Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MOSCOW3527
2008-12-05 14:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:
MFA PREVIEWS POST-START ISSUES FOR DECEMBER 15
how-toVZCZCXRO0478 OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHMO #3527 3401456 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 051456Z DEC 08 ZDK FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1010 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003527
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2018
TAGS: PREL PARM KACT START RS
SUBJECT: MFA PREVIEWS POST-START ISSUES FOR DECEMBER 15
MEETING
REF: A. STATE 114461
B. STATE 117164
C. MOSCOW 3153
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Alice G. Wells for reasons
1.4(b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003527
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2018
TAGS: PREL PARM KACT START RS
SUBJECT: MFA PREVIEWS POST-START ISSUES FOR DECEMBER 15
MEETING
REF: A. STATE 114461
B. STATE 117164
C. MOSCOW 3153
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Alice G. Wells for reasons
1.4(b) and (d)
1. (C) Vladimir Yermakov, head of the START Treaty section in
the MFA Office of Security and Disarmament Affairs (DVBR),
told us December 3 that the GOR was looking forward to a
"frank discussion" of all the issues related to a post-START
Treaty agreement at the December 15 meeting between the
delegations led by Acting U/S Rood and DFM Ryabkov. The GOR
was continuing to study the text we provided October 24 (refs
A, B, C) and hoped to have a non-paper in response in time
for the December 15 meeting. Yermakov said the GOR had been
"surprised" that the USG text had not included the language
Russia had proposed almost a year ago to A/S DeSutter, even
in brackets. Therefore, Moscow was also working on an
alternative text, but it was unlikely to be ready until
mid-January.
2. (C) Yermakov said the three key issues for the GOR were:
-- Reduction in the number of warheads (with "any number
between zero and 2200 open for discussion");
-- inclusion of delivery vehicles; and,
-- all strategic weapons stockpiles to be kept on national
territory.
When asked about the numbers of stockpiled weapons, Yermakov
said the GOR did not really care what was kept in storage.
Emphasizing that the GOR did not understand the definition of
"operationally deployed warheads," as proposed by the U.S.,
Yermakov added that as long as there was a limit on all
strategic delivery vehicles and they were counted, the GOR
had no problem with the number of warheads placed on such
vehicles. The GOR envisioned that the number would be
presumed to be the maximum that could be carried by each type
of delivery vehicle.
3. (C) Yermakov reiterated that Russia did not want as
cumbersome and complicated verification and inspection
provisions as in the START Treaty, and said Moscow was
looking at the structure of the text we had provided. He
thought the approach, with a very short Treaty text, followed
by a Protocol with the detailed provisions, might work,
provided all parts were legally binding and had the same
character as the Treaty itself.
BEYRLE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2018
TAGS: PREL PARM KACT START RS
SUBJECT: MFA PREVIEWS POST-START ISSUES FOR DECEMBER 15
MEETING
REF: A. STATE 114461
B. STATE 117164
C. MOSCOW 3153
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Alice G. Wells for reasons
1.4(b) and (d)
1. (C) Vladimir Yermakov, head of the START Treaty section in
the MFA Office of Security and Disarmament Affairs (DVBR),
told us December 3 that the GOR was looking forward to a
"frank discussion" of all the issues related to a post-START
Treaty agreement at the December 15 meeting between the
delegations led by Acting U/S Rood and DFM Ryabkov. The GOR
was continuing to study the text we provided October 24 (refs
A, B, C) and hoped to have a non-paper in response in time
for the December 15 meeting. Yermakov said the GOR had been
"surprised" that the USG text had not included the language
Russia had proposed almost a year ago to A/S DeSutter, even
in brackets. Therefore, Moscow was also working on an
alternative text, but it was unlikely to be ready until
mid-January.
2. (C) Yermakov said the three key issues for the GOR were:
-- Reduction in the number of warheads (with "any number
between zero and 2200 open for discussion");
-- inclusion of delivery vehicles; and,
-- all strategic weapons stockpiles to be kept on national
territory.
When asked about the numbers of stockpiled weapons, Yermakov
said the GOR did not really care what was kept in storage.
Emphasizing that the GOR did not understand the definition of
"operationally deployed warheads," as proposed by the U.S.,
Yermakov added that as long as there was a limit on all
strategic delivery vehicles and they were counted, the GOR
had no problem with the number of warheads placed on such
vehicles. The GOR envisioned that the number would be
presumed to be the maximum that could be carried by each type
of delivery vehicle.
3. (C) Yermakov reiterated that Russia did not want as
cumbersome and complicated verification and inspection
provisions as in the START Treaty, and said Moscow was
looking at the structure of the text we had provided. He
thought the approach, with a very short Treaty text, followed
by a Protocol with the detailed provisions, might work,
provided all parts were legally binding and had the same
character as the Treaty itself.
BEYRLE