RUSSIA CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT NAGORNO-KARABAKH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003659

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV AZ RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT NAGORNO-KARABAKH

Classified By: Deputy Pol MinCouns David Kostelancik for reasons 1.4(b)
and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In a December 10 meeting, MFA Counselor
Elena Kravchenko said the Minsk Group planned to organize
another meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents in
the new year. She said the major obstacles for a conflict
resolution were the Lachin corridor and the unwillingness of
the Azerbaijani and Armenian societies to accept any
compromise. Armenian president Sargsian's preparations for a
referendum were a sign of progress, as was recent acceptance
of the notion of a referendum in the Azerbaijani press.
Denying Russia was conducting checkbook diplomacy by offering
to buy Azerbaijani gas at high prices, Kravchenko insisted
Russia's influence in the region was limited by the
counterbalancing Armenian and Azerbaijani lobbies in Russia.
Irina Zvyagelskaya from the International Center for
Strategic and Policy Studies called for the inclusion of
Nagorno-Karabakh as a third party in negotiations, and
suggested Russia preferred a conflict resolution where
Armenia and Azerbaijan committed to political neutrality.
End Summary.

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Recent events, next steps
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2. (C) In a December 10 meeting, MFA Counselor for the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict Elena Kravchenko described the
recent activity on Nagorno-Karabakh as follow-through to the
November 2 Moscow Summit statement, in which Azerbaijani and
Armenian presidents Aliyev and Sargsian tasked their foreign
ministers to work with the Minsk Group to activate the
Nagorno-Karabakh negotiation process. This included the
mid-November co-chair visit to the region, the foreign
ministers' meeting in Helsinki December 4, and plans for
either a January meeting (possibly in Davos) between the
foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, or for another
co-chair trip to the region. The January event would serve
to set up a new meeting between Aliyev and Sargsian.


3. (C) Despite initially having voiced concerns about
Aliyev's November 27 assertion to RAI International that
Azerbaijan would "never rule out the military way as a way of
restoring our territorial integrity," Kravchenko denied that
this had in part caused the Minsk Group's foreign ministers
to release a statement at the Helsinki OSCE Forum December
4-5, rejecting any military solution of the conflict.
Kravchenko said Aliyev had simply restated a well-known
position in order to put pressure on Armenia.

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Significant obstacles
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4. (C) Kravchenko warned that, despite press reports of a
new dynamism in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
significant stumbling blocks remained. The first was the
question of the Lachin corridor, where, despite progress made
in comparison with the situation years ago, the sides were
still far from finding common agreement. The other major
problem according to Kravchenko was the internal political
situation in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Given internal
popular opposition to any solution that did not reflect
hard-line domestic demands, both presidents needed to prepare
and educate their respective countries' populations and
governments to accept a compromise, without internally
destabilizing the country.


5. (C) Kravchenko cautioned that the issues remaining to be
resolved were becoming increasingly difficult, requiring
presidential involvement by the conflict parties. She also
noted that agreements on individual Basic Principles often
evaporated when considering the package as a whole, as then
each side inevitably claimed the principles were weighted in
favor of the other side.

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Russia "cautiously optimistic"
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6. (C) However, Kravchenko agreed there was progress, too.
She noted that in an editorial published in Azerbaijan
December 9, the author described the idea of a referendum on
the status of Nagorno-Karabakh as "nothing terrible," and
then proceeded to estimate result of such a vote based on the
ethnicity of the population. What was remarkable, according
to Kravchenko, was that the author accepted the idea of a
referendum, which she claimed had been heretofore impossible
to present in Azerbaijani media. Kravchenko pocketed this as
the result of the continuous prodding, cajoling, and

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advocating by the Minsk Group co-chairs and others.


7. (C) In Armenia, Sargsian had also started to take
positive action, Kravchenko said. Shortly after the November
2 summit in Moscow, Sargsian had "bravely" launched cabinet
deliberations to lay the groundwork for a referendum on the
status of Nagorno-Karabakh. As a result, Russia was
"cautiously optimistic" about the possibility for progress on
resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

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Russian influence limited
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8. (C) Kravchenko denied that the GOR had any special
influence in the region it could exert in favor of resolving
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but then clarified to say that
the GOR had no insight into the internal political processes
Aliyev and Sargsian had to manage in order to sway the
populaces in favor of a compromise solution. She initially
brushed off as "laughable" the suggestion Russia was
conducting checkbook diplomacy by offering to buy Azeri gas
in return for a conflict resolution in Azerbaijan's favor,
claiming that notion was a "typical Azeri way of thinking,"
as evidenced by the GOAZ's "offer to buy Nagorno-Karabakh
from Armenia." Suggesting Azerbaijan had floated the
gas-for-resolution idea to Russia, not vice versa, Kravchenko
insisted that Russia had no intention of breaking the solid
front of the three Minsk Group co-chairs by striking a
separate deal with a conflict party. Finally, the presence
of significant diaspora populations from both Armenia and
Azerbaijan prevented Russia from advocating any resolution
that favored one side over the other. However, Kravchenko
allowed that she could imagine there might be "oscillations"
in the GOR on how to handle the idea of buying gas in return
for conflict resolution.

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Analyst's views
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9. (C) Irina Zvyagelskaya from the International Center for
Strategic and Policy Studies asserted that one key element in
a lasting resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was the
inclusion of Nagorno-Karabakh as a third and separate
conflict party, as Armenia's and Nagorno-Karabakh's interests
were not identical. While giving the Minsk Group positive
grades for its efforts, she also detected fault lines between
the co-chair nations. The presence of European or U.S.
troops would exert a calming influence in the region, but
Russia would never allow NATO country troops to be stationed
there. Russia's preferred resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh
situation included the neutrality (for which read rejection
of NATO membership) of the involved countries, according to
Zvyagelskaya.
BEYRLE