RUSSIA-GEORGIA: GENEVA PROCESS, PEREVI;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003309

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA-GEORGIA: GENEVA PROCESS, PEREVI;
NAGORNO-KARABAKH

REF: MOSCOW 3303

Classified By: A/DCM Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In a November 13 meeting, MFA fourth CIS
directorate chief Andrey Kelin described the procedural
difficulties EU Special Representative Morel faced in lining
up the November 18 Geneva process talks. Russia's primary
goal for the talks was to launch security discussions focused
on the buildup of Georgian forces near South Ossetia. Kelin
insisted a credible observer regime in Georgia proper had to
be established before it would be possible to discuss similar
"transparency" inside South Ossetia. On Perevi, Kelin said
Russian troops had been stationed in the South Ossetian town
of (Lesser) Perevi, as opposed to the neighboring town of
Perevi in Georgia proper. Similarly, Kelin rejected demands
that Russian troops withdraw from Akhalgori. Kelin predicted
"50 agreements" would be negotiated with each breakaway
republic following the Federation Council's November 12
ratification of the friendship treaties. On
Nagorno-Karabakh, Kelin said differences had been narrowed,
but no date set for the next ministerial level consultations.
End Summary.

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Geneva Process
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Format
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2. (C) MFA fourth CIS directorate chief Andrey Kelin told us
November 13 that the prospects for the November 18 Geneva
talks were slim, as the parties were still hung up over
procedural issues, despite EU Special Representative Pierre
Morel's shuttle diplomacy between Tbilisi, Tskhinvali, and
Sukhumi. He accused Georgia of behaving "as if nothing had
happened" by demanding to include the heads of the Abkhaz and
South Ossetian "exile governments" on its delegation, while
considering the representatives from the de facto governments
of the breakaway regions as members of the Russian
delegation. According to Kelin, Morel's shuttle diplomacy
last week was bedeviled by two issues. The first was Morel's
decision to start the November 18 talks where the October 15
ones had left off, namely with working group meetings,
instead of a plenary. Kelin noted that Abkhaz "foreign
minister" Sergey Shamba had insisted that all delegations
participate "on equal footing." The second issue was
Tskhinvali's refusal to allow Morel to arrive directly from
Tbilisi instead of via Vladikavkaz. Kelin said Tskhinvali
had relented on the latter point November 12, following GOR
pressure, and now also agreed to Morel's format proposal, as
long as the Georgian delegation did not include such figures
as Dmitry Sanakoyev or Alan Parastayev. Choosing Deputy
Foreign Minister Giga Bokeria as head of the Georgian
delegation was also unhelpful, Kelin charged. While Russia
was "not fixated on details" of the Geneva meeting, Kelin
said the GOR wanted progress in the working groups on
security issues and IDP return. Bokeria, who is not trusted
by the Russians and is "despised" even by the Georgian elite,
was not a figure capable of delivering results.

Georgian Rearmament
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3. (C) When asked about Russia's end-of-year timeline for
the Geneva talks, Kelin said Russia's goal for the Geneva
process was to stop the creeping buildup of Georgian forces
in the areas adjacent to South Ossetia, and, to a lesser
extent, Abkhazia. Instead of 11 Georgian police posts, Kelin
said Russian intelligence showed there were 24 posts
bordering South Ossetia, 10 of which were maintained by
Georgia's Ministry of Interior (MOI),14 by the Ministry of
Defense (MOD). Kelin maintained that heavy weapons,
including Grad multiple-launch rocket systems, were being
moved into Gori. He called on the EU observers to monitor
those developments. Kelin compared the buildup to the
situation pre-August conflict, and criticized that there were
no limits for troop numbers, or manned and unmanned flights
over the territories. Russia was receiving signals that
Georgian president Saakashvili was planning to seize lost
territories. We noted that the Georgian troops hardly
constituted a threat to Russian forces and reaffirmed
Georgia's sovereign right to self-defense.

OSCE and EUMM Access
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4. (C) Kelin said that EU observers would meet with the
Russian deputy commander of troops November 17, to discuss

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continued sniper fire from Georgia, which demonstrated the
need for a "special investigative mechanism." When pressed
that international monitors constituted such a mechanism and
Russia should grant them access to South Ossetian territory,
Kelin responded that a working observation regime in Georgia
proper had to be established before it would be possible to
discuss "transparency" in South Ossetia. Kelin insisted
South Ossetia was not blocking the return of eight OSCE
monitors, only demanding that the monitors be different from
those who allegedly "did nothing to prevent the August
conflict." (Noting the recent article citing OSCE observers
suggesting that Georgia precipitated the conflict on August
7, Kelin sniped, "it must be true, it was in the New York
Times.") Kelin suggested that the issues of violence in
Perevi, Akhalgori, and elsewhere were logically to be
discussed in Geneva.

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Perevi
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5. (C) In response to our strong concern over Russian
facilitation of South Ossetian forces into Perevi, Kelin
pulled out a map of South Ossetia drawn by A. A. Tsutsiyev in
2007 (available in Kavkazkiy Sbornik),which showed that one
town called Perevi lay outside of South Ossetia in Georgia
proper, while the neighboring village to the south, also
called (Lesser) Perevi, was located within South Ossetian
territory. Kelin claimed that South Ossetian "special
presidential envoy" Chochiyev had provided Morel with census
data from 1989 showing that the two towns bearing the name of
Perevi were distinct. Russian troops had been stationed in
Lesser Perevi, Kelin said, but had moved to Sinagur, in order
to avoid the controversy of allegedly being outside of South
Ossetia. Sinagur still afforded Russian troops control over
the only access road to Lesser Perevi, which at one point
moves through Georgia proper and therefore allows Georgia to
cut off South Ossetia's access to Lesser Perevi. Kelin said
no decision had been made yet to move 30 Russian troops back
to Lesser Perevi, as the Foreign Minister had told U/S Burns
November 12 (reftel). We stressed that the EUMM and OSCE
took issue with Russian geographical claims, and reinforced
Russian responsibility for the actions of its South Ossetian
clients.

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Akhalgori
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6. (C) On Akhalgori, Kelin again referred to the map to
demonstrate that the city lay in South Ossetian territory,
and noted that this had been the case since South Ossetia
joined Georgia as an autonomous republic in 1922, except for
a brief period under former Georgian President Zviad
Gamsakhurdia. Russian troops had no plans to withdraw from
Akhalgori, Kelin said, especially as Russia wanted to ward
off any Georgian incursion from the road through that town.

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Next steps
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7. (C) After the Russian Federation Council on November 12
ratified the September 17 treaties on friendship,
cooperation, and mutual assistance between Russia and South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, Kelin noted Medvedev needed to sign the
treaties, after which "about 50 agreements" would be
concluded on military cooperation, the guarding of borders,
dual citizenship, free trade, and other economic, cultural,
and social issues. Newly appointed Russian ambassadors were
already operating out of the MFA, and would depart to their
posts before the end of the year.

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Nagorno-Karabakh
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8. (C) Kelin was upbeat on the November 2 summit on
Nagorno-Karabakh, saying it gave a signal that a deal was
possible. Despite the "protocol glitch" that the presidents
"forgot" to brief the Minsk Group co-chairs, progress was
made in narrowing differences over the Basic Principles, with
the most daunting challenge remaining how to sell a deal to
the two publics. Both sides agreed that each step should be
guaranteed (possibly by the U.S., Russia, France, and the
Security Council),on the Lachin corridor, as well as the
status of Karabakh. Apart from a visit by the mediators to
the region next week, Kelin said Russia had no dates yet for
calling a meeting of the Foreign Ministers.
BEYRLE