RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH OVERCOMES BARRIERS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003362

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH OVERCOMES BARRIERS,
SOLIDIFIES DOMESTIC ROLE

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Alice G. Wells for reason
1.4(d)


1. (C) Summary. Uncertain economic and political
circumstances are having an impact on the role that the
Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) plays and steps it must take to
ensure its activities continue. In addition to domestic
challenges facing the ROC, the financial crisis has compelled
Patriarch Aleksey II to appeal for government financial
support and encouraged Orthodox social groups to seek
government favors. As a result of calls from the West for
greater respect for human rights in Russia, the Church
provided an official explanation of its view on human rights,
which urged less western intervention. Radical Bishop Diomid
from Chukhotka continued to call for the removal of the ROC
leadership, but there is little possibility of a significant
schism especially after the ROC defrocked him on October 6.
Aleksey II, in a reversal of past ROC opinion, sanctified the
family of Tsar Nicholas II as martyrs, officially restoring
them to the Church. Orthodox leaders also pushed for greater
ties with the Russian military, aiming to reintroduce
chaplains into the shrinking military forces. End Summary.

Financial Crisis: Medvedev, Luzhkov to Provide Alms to ROC?
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2. (SBU) Against the backdrop of the global economic crisis,
the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) recently took steps to
preserve its own place in Russian society. According to
press reports, Patriarch Aleksey II appealed to Medvedev in a
letter on November 4 for a guarantee of financial security
and preferential treatment for the financial accounts of the
ROC in the wake of the economic crisis in Russia.
Immediately after the story leaked, a Moscow Patriarchate
spokesperson unconvincingly denied its authenticity,
according to Russian news daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta's Andrey
Melnikov. Aleksey supposedly argued in the letter that the
ROC, unlike corporations, could not earn a profit from their
financial holdings, nor could it take out insurance to lower
risks, and therefore needed special consideration from the
state. The ROC also pushed to receive tax-free status on all
church properties utilized in carrying out its fundamental
activities.


3. (SBU) Official and unofficial ROC members also presented
ideas to Russian leaders to benefit the Church financially.
As reports circulated about Aleksey's letter to Medvedev, ROC
Bishop Dmitriy Smirnov gave a well-publicized sermon on
November 8 calling on Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov to finance
the construction of Orthodox churches in the outlying areas
of the city. Smirnov appealed to Luzhkov's concern for
public welfare, adding that Muscovites need new churches no
less than they need better roads and bridges. On the same
day, the social organization Union of Orthodox Citizens (UOC)
proposed that the Russian government develop a special
Orthodox network of food markets adjoining Orthodox parishes
throughout the country, thus providing special commercial
opportunities for the ROC. So far, the GOR has not responded
to these requests at any level.

Human Rights Concept Differs from Western Ideals
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4. (SBU) On June 26, the Russian Orthodox Church presented
its human rights concept which, in part, served as an
alternative medium for official Kremlin resistance to Western
criticism of Russia's human rights situation. In this
thinly-veiled rebuke of Western ideals, the ROC used a page
from Putin's playbook and suggested that "some civilizations
should not impose their own way of life on other
civilizations under the pretext of human rights protection,"
and human rights should account for different cultural and
religious traditions. In his statement, Head of ROC External
Relations Metropolitan Kirill claimed that public
institutions often have forced Christians to act in ways that
contradict God's commandments, preventing them from finding
salvation. Kirill cited the right to life, the freedom of
conscience and expression, the right to education, and
socio-economic, political, civic, and collective rights as
part of the ROC's human rights concept, while condemning
homosexuality, abortion, and suicide.


5. (C) Owner and director of the analytical religion website
www.Portal-Credo.ru Aleksander Soldatov told us on November
14 that Kirill managed to manipulate both the liberal and
conservative wings of the ROC, and used the human rights
concept to pacify those on the far right. The Church linked
patriotism to the teachings of Jesus Christ, explaining that
the love a Christian feels for family and friends naturally
carried over into love for the homeland. According to
Soldatov, by playing the patriotic card as part of the human

rights concept, Kirill controlled the conservative elements
in the Church. Kirill supplemented this tactic by connecting
human dignity and morality, saying that a Christian must live
in accordance with moral norms by asserting personal
responsibility. Going further, Kirill added that while the
ROC recognized the value of freedom of choice in society as a
human rights concept, a Christian's evil choices eroded the
value of that very freedom and, therefore, human rights
cannot be superior to spiritual values. Head of the human
rights organization "Memorial" Valentin Gefter contradicted
Kirill's statement, telling the press on June 27 that "morals
must not be the exclusive criteria for evaluating human
rights."

Bishop Diomid, Old Believers: Little Chance for Schism
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6. (C) As the Church strove to unite adherents under a
singular values system, it also struggled with internal
dissent from Bishop Diomid. At the October 6 gathering of
the Holy Synod, the ROC officially defrocked the highly
controversial former bishop, infamous for his condemnations
of Patriarch Aleksey II's acknowledgment of Orthodox
spiritual commonalties with Judaism, the ROC's cooperation
with the government, and for the Church's failure to advocate
for the rehabilitation of the Romanov dynasty. Diomid
continued to receive encouragement from ultranationalists and
hardliners after his demotion; however, only 15 protesters
picketed outside of the patriarch's residence at Danilovsky
Monastery as the Holy Synod deposed him. On October 6,
Vsevolod Chaplin told us that Diomid maintained support from
followers in the Russian Far East and St. Petersburg, but he
could not provide specific parishes or numbers. Even though
the ROC demoted Diomid from the rank of bishop to an ordinary
monk, Kirill expressed hope that Diomid would repent and
return to the fold, and that the ROC would restore him as a
bishop once again should he recant his criticism. Diomid
announced in July his intent to create a rival Orthodox
Church in Moscow, one that opposed association with the
Russian government.


7. (C) On October 17, the Convocation of the Russian Church
of Old Believers voted to continue contacts with the ROC
Moscow Patriarchate, despite the threat of a resulting schism
among Old Believers, because of the "growing public interest
in ancient church tradition." Old Believers head
Metropolitan Korniliy called on the twenty members who had
broken with the Old Believers in protest against Korniliy's
contact with the ROC to return to the fold of the main
church. Soviet dissident and defrocked priest Gleb Yakunin
told us on November 14 that the situation with both the Old
Believers and Bishop Diomid remained unclear, but he expected
greater ROC contact with the Old Believers leadership, yet
did not expect that Diomid would return to the Russian
Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate after the ROC's
"propaganda campaign against him."

ROC Opposes Communist Legacy
--------------


8. (SBU) Incidentally defusing one of Diomid's complaints,
the ROC formally acknowledged on October 2 the family of
Russia's last tsar as martyrs of the Church. Deputy Head of
the ROC's Department of External Relations Vsevolod Chaplin
announced that the ROC sanctified Emperor Nicholas II and his
family as regal martyrs, and believed that the government's
admission of unfounded repression against the Russian royal
family would promote a "moral rebirth in Russia." On October
1, the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation had recognized the royal family as "unjustifiably
repressed and subject to rehabilitation," satisfying a
complaint from House of the Romanovs attorney German Lukyanov
challenging a 2007 Supreme Court resolution that refused to
rehabilitate the family of the last Russian emperor.
According to a VTsIOM poll released on November 17, 69% of
Russians surveyed positively viewed the Church's
rehabilitation of the tsar and his family, and 44% expressed
sympathy for his actions before the 1917 revolution. The
Romanov's elicited higher support than Lenin (42%),NKVD
Chief Feliks Dzherzhinskiy (40%),and Stalin (28%). The
adjustment in official Church policy followed Vsevolod
Chaplin's call to remove the Communist stars from the Kremlin
spires in September as well as the UOC's push to block the
restoration of a statue dedicated to KGB Director Feliks
Dzherzhinsky in front of FSB headquarters across from
Lyubyanka Square.

Church-Military Relations Strengthening?
--------------


9. (SBU) As reports circulated about reduced interest in

military service, the ROC has coordinated with the Russian
Army over the past several months on increased spiritual
education for military personnel, a throwback to
pre-Communist times. Head of the Public Chamber Commission
on War Veterans Alexander Kanshin stated on November 11 that
the ROC and Russian Armed Forces should legally establish
closer contacts, proven as an "efficient way to boost the
moral and psychological state of army and navy personnel."
Kanshin questioned the efficacy of Russia's national defense
considering that most conscripts joined the military for
purely financial motives, without spiritual direction. One
suggestion for building stronger ties has been the
restoration of regimental priests, a practice introduced in
1716 by Peter the Great. Patriarch Aleksey II provided his
blessing to an experiment in 2006 to reintroduce military
chaplains at the troop level, yet no formal legislation
passed in the interim. However, in September 2008 religious
officials of all four officially recognized religions --
Orthodoxy, Judaism, Buddhism, and Islam -- participated in
the Tsentr-2008 military exercise located in the Volga-Ural
military district. While ROC officials drove the initiative
over the past several years, other religious leaders planned
to ride on the coattails of the ROC. Jewish representatives
from the Federation of Jewish Communities in Russia (FEOR)
introduced a mobile synagogue and chaplains at the
Tsentr-2008 military exercises, and Muslim leaders softened
their tone, planning to monitor the ROC's "forward approach"
after criticizing the Church's 2006 suggestion for
multi-confession chaplains as a violation of the Russian
Constitution. Religious organizations continue to devote
attention to this issue considering that 64 percent of all
Russian servicemen are believers, according to an Armed
Forces Sociological Center poll (Note: 83% are Orthodox, 8%
are Muslim, 9% are Jewish, Buddhists, or worshippers of other
religions. End Note).

Comment
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10. (C) Despite the fact that less than 10% of Russians
actively participate in Russian Orthodox life, over 70% of
the population identifies themselves as Orthodox and, in
turn, identifies with Orthodox beliefs. The ROC's human
rights concept not only represents the general Russian
preference for financial security over personal rights, it
also neatly overlaps with Kremlin ideology against the
violation of a sovereign country's beliefs. As the financial
crisis impacts Russian institutions more severely, the
Church's dependence on support from the Kremlin will
increase. In order to mollify growing concern about a longer
economic downturn, the GOR will expect the ROC to stay on
message, rallying public opinion in its favor.
BEYRLE