Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MOSCOW3323
2008-11-17 13:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIA'S CONCEPT OF THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST,

Tags:  PROV PREL ECON MARR RS XF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2815
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHMO #3323/01 3221339
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171339Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0741
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003323 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2018
TAGS: PROV PREL ECON MARR RS XF
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S CONCEPT OF THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST,
TINGED BY RACISM

REF: A. MOSCOW 751

B. MOSCOW 346

C. MOSCOW 1478

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003323

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2018
TAGS: PROV PREL ECON MARR RS XF
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S CONCEPT OF THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST,
TINGED BY RACISM

REF: A. MOSCOW 751

B. MOSCOW 346

C. MOSCOW 1478

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary: With the prospect of a major Middle East
conference being convened in Moscow in early 2009, analysts
explained to us how Russia views the Middle East and how they
believe the region, in turn, views Russia. For Russians, the
"Middle East" is a concept more than a region, which includes
Russia's Muslim population, Central Asia, and the broader
Middle East. The primary importance of the Middle East lies
in its ability to create instability within the Muslim world,
which could threaten Russian interests. Analysts believe
that Russian influence in the region is severely limited, and
the GOR has little chance of making an impact on the Middle
East peace process. They doubt the real extent of Russia's
supposed increase in economic activity in the region, which,
apart from certain energy deals, is based upon Middle Eastern
governments using Russia to appear to balance their
relationship with the U.S. Russia's real influence is with
the "Arab street" that again looks to Moscow to counter
Washington, as it did during the Soviet era. Ironically, the
analysts believe that Russians harbor racist attitudes toward
Arabs and Moscow cares little for their well-being. End
summary.

Russia's Expansive Idea of the "Middle East"
--------------


2. (C) The Moscow Carnegie Center's Dmitri Trenin explained
that Russians have an expansive concept of the "Middle East"
that consists of three parts: Russia's Muslim population,
Central Asia, and the broader Middle East that includes
"everything West of India." Russia's Muslims are the most
important aspect of the "Middle East," as they have the
greatest political and security implications. While there is
no Russian version of an American-style ethnic lobby, the
views of Russian Muslims are taken seriously by the political
leadership and relations with the larger Muslim world are
considered a factor in maintaining "domestic tranquillity"
(ref A). The potential for trouble with "restive" Muslims in

the Caucasus still exists, although Moscow is ready to co-opt
them the way it did in Chechnya through Kadyrov. Central
Asia is viewed as part of Russia's sphere of influence and
has to be protected from outside influences, including Iran
and Muslim extremists.


3. (C) Trenin said that although Russians saw developments in
the West and East Asia as most crucial to their interests,
they did consider the "southern flank" because events in the
Middle East could adversely impact the Muslim populations in
Russia and Central Asia. This view was seconded by Tzvey
Mirkin, an Israeli Emboff and former chief Russia analyst for
the Israeli MFA, who thought that Russian interest in the
Middle East was based upon the belief that the region was the
primary source of global instability and threatened Central
Asia, the Caucasus, and other predominantly Muslim parts of
Russia.

Russian Influence and Opportunities Limited
--------------


4. (C) Analysts were nearly unanimous in telling us that
Russian influence in the Middle East was limited. Trenin
said that Russia was no longer a "stakeholder" in any one
Middle Eastern country, perhaps with the exception of Syria
as a result of arms sales. Even there, however, Moscow's
ability to influence Damascus' actions was limited. Both
Trenin and Marianna Belenkaya, a commentator at RIA Novesti
and Russia Today's Arabic service, said that Russia was not
willing to spend its capital, either political or monetary,
in the manner of the U.S. and Europe. Until Russia is
willing to provide real aid to the region, the way the U.S.
does with Israel, Egypt and Jordan, it will never have
anywhere near the level of influence.


5. (C) Analysts thought that Russia had proven it had little
ability to bring positives to international dialogue in the
Middle East, and that Moscow's real influence amounted to its
"obstacle-making ability." They reiterated that the
prospects for the GOR's plans for a Moscow Middle East
conference, now slated for the spring of 2009, were dim.
Both Georgi Mirksy, a longtime Arabist currently with the
Institute of Higher Economics, and Middle East Studies
Institute Director Yevgeniy Satanovskiy, stressed that if
Washington could not bring the Israelis and Palestinians to
an agreement despite years of trying, there was little Moscow
could accomplish.


MOSCOW 00003323 002 OF 002


Business Contracts Tied to ME Politics
--------------


6. (C) Belenkaya argued that Russian prospects in the Middle
East were so meager that many contracts were given to Russian
companies by Middle Eastern governments for political
purposes, and could be withdrawn for the same reasons. She
pointed to Saudi Arabia, where Russian Railways appeared to
win, then lose, a major contract; Libya, where Russian oil
and gas companies have encountered difficulties and Moscow
had yet to land an arms deal; and Algeria, which returned
MIGs to Russia complaining of their quality. These countries
went to Russia in order to appear to balance their
relationship with the U.S., but would go back to the U.S. if
it suited their interests. Mirsky agreed that Middle Eastern
countries used Russia to appear to balance their relationship
with the U.S., much as Russia used them to appear a
diplomatic player. He dismissed Putin's touted 2007 trip to
the region as being more about wanting to seem active than
accomplishing real political objectives.


7. (C) Ruslan Pukhov, Editor of the Moscow Defense Brief,
dismissed the prospect of Russian military sales to the
Middle East increasing dramatically. He classified Russia's
primary arms customers as "marginally blockaded markets"
Syria, Iran and Venezuela, plus countries such as Malaysia
and Indonesia that wish to avoid the political strings that
come with buying from the U.S. Pukhov thought little of
reports of a potential Saudi arms purchase, saying that
Riyadh was simply "throwing Russia a bone." Mirkin thought,
however, that the Russian establishment took potential arms
sales and other contracts in the region seriously since they
stood to benefit personally.

Russia's Influence is With the Arab Street
--------------


8. (C) If Russia has influence in the Middle East, it is with
the Arab street that now looks to Russia the way it did the
Soviet Union to stand up to the U.S., argued Belenkaya.
During the Georgia crisis, Russia Today's Arabic service was
deluged with emails from people in the Middle East who were
glad that "Russia was back." The prevalence of such
sentiments meant that regional leaders talk-up their
relations with Russia in order to strike a pose for public
consumption. The odd arms sale or business contract with
Russian companies accomplished this as well. Ironically,
both Belenkaya and Mirsky argued, the Russian leadership did
not really care about Arabs, their views of which were tinged
by racism. They only felt warmly toward Israelis, with whom
Russia had strong cultural ties.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) Analysts have typically viewed Russian motives in the
Middle East with skepticism, and recognized the limits of GOR
influence in the region (ref B). They appear to have taken
the last year, which began with hope that Russia could use
its relationships with Syria, Lebanon, Hamas, and even Iran,
to help move the various tracks of the peace process forward,
as a sign that Russian options are even more circumspect than
once believed. When it came time for Moscow to use its
vaunted ties with Damascus and Tehran to help settle the
stalemate over selection of a new Lebanese President, even
the GOR admitted that it had little real ability to do so
(ref C). For Russia, the Middle East remains a concern
primarily because Moscow believes that the region can cause
it trouble. The Middle East also offers Russia the
opportunity to appear a vigorous diplomatic player. The
upcoming Moscow conference holds out the prospect of
maintaining this appearance, if little else.
BEYRLE