RUSSIA INCHES AWAY FROM ARMENIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003364

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON AM AZ RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA INCHES AWAY FROM ARMENIA

Classified By: POL M/C Alice Wells for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In the aftermath of the Georgia conflict,
Russian and Armenian officials assert there has been no
change in Russian-Armenian relations, and see no detrimental
impact of possible improved relations between Turkey and
Armenia. Experts however argue that Russia is able to use
the leeway it has with Armenia -- due to Armenia's dependence
on Russia -- to pursue increased ties with the
geostrategically more wily Aliyev. Russia sees Armenia's
relations to Turkey as limited to practical cooperation,
while the GOT's proposed cooperation platform is still too
vague to be a factor. Strong domestic lobbies within the
Kremlin mitigate against any abrupt change of Russian course.
End Summary.

--------------
Bilateral ties
--------------


2. (C) MFA Armenia desk counselor Sergei Vinogradov told us
in an October 31 meeting that bilateral relations between
Russia and Armenia remained unchanged. He took pains to
explain that Medvedev's first visit to Armenia as president
October 20-21, long after his July 2008 visit to Azerbaijan,
was not a slight to Armenia. Vinogradov noted that there
were 12 presidential visits between the two countries since
2005, including four visits in 2008 by Armenian president
Sargsian to Russia in March, June, September, and November.
There was no reason to believe that the GOR was seeking
Azerbaijan's favor, to Armenia's detriment.


3. (C) Vinogradov stressed that bilateral ties between
Russia and Armenia remained significant. Russia continued to
be Armenia's largest trade partner in both exports and
imports, and trade with Armenia had increased sharply in the
past months, even though Armenia's access to Georgian ports
had been interrupted in the conflict. Vinogradov noted
Russian investments in Armenia helped "keep that country
afloat," as did the remittances from Armenian guest workers
in Russia, in addition to improving Armenia's tech level.
Vinogradov also pointed to Russian military support for
Armenia, positing that the 2000 agreement to locate the 102nd
Russian military base in Armenia in order to guard its
borders was part of Russia's contribution to guarantee
stability in the Caucasus.

--------------
Turkey
--------------


4. (C) Vinogradov noted Turkey's recent favorable politics
toward and interest in establishing diplomatic relations with
Armenia, but stated that Armenia's geographical position -- a
Christian country almost surrounded by Muslim neighbors --
naturally ensured that Armenia would continue to maintain
close ties with Russia. Vinogradov saw Armenia seeking ties
with Turkey for pragmatic reasons only -- to improve
Armenia's international transport and communications ties,
which had suffered during the Georgian conflict. Vinogradov
said Russia had no formal position on Turkey's proposal for a
stability and cooperation platform, but was willing to
consider the GOT's plans once they were fleshed out.

--------------
Nagorno-Karabakh
--------------


5. (C) Vinogradov affirmed that Russia's support for
resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict within the Minsk
Group remained unchanged. It was a success in itself to get
Sargsian and Aliyev to talk together again at the November 2
summit, after their first meeting in June. Vinogradov
painted Russia as an impartial mediator whose offer to assist
had been welcomed by both sides.

--------------
Armenian Embassy
--------------


6. (C) Armenian counselor Ruben Ananyan similarly insisted
November 8 that Armenia did not feel Russia was letting down
Armenia by courting Azerbaijan, noting the traditionally
close ties between the two Christian countries. In the same
vein, Armenia had no intention of moving closer to Turkey at
Russia's expense. Any improvement in relations with Turkey
would only be for purely "practical" reasons. Given
Armenia's near-isolation, Ananyan said Armenia needed to
speak with all its neighbors, including Iran, but did so
openly so as not to antagonize its other neighbors.


MOSCOW 00003364 002 OF 002


--------------
Experts
--------------


7. (C) Despite the official denials, analysts detect a shift
in Russian-Armenian relations in favor of a
Russian-Azerbaijani rapprochement. An editorial in the
November 17 Caucasian Review of International Affairs claims
Moscow is inching away from Armenia and toward Azerbaijan,
reflecting the view that Russia offered Azerbaijan a Karabakh
resolution -- which would require Russia to abandon its
traditional pro-Armenian bias -- in return for access to
Azeri gas. Others suggest Russia was now starting to use the
leeway it already possesses in its relations to Armenia, due
to Armenian dependence on Russia. Sergei Markedonov from the
Institute for Political and Military Analysis asserted that
the recent warming of relations between Moscow and Baku --
including via statements such as chairman of the State Duma
Committee for the CIS Aleksey Ostrovskiy's recent support for
the principle of territorial integrity as a "governing
principle of international law" -- were a cause for alarm in
Yerevan. Pavel Sheremet from ORTV credited Russia's new
friendliness to Azerbaijan, including offers on energy
cooperation, to the strong Azerbaijani lobby in Russia, which
"influenced the Kremlin."

--------------
Comment
--------------


8. (C) While Russia may be pocketing its close relations
with Armenia, investing more time and diplomacy in the
geostrategically more wily Aliyev, there are strong Armenian
and Azerbaijani lobbies in the Kremlin that mitigate the
chances of an abrupt change in GOR policy.
BEYRLE