Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MOSCOW3612
2008-12-12 14:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIA'S APPOINTED AMBASSADOR ON ABKHAZIA

Tags:  PREL PGOV GG RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4998
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #3612/01 3471456
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121456Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1161
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003612 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S APPOINTED AMBASSADOR ON ABKHAZIA

REF: TBILISI 2271

Classified By: Pol MinCouns Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003612

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S APPOINTED AMBASSADOR ON ABKHAZIA

REF: TBILISI 2271

Classified By: Pol MinCouns Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Newly appointed Ambassador to Abkhazia
Semyon Grigoriev assured us December 11 that Russia would not
welcome or condone any Abkhaz effort to redraw boundaries
along the Enguri river. In order to improve border security,
Russia and Abkhazia planned to sign an agreement on joint
border forces. However, he said Russia had no way of
stopping the border mining activities. Stressing that
Russia's main message to Abkhazia was that only a
multinational state was sustainable, he posited that the
joint use of the Enguri power station could serve as a
confidence-building measure between Georgia and Abkhazia.
Grigoriev maintained that, following reconstruction efforts,
Abkhazia had the potential to be an economically viable
state, although the government, police, and court system was
corrupt. Grigoriev said he would present his credentials on
December 16, and would take up his position as ambassador in
late February or early March. Grigoriev estimated that the
fully staffed embassy would comprise 10 diplomats plus an
additional 10-15 administrative staff. End Summary.

--------------
Border dispute and military presence
--------------


2. (C) MFA 4th CIS Deputy Director and appointed Ambassador
to Abkhazia Semyon Grigoriev told us December 11 that Russia
supported Soviet-era administrative border divisions, and
would not welcome or condone any Abkhaz effort to redraw
boundaries along the Enguri river. On this, Grigoriev
asserted, there was "absolutely no ambiguity." The border
should remain the same as "the one on the maps." Grigoriev
noted that in August, Abkhaz troops had surrendered occupied
Georgian territory on Russia's insistence.


3. (C) In response to our concerns over reports of
deteriorating security and provocative acts by Abkhaz forces
(reftel),Grigoriev acknowledged that the situation in
Abkhazia, while better than in South Ossetia, remained
"tense." While Russian forces still maintained several block
posts, they no longer controlled the border itself. In order
to improve the situation on the border, Russia and Abkhazia
planned to sign an agreement on joint border forces, similar

to what Russia had done with Armenia -- Russia would supply
officers and Abkhazia the soldiers for a protection system
based on Russian standards. Grigoriev acknowledged that it
was also necessary to create a coordination mechanism with
the UN and EU monitors. While the agenda for the December 17
Geneva talks included the discussion of an incident
prevention mechanism with the UN and EU, Grigoriev said there
were no plans to discuss a coordination mechanism for border
protection at that venue. Grigoriev confirmed the
establishment of a Russian military base in Gudauta, but
noted that new Russian military reforms would result in less
than full brigade strength -- 3,000 soldiers, vice 3,800. We
expressed concern over the proposed establishment of joint
Russian-Abkhaz border forces, and underscored that a
continued Russian brigade-strength troop presence in Abkhazia
would create problems within the CFE process.

--------------
Confidence-building measures
--------------


4. (C) Grigoriev posited that the operation of the Enguri
power station could serve as a confidence-building measure
(CBM) between Georgia and Abkhazia, given the previous
understanding of joint use remained in force. He said the
continued use of the power station according to extant
agreements made common sense, as it was "based on common
interests."


5. (C) Grigoriev admitted that Russia had not developed any
other CBMs so far, and lamented that there was no
Georgia-Abkhazia dialogue to do so, either. Responding to
our comment that the Geneva process constituted such a
dialogue, Grigoriev said he doubted Russia would insist on
stopping the process "very soon," but called the transfer of
discussions into a UN framework a logical step, as the Geneva
process had only arisen out of the ceasefire agreement.


6. (C) We pressed Grigoriev on the need for more CBMs and
opportunities to keep the conflict parties talking, including
by continuing the Geneva process. We called on Russia to use
its influence to secure the renewal of the UNOMIG mandate in
a way that did not recognize any loss of Georgia's
territorial integrity, and enable the return of IPDs to
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

MOSCOW 00003612 002 OF 002




7. (C) Grigoriev stated that Russia's main message to
Abkhazia was that only a multinational state that included
Georgian and other populations was a sustainable state. This
involved conforming Abkhazia's legislation to international
conventions on the protection of minorities, refugees, and
human rights. Grigoriev reported that Abkhaz "president"
Bagapsh and "foreign minister" Shamba had both expressed to
him their willingness to talk to Georgia "on an equal basis."
However, they were not willing to talk to the present
leadership of Georgia. Grigoriev considered Vashadze a
positive choice for foreign minister, and said Abkhazia
respected Georgia's former Ambassador to the UN, Irakli
Alasania.

--------------
Violence
--------------


8. (C) Grigoriev sympathized with, but offered little help
for our concerns about the border mining and other incidences
of violence near the administrative border. Calling the
mining the result of the "absolute lack of confidence" of
Abkhaz authorities in the GOG, he said Russia had no way of
stopping that activity. Grigoriev suggested only a change of
the atmosphere in relations could promise relief.


9. (C) Grigoriev had not heard reports about tanks stopping
within several hundred meters of a UN station, or helicopter
overflights, but put that down to a "presentation of power"
by Abkhaz forces. He agreed on the need to reduce the
potential for provocation. We underscored that security
issues were the most immediate reason for our visit, and
asked Grigoriev to relay our concern that Abkhaz actions
could provoke a new conflict.

--------------
Viability as a state
--------------


10. (C) Grigoriev maintained that, following reconstruction
efforts, Abkhazia had the potential to be an economically
viable state. He noted the resort conditions, agricultural
production, and existence of coal and electricity industries
as foundations of an independent economy, and pointed to
Russian investment and military presence as additional
factors. While preparations for the Sochi Olympic Games made
up another revenue stream, Grigoriev cautioned that the
uncontrolled exploitation of Abkhaz resources by eager
Russian construction companies could devastate the ecology,
which was important for the resort tourism sector.


11. (C) Calling Abkhazia's government, police, and court
system "capable," Grigoriev questioned its effectiveness due
to corruption and infiltration by criminal elements.
However, this compared favorably with South Ossetia, which he
claimed four months after the conflict had yet to form a
working government.

--------------
Credentials
--------------


12. (C) Grigoriev told us he would only stay briefly in
Abkhazia to present his credentials to Abkhaz "president"
Bagapsh December 16, and expected to take up his position
only in late February or early March. The reasons for this
delay were that the bureaucratic procedures to create a new
embassy had still not been completed, and the interim
premises of the embassy -- an old sanatorium -- needed
repair. Grigoriev estimated that the fully staffed embassy
would comprise 10 diplomats plus an additional 10-15
administrative staff.


13. (C) Grigoriev noted that the MFA was in the process of
identifying a building to house Abkhazia's embassy in Moscow.
On December 10, the appointed Ambassador of the Republic of
Abkhazia to the Russian Federation, Igor Akhba, presented DFM
Grigory Karasin copies of his credentials.

--------------
Comment
--------------


14. (C) While not very enthusiastic about his new
appointment, Grigoriev is a pragmatic and understanding
interlocutor. Given the MFA's marginalized status on
policymaking toward the conflict republics, Grigoriev's
ability to influence future Russian actions will be limited.
RUBIN