DFM KARASIN ON UKRAINE, GEORGIA, TRANSNISTRIA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000353

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG UP MD AM BO RS
SUBJECT: DFM KARASIN ON UKRAINE, GEORGIA, TRANSNISTRIA,
ARMENIA AND BELARUS

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary. In a February 8 meeting with the
Ambassador, DFM Karasin strongly cautioned against the
Ukrainian government's push for NATO membership, underlining
that a decision by the Alliance would be met with counter
measures that would test our strategic relationship. Karasin
urged the U.S. to steer the Georgian leadership toward
responsible behavior in the aftermath of the Kosovo CDI and
to follow the January 23 UNSYG's recommendations. Russia
would not tolerate the GOG "feigning a normal bilateral
relationship" with Russia while preparing its NATO MAP
request. Ambassador pressed back, reminding Karasin of GOR
responsibility for reducing tensions with Tbilisi. The GOR
continued to believe, Karasin added, that the best channel
for resolving the stand-off over Transnistria remained direct
dialogue between Voronin and Smirnov, and the prospect for
resolution had increased with Voronin taking a more
constructive stance in recent months. The GOR expected
Armenian Prime Minister Sarkisian to win the February 19
presidential election and was prepared to develop a dynamic
bilateral relationship with Armenia during Sarkisian's
tenure. Karasin forecast no major new developments in
Russia-Belarus relations. End summary.

Ukraine: NATO Ripples and Mazepa Dispute
--------------


2. (C) On February 8, DFM Karasin told the Ambassador that
the GOR was "extremely disappointed" with and "surprised" by
the speed with which the new Ukrainian government had
requested MAP and NATO membership. The GOR does not
understand how and why the very first political act by the
GOU had to be about NATO, which Karasin characterized as an
act of "fanaticism." The GOR, Karasin said, was dismayed and
would be not be shy about airing its disappointment. "Who,"
Karasin asked, is threatening Ukraine?" Karasin gauged the
GOU's decision as dangerous domestically for a country where
the political process is still in flux. He emphasized that
Russia would not consider a MAP offer as a "technical" step.
It would be a strategic challenge with serious strategic
consequences.


3. (C) The Putin - Yushchenko Intergovernmental Commission
meeting will convene in Moscow on February 12, without
Tymoshenko's participation. Karasin thought that Ukraine and
Russia needed to focus on economic cooperation. He
criticized the GOU's misdirected efforts to re-invent
history. According to Karasin, as in the cases of Holodomor
and Roman Shukevich, the GOU is misinterpreting history by
creating a national hero out of a questionable figure like
Ivan Mazepa, who was a "traitor."

Georgia: NATO Ripples and Kosovo
--------------


4. (C) Karasin affirmed that two Georgian DFMs -- Vashkidze
and Vashadze -- are due in Moscow next week, and that the GOR
expected Saakashvili at the February 22 CIS informal summit,
which would be followed by new FM Bakaradze's maiden visit.
Karasin warned against what he described as a possible
Georgian smoke screen of conciliatory words and a flurry of
visits followed by the offer of a NATO MAP in Bucharest.
Ambassador pressed back, reminding Karasin of GOR
responsibility for reducing tensions with Tbilisi. Karasin
repeated that a MAP offer would be seen strategic, and would
affect not only Russia-Ukraine and Russia-Georgia relations
but also Russia's partnership with the U.S. Karasin added
that the scale of Russian reaction is difficult to predict
but would have major implications.


5. (C) Per Karasin, FM Lavrov during his January 20 visit to
Tbilisi, repeatedly told the Georgian leadership that the
fastest route to resolving the frozen conflicts was to
convince Abkhazia and South Ossetia to join Georgia by making
Georgia more attractive to them, rather than threatening
forceful reintegration. Although he did not expect a radical
GOR move after the Kosovo CDI, considering both Abkhazia and
South Ossetia are waiting nervously for the eventual date of
Kosovo's independence, Karasin could not exclude unexpected
new developments. Georgia, he argued, had not taken UNSYG
Ban's January 23 statement on Georgia seriously. The GOR on
the contrary thought it was on the right track. Karasin
promised to work with the Abkhazians, while requesting the
U.S. to urge the Georgians to behave responsibly.


6. (C) With the Group of Friends meeting scheduled in Geneva
for February 18-19, the Abkhazia negotiation process may
resume, while the situation in South Ossetia is more tense.
Karasin saw the absence of "adventurism" in the region during
the December election campaign in Georgia as a good sign. He

hoped that Saakashvili's weakened mandate may make him behave
more reasonably. The Ambassador pointed out that Kosovo
would make its decision shortly. He urged the GOR to work
with Serbia to preserve stability in the region in order to
avoid the concept of the zero-sum game as Serbia's political
and economic ties with Russia and Serbia's EU membership
could go hand in hand.

Transnistria: Better Prospect
--------------


7. (C) Karasin praised the new OSCE HOM Remler for his good
grasp of the situation and the ability to find a common
language with all involved parties. He thought the Romanian
government's aggressive Moldova policy has been helpful in
pushing Voronin to take a more constructive stance. Against
his habit and reflex, Voronin has to accept Smirnov as a
partner on equal footing, Karasin added. Asked by the
Ambassador whether any resolution could be expected anytime
soon, Karasin answered, "no artificial deadline but the
prospect is good for the resolution by the end of 2008."

Armenia: Getting Ready for Sarkisian
--------------


8. (C) Karasin considered Sarkisian, a "strong and
confident" leader who will win in the first round. The
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict may have a better chance for
resolution during his presidency. The GOR is ready to
develop a dynamic relationship with Armenia, which would much
benefit from cooperation with Russia in the transport and
energy sectors.

Belarus: Status Quo
--------------


9. (C) Karasin reported no development on the union state
between Russia and Belarus. The GOR continued to support
Belarus by demonstrating solidarity against the sanctions
imposed on it. A longer-term policy was necessary for
Belarus, Karasin thought, and it was an area where Washington
could exert leadership, and perhaps set the direction for
other nations. Ambassador said that's what we intended to do
-- although it might not be the direction sought by Russia.
BURNS