LOWER PROFILE FOR KREMLIN YOUTH GROUP

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000339

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SOCI PINR RS
SUBJECT: LOWER PROFILE FOR KREMLIN YOUTH GROUP

REF: 07 MOSCOW 3808

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reason: 1.4 (d).


1. (C) Summary: Recent Kremlin steps to rein in the United
Russia-affiliated youth movement Nashi suggest that GOR
neuralgia about a possible Orange Revolution has faded. With
the Kremlin now confident that operation successor has been
successfully launched and will encounter no opposition, Nashi
has been told to re-invent itself as a provider of charitable
and community-based services related to the Medvedev-led
National Priority Projects and end its harassment of alleged
"enemies" of the regime. Commentators believe that the
Kremlin had tired of Nashi's heavy-handed tactics and
confrontational style, and hope that Nashi in its new
incarnation will present a better face to the West and to
Russia's own citizens. End summary.

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Rumors of Nashi's Demise...
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2. (SBU) The Kremlin-friendly youth group Nashi was created
in 2005 in order to counter the perceived threat of an Orange
Revolution in Russia. Since its creation, the organization
has been used to promote Kremlin policies and discredit
anti-Kremlin figures. The movement has been reflexively
hostile towards the West and other of Russia's perceived
enemies, ostensibly in response to the "mood" of the Russian
people. In response to Estonia's decision to re-locate a
Soviet World War II memorial from Tallinn's central square to
a cemetery, Nashi members picketed the Estonian Embassy in
Moscow and hounded the Estonian Ambassador. In the wake of
his appearance at the anti-government Other Russia conference
in summer 2006, Nashi activists relentlessly harassed the
British ambassador: they picketed the British Embassy, and
dogged the Ambassador's at his public appearances in Moscow
and the regions. Formal efforts by the British Embassy via
the MFA to force Nashi to halt its disruptive behavior bore
no fruit for months.


3. (SBU) In the run-up to the 2007 Duma election campaign,
Nashi activists heckled former Premier and erstwhile
presidential candidate Kasyanov and took part in activities
to intimidate opposition movements, including harassment of
several of the Dissenters Marches. In the wake of the
December 2 elections, Nashi members appointed themselves,
with no interference from the police, to "protect" the
Central Election Commission from potential incursions.
According to news reports, Nashi youth were on combat duty
the day following the elections, ready to defend against
"enemies of Russia" and to short-circuit any effort to stage
an Orange Revolution.


4. (U) On January 29, the media reported that Nashi would
re-invent itself as a less centralized youth movement, and
noted that only five of the movement's fifty regional offices
would remain open. The movement's top cadres have moved from
work in the youth movement to jobs in the government,
legislature, and Public Chamber. Vasiliy Yakemenko, the 37
year old former leader of Nashi, has been appointed to head
the Committee on Youth Affairs, a Federal organization
created to coordinate national youth policy and programs.
Five leaders from Nashi and other youth movements won seats
in the December 2 Duma elections, while others were elected
to seats in local legislative assemblies or in the regional
public chambers. Rumors have circulated that many others in
Nashi were disappointed and disillusioned that they had not
received jobs allegedly promised them during the Duma
campaign.

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...Have Been Greatly Exaggerated
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5. (U) At a February 1 press conference, Nashi Head Nikita
Borovikov said, "the subsiding of the threat of an "Orange
Revolution" (presumably because of the apparently seamless
transition from Putin to Medvedev) meant that Nashi could now
"concentrate on other things." He suggested that his
organization would maintain the ability to attract at least
100,000 demonstrators to rallies, protests, or other mass
activities should a specific threat arise. According to
Borovikov, Nashi planned to focus on twelve core projects
that would provide a variety of political outlets for young
people. They include efforts to improve the image of service
in the armed forces, instruction in Russian Orthodoxy, and
even a new line of fashionable yet patriotic clothing. These
new projects appeared to emerge from the activities that
Nashi activists took part in at their most recent summer camp
(reftel). Borovikov indicated that each project was begun
late in 2007, although the exact number of participants in
each project were not given. When asked, he did not or could
not identify funding sources for the projects.


6. (SBU) Despite discussions about a new role for Nashi, the
organization has continued to behave assertively. In January,
Nashi members picketed the European Commission in Moscow to
protest the inclusion of several Nashi members on an EU visa
blacklist. Those blacklisted had participated in sometimes
violent protests against the re-location of a Soviet War
Memorial from central Tallinn, and when Estonia entered the
Schengen zone on January 1, Tallinn ensured that the
activists would be prevented from traveling to other Schengen
countries. In response, on January 29 Nashi leaders submitted
to the Russian Foreign Ministry a list of Estonian citizens
whom they feel ought to be barred from entering Russia.

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The Kremlin's Unruly Child
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7. (C) According to Aleksey Mukhin, General Director of the
Center for Political Information, presidential heir apparent
Medvedev has little interest in maintaining a youth group
whose aim would be solely to prevent an Orange Revolution.
With Medvedev's popularity soaring and real opponents like
ex-Prime Minister Kasyanov out of the race, there is little
prospect of an Orange Revolution in Russia. Mukhin thought
that youth parading through Moscow in defense of the current
establishment had increased the unease of Western media and
governments with Russian politics. In particular, the image
of Nashi youth hounding the Estonian and British ambassadors
had created a negative image in Europe and seemed to have
embarrassed the Kremlin. According to Mukhin, the order to
reorganize Nashi came directly from the Kremlin and was part
of an effort to support Medvedev's attempt to present a more
Western-leaning image of Russia as the succession race got
underway.


8. (C) Nashi's new-found restraint, according to Mukhin,
would be another signal that Russia's political culture had
entered a new, less confrontational phase. Mukhin noted that
the change had been in the works for some time and had
culminated with the Kremlin decision to put Borovikov in
charge of the "liquidation" of Nashi, and the absorption of
much of the organization's leadership into government
committees or the Duma.


9. (C) Still, as the Moscow Carnegie Center's Liliya
Shevtsova told us, five of Nashi's regional offices will
remain open, "in order to keep Nashi within bus range" of any
undesirable developments. Shevtsova agreed that, with
concerns about an Orange Revolution on the wane, many in the
Kremlin had tired of Nashi's "tacky" escapades, and that the
Medvedev team, in particular wanted to keep Nashi's street
politics at arm's length.

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Comment
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10. (C) All signs are that, Mukhin's comments
notwithstanding, the decision to re-channel Nashi had been
made relatively recently. As early as the summer of 2007,
the organization seemed to be in full flower. Its camp at
Selinger was well-attended, and the organization's activities
there were only selectively accessible to a very curious
press. With the beginning of the fall Duma election
campaign, Nashi remained poised to be a thorn in the side of
those identified as "foreign and domestic enemies." The
decision to pull the plug on the kinds of activities that
Nashi has been most closely identified with to date suggests
that Medvedev's team is attempting at least to put a new face
on its treatment of those out of step with the Kremlin.
BURNS