Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MOSCOW3429
2008-11-26 13:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIA'S VIEWS ON THE IAEA REPORT ON IRANIAN AND

Tags:  KNNP MNUC PARM IAEA TRGY IR SY RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0358
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMO #3429 3311313
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261313Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0906
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 1014
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0538
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0448
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003429 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ISN/RA (R.NEPHEW; J.DANIEL),IO/T (H.VONBEHREN),
EUR/PRA (M.NASH)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2018
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM IAEA TRGY IR SY RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S VIEWS ON THE IAEA REPORT ON IRANIAN AND
SYRIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMS

REF: STATE 123074

Classified By: DCM ERIC RUBIN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003429

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ISN/RA (R.NEPHEW; J.DANIEL),IO/T (H.VONBEHREN),
EUR/PRA (M.NASH)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2018
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM IAEA TRGY IR SY RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S VIEWS ON THE IAEA REPORT ON IRANIAN AND
SYRIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMS

REF: STATE 123074

Classified By: DCM ERIC RUBIN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) On November 25, ESToff delivered reftel points on
the IAEA reports on the Iranian and Syrian nuclear programs
to Alexander Bolichiov, Second Secretary in the MFA
Department of Security and Disarmament Affairs.

Syria
--------------


2. (C) Bolichiov was dismissive regarding the points on
Syria's refusal to allow IAEA inspectors to re-visit the site
of the destroyed facility or the three potentially associated
sites nearby. Why, he asked, should an "NPT-signatory
country be cooperative when a non-NPT-signatory country
attacks its infrastructure?" Bolichiov was also
argumentative regarding the other sites, saying "the IAEA
will visit those and then ask to see five more, then ten...
when does it stop?" Bolichiov stated that any sort of
resolution at the November 27 - 28 Board of Governor's
meeting would be "unlikely" to succeed as it would be
difficult to generate sufficient support.


3. (C) Regarding the Technical Cooperation (TC) project
requested by Syria in the IAEA's Technical Assistance and
Cooperation Committee (TACC),Bolichiov was non-committal.
He did say that Russia could not see the connection between
the ongoing IAEA investigation of "something that probably
was not a nuclear facility" and the "proper" request for IAEA
assistance in helping Syria move forward towards a peaceful
use for nuclear energy.

Iran
--------------


4. (C) Bolichiov agreed, somewhat grudgingly, that Iran
continued to defy the UNSC and had not cooperated with the
IAEA. He paid close attention to the suggested key points
for the Russian Federation to include in their national
statement (reftel),but did not give any indication they
would be used. Bolichiov was particularly skeptical on the
heavy-water reactor under construction in Arak. With respect
to the Iranian's refusal to allow the IAEA to conduct a
Design Information Verification inspection of the site, he
countered "perhaps there is nothing to see."


5. (C) Comment: As the points on Iran were being presented,
Bolichiov asked if these issues were "coming from the old
administration, or the new one?" Earlier in the meeting, he
had asked questions about the transition to a new
administration. In previous meetings, Bolichiov had not
displayed such curiosity, which could reflect increased MFA
interest on the future direction of USG policy regarding
Iran. End Comment.
BEYRLE