CHATTERING CLASS ON WHY PUTIN CAN'T FAIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003507


E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR EFIN RS
SUBJECT: CHATTERING CLASS ON WHY PUTIN CAN'T FAIL

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle: Reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: Putin remains the linchpin of the Russian
political system, with rumors over his return to the Kremlin
or departure from the White House serving to keep all options
open and everyone off balance. Despite disagreements over
whether and why Putin might contemplate a "spring scenario"
returning himself to the Kremlin, many political commentators
point to the political imperative that Putin not fail, or be
seen to fail, in responding to the economic crisis. With the
legitimacy of the Russian state still concentrated in one
man, and with Putin viewing himself as indispensable to
Russia's stability, some fear that the financial crisis could
reinforce Putin's instinct for control and trump Medvedev's
nascent reform agenda. Anti-Americanism, stoked by the elite
and inflamed by U.S. support for Georgia, will remain an
easy foil during a time of economic pressure. While the
Russian leadership is still waiting to gauge U.S.-Russian
relations under a new administration, Putin's alleged desire
for a central role could be a complicating factor. End
Summary

Putin Keeps Political Class Off-Balance
--------------


2. (C) Six months after Medvedev's inauguration, Putin
remains the linchpin in the Russian political system, sowing
uncertainty about his future political intentions, but
keeping all options open and all levers within ready reach of
his White House office (or his Novo Ogoreva dacha, where he
spends a chunk of his working day). With the immediate
caveat that "no one really knows anything," veteran Kremlin
watcher Ekho Moskvy chief editor Aleksey Venediktov insisted
to us that Putin is preparing a near-term return to the
Kremlin, with Deputy PM Shuvalov already lining up his
cabinet. Venediktov described being shown Putin's planning
calendar, replete with foreign policy meetings not reflected
on the Prime Minister's website, where the "fiction" is
maintained that the Prime Minister has ceded foreign affairs
to Medvedev. Venediktov argued that elections would be held
as early as spring, before the worst of the economic crisis
hit home in fall 2009, and pointed to Putin's take charge
performance at the United Russia party conference as further
proof that Medvedev's tenure in the Kremlin would be short.


3. (C) The rumor that Shuvalov is being positioned, or
positioning himself, for prime ministerial duties is
widespread, but opposite conclusions have been drawn about
Putin's intentions. For observers such as NG Editor
Konstantin Remchukov and Council for Defense and Security
Chairman Karaganov, Putin is looking for a fall guy for the
economic crisis, and sees Shuvalov and Kremlin economic
adviser Dvorkovich as two likely candidates. (N.B. Finance
Minister Kudrin is another possibility, whose imminent demise
is periodically predicted, but his ties to Putin and
international prestige probably protect him.) Remchukov
attributed the sustained succession drama to the fact that
Putin "can't find the right position" and not to any
shortcomings in Medvedev, whom he insisted was coming into
his own as President. Noting his surprise that Putin had
settled upon becoming premier, despite the inherent risk in
captaining the Russian economy, Karaganov joined Remchukov in
arguing that what Putin sought was "father of the nation"
status, and not a return to the Kremlin. The dilemma,
according to Karaganov, was that Putin's main source of power
was his ability to return to the Kremlin at any time, whereas
-- if he lost his legitimacy in a prolonged economic crisis
-- he couldn't.


4. (C) For those who dismiss Medvedev's political relevance
entirely, such as Russian Newsweek editor Misha Fishman,
Russia has entered a "prolonged political crisis." After
eight years of unrivaled economic good luck, Putin is mired
in an economic crisis that exceeds his competency and for
which he will not accept responsibility. In Fishman's view,
the Medvedev reform agenda stalled with the August war, and
was made irrelevant by an economic slump that has elicited
greater state intervention (worldwide) and recourse to the
"vertical of power." In a similar vein, but from the
opposite end of Russia's political spectrum, the pro-Putin
Political Class Editor Vitaliy Tretyakov spun the political
dilemma facing Russia as the legacy of the western
interference that dissuaded Putin from seeking a third term
as President. Noting that the "spring scenario exists,"
Tretyakov preemptively mourned the hit to Putin's popularity
if he were forced to return to the Kremlin and take over from
a "weaker and weakening" Medvedev.

Putin Can't Fail
--------------


5. (C) These otherwise divergent analysts agree that the
political imperative driving Russia's response to this
economic crisis is that Putin not fail, or be seen to fail.
Having subordinated Russia's nascent institutions to his
vertical of power, Putin is the only "institution" that
enjoys real legitimacy, personifying the repudiation of
Russia's period of post-Soviet weakness, and epitomizing
Russia's return as a global power with assertive regional
ambitions. While the Kremlin is the traditional epicenter of
Russian rule, President Medvedev's legitimacy is
Putin-derived, and despite his high poll ratings, few here
believe that Medvedev could survive in power without Putin's
sanction. The legislature remains a rubber stamp body, where
the Putin-chaired ruling party enjoys a constitutional
majority but no independent power base. Beyond a cultural
predilection for a "strong man" ruler, Russia's political
class is pragmatically invested in Putin's success.


6. (C) The concern for our contacts in the westernizing
camp is that Putin will choose a blunt, anti-West, and
"fortress Russia" solution to the financial crisis, where
xenophobia and "sovereign democracy" trump calls for systemic
reform that is based on empowering and growing a middle class
and implementing rule of law. Eurasia Foundation's Andrey
Kortunov asserted that Putin saw himself as the "fearless
fighter" on the frontlines of "a crisis he did not produce,"
battling "a tsunami" that threatens to destroy a system that
he sincerely believes is best for Russia. Western critics,
Kortunov suggested, are too quick to paint Putin as cynical.
If Putin were cynical, he would return to the Kremlin, and
hire and fire his way through a series of technocratic prime
ministers (a la Yeltsin). Instead, Putin -- "like many
autocrats" -- believes that he is "indispensable" and the
"savior" of a system that can still work. Putin's mission,
Kortunov postulated, is to "fix Russia" and in this scenario
Medvedev is marginalized -- "the p.r. man."

Anti-Americanism an Easy Foil
--------------


7. (C) Liberals like Kortunov, Fishman, and former Duma
Deputy Vladimir Ryzhkov agree with conservatives like
Tretyakov that the "bitter frustration" among Russians
generated by U.S. support for Georgia, along with the strong
disposition to hold America responsible for the global
meltdown (a stance stoked by the Russian leadership and
reinforced by comments of some European leaders),makes
America a natural scapegoat as the "real economy" stalls.
Kortunov, who attended a recent brainstorming session on the
future of U.S.-Russian relations hosted by Medvedev's
thinktank, related that most argued against committing
significant capital in restoring a partnership. Even for
those deeply invested in better relations with the U.S.,
Kortunov stressed, "Georgia was a breach of faith."

Comment
--------------


8. (C) While anti-Americanism remains an easy foil, our
sense is that the Russian leadership is waiting to gauge the
incoming U.S. administration and, potshots aside, has
preserved the political and rhetorical space to engage more
cooperatively. Managing the Putin-Medvedev power balance
could become more complicated, however, with White House
foreign policy adviser Ushakov telling Venediktov that
U.S.-Russian relations will remain conflict-prone until Putin
is put back at the center of the bilateral relationship.
Even those with less investment in Putin's success than
Ushakov, though, have told us how important it is that Putin
not feel he is being sidelined as the Obama administration
makes its initial contacts with the Russian leadership. As
one oligarch close to Putin warned the Ambassador, "Putin is
not our Vice President." End Comment


BEYRLE