MFA ON AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003372

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR AF IR PK RS
SUBJECT: MFA ON AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND IRAN

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 b/d.

1.(C) Summary: On November 14, MFA Second Asia Director
Aleksandr Maryasov provided SCA DAS Krol an overview of
Russian concerns regarding the need to stabilize Afghanistan
and Pakistan, while engaging with Iran in order to dissuade
it from making trouble in the region. Maryasov reiterated
that the GOR hoped to resume military assistance to
Afghanistan, and was ready to train Afghan counter-narcotics
officials in Moscow. Russia had concerns about sources of
financing for the upcoming Afghan election, and remained
opposed to allowing the Taliban into the government.
Maryasov expressed Russian concern with the Pakistani
government's inability to control its border with
Afghanistan, and thought Iran was in a "strong position" to
influence events in Afghanistan. End summary.

Stabalizing Afghanistan
--------------


2. (C) MFA Second Asia (South Asia) Director Maryasov
explained to DAS Krol Russian concerns regarding the
stabilization of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the failure of
which threatened to destabilize the wider region. Maryasov
stressed the need for Afghanistan's neighbors to assist in
gaining control of the country,s borders, especially
Pakistan. He reiterated Russian concern with Kabul's lack of
control of large swaths of southern and eastern Afghanistan.


3. (C) Maryasov said that the GOR understood that stabilizing
Afghanistan required strengthening the Afghan National Army
(ANA) and police, both of which Russia was ready to assist.
He noted that past Russian arms donations to the ANA were
halted after the GOR learned that the weapons were not being
used by the Afghans and simply sat in warehouses. Medvedev
and Karzai agreed during their August meeting that military
aid should be resumed, and the GOR hoped to send a delegation
to the U.S. in order to discuss the matter in detail.


4. (C) Maryasov reiterated that Russia was ready to train
Afghan and Central Asian counter-narcotics officials at its
Domodedova facility, and expressed Moscow's pique at the
recent failure of Afghans to appear for training. He
explained Russian opposition to two OSCE training programs
intended to train counter-narcotics officers near the Afghan
border by asking how security could be guaranteed at remote
locations when the Taliban were capable of carrying out an
attack on the police academy in Kabul. Maryasov spoke of the
need for closer cooperation on security and anti-narcotics
between NATO/ISAF and the CSTO, although the GOR understood
that NATO was constrained legally from working with the
regional organization.


5. (C) Maryasov asked about the prospect for the upcoming
Afghan election, including whether Ambassador Khalilzad would
be a candidate. He raised the issue of election funding, the
sources for which might be diminished by the international
financial crisis. He added that while Russia understood the
idea behind the Afghan reconciliation process, the GOR did
not support allowing the Taliban into power by taking a role
in the current government.

Pakistan
--------------


6. (C) Maryasov observed that the new Pakistani government
had taken some action against the Taliban, but needed to do
more both to strengthen Pakistan,s internal security and
stop the flow of fighters and weapons into Afghanistan. He
raised Russian concern with the seemingly contradictory
approach taken by Islamabad that included talking to
extremists and fighting them simultaneously. Maryasov
questioned the wisdom of democratizing Pakistan when
stabilizing the country was the priority, drawing parallels
between the difficulty both Islamabad and Kabul had fighting
extremists.

Iran
--------------


7. (C) In response to DAS Krol's question about Russia's
assessment of Iranian influence in Afghanistan, Maryasov said
that Iran was in a "strong position" helped by its ethnic
ties to Afghanistan, as well as the funding Iran provided for
Afghan infrastructure projects. Tehran enjoyed "normal
relations" with Karzai, but also took seriously the fact that
Afghanistan provided the U.S. a "base" from which to carry
out anti-Iranian activity.


8. (C) Maryasov stressed that the GOR thought it necessary to
engage in an effective dialogue with Iran, which had the
ability to impact the situation in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
elsewhere in the Middle East. This required settling the
Iranian nuclear issue without additional sanctions that would
only make Iran "feel cornered." Maryasov said that a new
administration in Washington offered a "great chance" to
change the U.S. approach toward Iran. He advised that doing
so would offer support to the reformers in Tehran that were
crucial to diminishing the influence of Ahmedinijad and other
radicals.


9. (U) DAS Krol has cleared this cable.
BEYRLE