MFA ON RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN ROLES IN CENTRAL ASIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003379

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ENRG SENV SMIG SNAR AF RS ZK
SUBJECT: MFA ON RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN ROLES IN CENTRAL ASIA

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary: On November 14, MFA officials expressed to
DAS Krol Russian concern that the U.S. presence in Central
Asia, combined with efforts to expand NATO, gave the
appearance that Russia was "surrounded" and called for the
U.S. to be transparent in its actions. The GOR understood,
however, that its "partners" in Central Asia acted
pragmatically and would seek development assistance and
energy deals with whichever countries offered them the best
return. This presented an opportunity for China, which could
eventually be the destination for more of the region's oil
and gas. Russia was concerned about water and electricity
shortages that made life harder on Central Asia's rural
population, which was most at risk of influence by the
"mullahs." The international economic crisis was already
hitting the region's migrants, who were receiving less pay
and finding it harder to get work in Russia and Kazakhstan.
Russia struggled to contain narcotics from Central Asia, and
would continue its efforts to try and cordon off Afghanistan
through the CSTO. End summary.

U.S. Role in Central Asia
--------------


2. (C) In the course of a meeting on Central Asian issues,
MFA Third CIS Director Maxim Peshkov and Deputy Director
Sergei Nikolaev expressed to DAS Krol Russian concern about
the U.S. presence in Central Asia, which, combined with the
missile defense system proposed for Eastern Europe and the
potential for Ukraine and Georgia to enter NATO, made it
appear that the U.S. had Russia "surrounded." Nikolaev
called for the U.S. to maintain "transparency" in its
activities in Central Asia to avoid raising GOR suspicion of
U.S. intentions toward a region in which Russia had strategic
interests.


3. (C) Krol responded that the U.S. did not impose itself
upon Central Asian nations but wanted normal political,
economic, and trade relations with them. He stressed that
the U.S. was not playing a great game. The Central Asian
countries were not pawns but sovereign, independent states.
Krol added that U.S. encouragement of alternate energy
shipment routes, such as the trans-Caspian pipeline, were not
anti-Russian but anti-monopoly.


4. (C) Krol noted that he hears regularly that Russia is
pressuring Kyrgyzstan to close the Manas air base. He asked
Peshkov if indeed Russia desired this when they knew full
well how important the base is to prosecuting the Afghan war,
which Russia has always claimed was in its interest to end.
Krol stressed the U.S. did not intend Manas to be a permanent
base but would be needed only as long as the fight in
Afghanistan continued. Peshkov acknowledged the importance
to Russia of ending the Afghanistan conflict successfully and
the role of Manas, but he noted one needs to look at the
overall context. The U.S. placing missiles in Central Europe
and expanding NATO to Russia's borders leads many in Russia
to question Manas.

Energy and Water Resources
--------------


5. (C) Peshkov commented that Russia's Central Asian partners
had become more "pragmatic" in pursuing their economic
interests, leading them to seek energy contracts with whoever
offered the greatest profit at the lowest cost. He predicted
that if China gave Central Asia better terms, more oil and
gas could ultimately go east rather then to Russia and
Europe.


6. (C) Peshkov said that Russia remained interested in
increasing the amount of gas flowing from Central Asia in the
winter, when demand was highest. Russia was ready to invest
in expanding gas-related infrastructure, but required
guarantees that it would reap some of the benefits.


7. (C) Peshkov explained the GOR was concerned about Central
Asia's situation, which deprived Kazakhstan of drinking water
and caused hydro-electric shortages in Kyrgyzstan.
Especially poor infrastructure and a lack of economic
development hit the rural regions especially hard,
threatening to push disaffected people "toward the mullahs."
Peshkov reflected on the fact that for many Central Asians,
the economic situation has deteriorated since the Soviet
collapse 17 years ago and they have seen a decline in basic
infrastructure. Governments that need to finance
construction projects might look to China as a source of
funding, thereby allowing Beijing to means obtain a larger
share of the region's energy resources.

Central Asian Migrants
--------------


8. (C) Peshkov said that while the financial systems in the
Central Asian states might themselves be insulated from the
effects of the world financial crisis, their economies would
suffer as the Central Asians who work in Russia and
Kazakhstan were already earning less and would find it harder
to get employment as the construction industry slowed. As to
the larger issue of Central Asian labor in Russia, Russians
"understood there is a difficult situation in these strategic
partners" and acted accordingly. There was, however, a
difference between Central Asians who were in Russia legally
and illegally, and the latter would be sent home.

Narcotics
--------------


9. (C) Peshkov explained that the GOR saw Tajikistan as the
source of fifty percent of Central Asian narcotics entering
Russia. While the CSTO's Operation Canal had some success,
preventing narcotics trafficking was increasingly difficult
as the traffickers developed a "better and better"
organization for transporting narcotics from Central Asia,
through Russia, to Europe. The Uzbek-Tajik border was
especially porous and the border guards in the region were
not capable of stopping the flow. Peshkov complained that
while Russia was ready to train counter-narcotics officials
from the region at its Domodedova facility, not many had gone
through the program.


10. (C) Peshkov spoke of the necessity to maintain a "circle
around Afghanistan" to contain the narcotics and terrorist
threats emanating from the country. The present security
circle consisted of the Central Asian states and Russia
through the CSTO, with the support of China. Nikolaev added
that Iran was doing its utmost to protect its border with
Afghanistan against narcotics and other contraband, but "God
knows" what Pakistan was capable of doing to gain control of
its border.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) Our MFA interlocutors clearly exhibited traditional
Russian neuralgia over the U.S. presence and activities in
Central Asia. Ironically the MFA's assessment of
developments in the region squares pretty much with our own
across the board. The Russians also made clear their
apprehension of China's activities in Central Asia and fear
it could be the major beneficiary of rivalry between Moscow
and Washington. While we have tried to be transparent with
Russia over our intentions and actions, perhaps we can look
more closely at what more can be done in this area, such as
engaging in more frequent consultations in capitals and at
posts. Still, we harbor few illusions that any amount of
transparency will overcome basic Russian suspicion of U.S.
presence in their "near abroad." But we shouldn't give up
trying.


12. (U) DAS Krol has cleared this cable.
BEYRLE