In a December 24 meeting, Russia's
ambassador to South Ossetia, Elbrus Kargiev, told us
"president" Kokoity needed to gain experience in running a
peacetime government, while making quiet progress on security
and economic development instead of overreacting to
accusations in the press. Kargiev rejected our call for
Russia to influence South Ossetian authorities to allow more
monitors into the region, citing South Ossetia's
"sovereignty." However, he noted it was essential for a
multi-ethnic South Ossetia to work with international
organizations to ensure security and the return of IDPs.
Kargiev called for an independent international commission to
confirm the technical viability of resuming interrupted gas
deliveries from Georgia, charging that the GoG was playing
politics in cutting off gas. Kargiev said that Russia's
border demarcation policy was to recognize Soviet-era
administrative boundaries. According to Special Envoy for
South Ossetia, Yuriy Popov, Kargiev's new assignment will be
his last, and is meant to secure him the title of Ambassador
before he retires. Karigiev expects to take up his post in
February 2009. End Summary.

--------------
Support for South Ossetian government
--------------


2. (C) In a December 24 meeting, Russia's ambassador to
South Ossetia Elbrus Kargiev provided muted criticism of the
South Ossetian "president," stating Kokoity needed learn how
to control a peacetime government, including by gaining
experience in running a bureaucracy. Kargiev endorsed
Kokoity's call for a strong presidium, "like Russia's prime
ministry," maximizing the government's effectiveness by
centralizing power and financial control. Instead of
overreacting to accusations in the press, including the
December 4 interview with former security council secretary
Anatoliy Barankevich, Kokoity should make quiet progress on
security and economic development. Kargiev called for an
independent committee to investigate former Prime Minister
Yuriy Morozov's allegations of government corruption in South
Ossetia, but made mild fun of Barankovich's grandiose claims
of leadership during the attack on Tskhinvali. (Note: In
addition to suggesting Kokoity was a coward, Barankovich
accused the "president" of corruption, abuse of Georgian
prisoners, and overall incompetence. End Note.)


3. (C) Noting his recent travel to Tskhinvali to present his
credentials, Kargiev commented on the new sense of
independence and self-worth among South Ossetians, and
asserted that even small peoples have the right to
independence. Acknowledging our point that the international
community would not fall in line with Russia's recognition of
South Ossetia, Kargiev made the case for its sustained
independence. Although there was little industry -- Kargiev
noted machine-building, agriculture (especially fruits),and
tourism -- Kargiev argued that South Ossetia was economically
viable. Russia's military base in South Ossetia would
provide the stability needed to develop the economy. He
sidestepped questions over Kokoity's previously expressed
interest in joining the Russian Federation, noting only that
North and South Ossetians were separated by more than a
border, with diverging linguistic, clan, and social
developments complicating any potential merger.

--------------
Cooperation with international organizations
--------------


4. (C) Kargiev rejected our call for Russia to influence
South Ossetian authorities to allow more monitors into the
region, citing South Ossetia's "sovereignty." Kargiev
supported South Ossetia's refusal to accept an OSCE mission
in South Ossetia that was part of the Tbilisi OSCE mission.
However, as part of a lasting conflict resolution, Kargiev
said Georgians would have to feel safe living in South
Ossetia, and South Ossetia had to work with international
organizations. Kargiev said Russia was urging Kokoity to
allow Georgian IDPs to return, and to make South Ossetia a
multi-ethnic state.

--------------
Borders
--------------


5. (C) While Kargiev declined to comment on Russia's
decision to reoccupy the Perevi checkpoint, he insisted that
Russia's policy was to recognize Soviet-era administrative
boundaries; walking back that recognition, he suggested,
would open a Pandora's box of post-Soviet territorial

MOSCOW 00003753 002 OF 002


tensions. He also applied this to the Akhalgori question,
affirming that Leningori district was part of South Ossetia
according to Soviet-era border demarcations.

---
Gas
---


6. (C) Kargiev called for an independent international
commission to confirm the technical viability of restoring
the interrupted gas deliveries from Georgia, charging that
the GoG was playing politics in cutting off gas. He rejected
Tbilisi's assertions that poor weather had prevented the
removal of land mines, and said Russian experts had inspected
the facilities. Lavrov in his December 23 press conference
with Abkhaz "Foreign Minister" Shamba affirmed the pipeline's
operability and challenged Georgia to provide the gas.

--------------
Biographics
--------------


7. (C) Kargiev was most recently General Counsel in Trabzon,
Turkey, and earlier served as deputy prime minister and
minister for education in North Ossetia. While his family no
longer resides in Vladikavkaz, Kargiev is intimate with the
clan and class cleavages that mark North Ossetia's relations
with its southern neighbor. According to Special Envoy for
South Ossetia, Yuriy Popov, Kargiev's new assignment will be
his last, and meant to secure him the title of Ambassador
before he retired. Karigiev expects to take up his post in
February 2009.

--------------
Comment
--------------


8. (C) Charming and friendly, Kargiev is unlikely to play a
decisive role in GoR policy formulation on South Ossetia.
RUBIN