Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MOSCOW3303
2008-11-14 08:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:
UNDERSECRETARY BURNS' MEETING WITH FM LAVROV:
how-toVZCZCXRO3567 OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHMO #3303/01 3190823 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 140823Z NOV 08 ZFR (ZUI RUEHSD 0068 3230420) FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0711 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003303
ZFR ZFR PLEASE CANCEL THIS TELEGRAM IN ITS ENTIRETY.
CABLE WILL BE REISSUED.
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR KNNP KACT MNUC EFIN AF GG AM
AJ, MD, IR, RS
SUBJECT: UNDERSECRETARY BURNS' MEETING WITH FM LAVROV:
US-RUSSIA RELATIONS, POST-START, MISSILE DEFENSE, GEORGIA,
NAGORNO-KARABAKH, TRANSNISTRIA, MEPP, EL ZAHABI
REF: MOSCOW 3243
MOSCOW 00003303 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
MOSCOW 00003303 002 OF 003
sites, Lavrov suggested, but perhaps could come and go in
shifts, as long as there would be a Russian presence around
the clock. But the Poles and Czechs continued to tell Moscow
that Russian officers would need to be invited and to request
and receive permission to enter the sites. He added that he
still did not fully understand the concept of reciprocity.
5. (C) Lavrov said Russia wanted to continue the discussions
with U/S Rood, but did not think it was possible to complete
the interagency review and consultations by the first week of
December, as Washington had proposed. The second or third
week of December would be better, Lavrov said, but stressed
that Moscow wanted to meet before the end of the year. The
MFA would prepare some additional papers for the U.S. prior
to the meeting, he added.
6. (C) U/S Burns agreed it was important to continue the
discussions on MD and post-START before the end of the year.
Medvedev's statement had sent the wrong message to the
President-elect, he noted, but this also emphasized how
important it was to reconstitute a serious strategic dialogue
between the U.S. and Russia. He expressed the hope that the
tone of Russia's messages could emphasize the areas where we
could work together constructively. The sharp and
increasingly negative tone of Russian rhetoric was
counterproductive, especially as the U.S. was going through a
transition to a new Administration.
Resume Economic Dialogue
--------------
7. (C) Lavrov said Russia wanted more economic cooperation
with the U.S. It was unfortunate that the events in the
Caucasus had led to the cancellation of the dialogue between
U/S Jeffery and First Deputy Foreign Minister Denisov. He
asked if the two could meet before January 20. He added that
while the dialogue between the two was a useful tool, it was
not clear that a first deputy FM had enough leverage. We
might want to consider a higher-level dialogue, something
like Gore-Chernomyrdin. There should also be a separate
business-to-business dialogue, without government
representation, but with the government aware of what was
being discussed. Lavrov also said he had been surprised by
Japan's postponement of G8 meetings and hoped they could be
rescheduled soon.
8. (C) Burns said Jeffery would try to call or to talk to
Denisov on the margins of the G20 meeting in Washington and
propose that the two look for a date to meet. The
Jeffery-Denisov dialogue mechanism was useful in light of the
global financial crisis. It was important to have structural
dialogues on economic, as well as security, issues. He noted
there was not much time before the end of the Japanese
chairmanship to reschedule G8 meetings, but said the U.S. was
not opposed to going forward with areas such as the Lyon
Process meetings, non-proliferation, and energy efficiency.
Georgia: Perevi, Abkhazia, November 18 Meeting
-------------- -
9. (C) Noting that there was not much to add to the
discussion between the Secretary and Lavrov on Georgia in
Sharm-el-Sheikh the previous weekend, U/S Burns stressed the
importance of keeping the situation in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia stable, and for Russia to protect the civilian
population in the two enclaves.
10. (C) Lavrov said Russia was trying to protect the
populace. Moscow was concerned about increased tensions in
the town of Perevi. The border had "run down the middle of
the town," and Russia had had a checkpoint on the South
Ossetian side. But when, several days before, groups living
there "rearranged the border," Russian troops had withdrawn.
But the tensions there had risen, and so, Lavrov said, he had
instructed Defense Minister Serdyukov to send approximately
30 troops back in to the checkpoint to supervise the South
Ossetian side. Russia was also working to prevent ethnic
clashes, but the situation required vigilance on both sides
of the border.
11. (C) In Abkhazia, the Georgians were "still active,"
Lavrov contended. Some "unrecognized" groups kept trying to
get into the Russian outpost. Saying all the Georgians who
MOSCOW 00003303 003 OF 003
had wanted to leave the enclave had already left, Lavrov
acknowledged it would be difficult for those who wanted to go
back, and it would take time. But, he insisted, Russia would
be willing to assist them when they did.
12. (C) Lavrov said he had urged the French to focus on
substance at the November 18 meeting in Geneva. If the
participants were hung up on questions of format, or issues
like nameplates and badges, it could fall apart like the
October 15 meeting. He noted that French negotiator Morel
would travel to Moscow after the EU-Russia Summit in Nice on
November 14. He said it was "too bad" that former Georgian
Deputy Foreign Minister Vashadze had become Minister of
Culture as Russia had been able to work with him. But it
might be useful to arrange some cultural exchanges between
the two sides.
Nagorno-Karabakh: Encouraging Signs, but Obstacles Remain
-------------- --------------
13. (C) In response to U/S Burns' question, Lavrov said there
had been "encouraging signs" during the meeting of the
Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents in Moscow the previous
week, but no breakthroughs on Nagorno-Karabakh (NK). The
fact that they had met and signed a joint declaration had
sent a good "political signal," but, Lavrov noted, it had not
been easy getting agreement on the declaration. The main
stumbling block was still Armenia's insistence that the
Lachin Corridor have the same status as NK. Azerbaijan's
reluctance to include any reference to the Madrid principles
had also made it difficult to reach agreement on the
declaration. Still, he said, it was important for the two
Presidents to say that they would continue to meet and to
instruct their Foreign Ministers to meet. Lavrov added that
the Armenian and Azerbaijani Ambassadors to Moscow, both
former Ministers of Culture would do a joint visit to Baku,
Yerevan and Nagorno-Karabakh.
Transnistria
--------------
14. (C) The Transnistria issue was much more difficult than
NK, Lavrov said. Russia had again tried to use Medvedev's
office to restart a dialogue, but Smirnov had undermined the
effort by refusing to let Voronin travel to his native
village. Lavrov stressed that, as with NK, Russia and the
U.S. needed to "act in synch." Moscow was not doing anything
out of line with the "5-plus-2" process, he claimed, but was
concerned when it heard European envoys saying an EU role
would "prevent too much Russian influence," or a NATO
official remarking that NATO needed to think about ways to
stop Russian actions, and to get NATO involved. "We're not
looking for credit," he said, and this "should not be seen as
a fight for territory."
MEPP
--------------
15. (C) Lavrov said the meeting in Sharm-el-Sheikh had been
"not bad." It had reinforced all the parties' desire to keep
the framework going. Livni had been confident she would
become Prime Minister and Abbas had committed to continuing
negotiations. Russia wanted to help Egypt prevent Hamas from
blocking progress until January, when Abbas; mandate expired.
The GOR had sent a "strong message" to Hamas saying it
supported Egypt's proposal and urging Hamas to abide by its
commitment to work constructively.
El Zahabi: Acquiescence
--------------
16. (C) U/S Burns said he hoped the U.S. and Russia were
close to finalizing the transfer of Mohamed Kamal El Zahabi
to Russia. He thanked the Minister for Russia's assurances
that El Zahabi would not be held in detention in Chechnya,
and that while he was in Russian detention, the USG would
have physical access to him. Lavrov nodded, and said "yes, I
think we acted expeditiously on this issue." Post will
follow up to get a cover letter from MFA North America
Director Neverov enclosing the assurance letters previously
provided.
BEYRLE
ZFR ZFR PLEASE CANCEL THIS TELEGRAM IN ITS ENTIRETY.
CABLE WILL BE REISSUED.
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR KNNP KACT MNUC EFIN AF GG AM
AJ, MD, IR, RS
SUBJECT: UNDERSECRETARY BURNS' MEETING WITH FM LAVROV:
US-RUSSIA RELATIONS, POST-START, MISSILE DEFENSE, GEORGIA,
NAGORNO-KARABAKH, TRANSNISTRIA, MEPP, EL ZAHABI
REF: MOSCOW 3243
MOSCOW 00003303 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
MOSCOW 00003303 002 OF 003
sites, Lavrov suggested, but perhaps could come and go in
shifts, as long as there would be a Russian presence around
the clock. But the Poles and Czechs continued to tell Moscow
that Russian officers would need to be invited and to request
and receive permission to enter the sites. He added that he
still did not fully understand the concept of reciprocity.
5. (C) Lavrov said Russia wanted to continue the discussions
with U/S Rood, but did not think it was possible to complete
the interagency review and consultations by the first week of
December, as Washington had proposed. The second or third
week of December would be better, Lavrov said, but stressed
that Moscow wanted to meet before the end of the year. The
MFA would prepare some additional papers for the U.S. prior
to the meeting, he added.
6. (C) U/S Burns agreed it was important to continue the
discussions on MD and post-START before the end of the year.
Medvedev's statement had sent the wrong message to the
President-elect, he noted, but this also emphasized how
important it was to reconstitute a serious strategic dialogue
between the U.S. and Russia. He expressed the hope that the
tone of Russia's messages could emphasize the areas where we
could work together constructively. The sharp and
increasingly negative tone of Russian rhetoric was
counterproductive, especially as the U.S. was going through a
transition to a new Administration.
Resume Economic Dialogue
--------------
7. (C) Lavrov said Russia wanted more economic cooperation
with the U.S. It was unfortunate that the events in the
Caucasus had led to the cancellation of the dialogue between
U/S Jeffery and First Deputy Foreign Minister Denisov. He
asked if the two could meet before January 20. He added that
while the dialogue between the two was a useful tool, it was
not clear that a first deputy FM had enough leverage. We
might want to consider a higher-level dialogue, something
like Gore-Chernomyrdin. There should also be a separate
business-to-business dialogue, without government
representation, but with the government aware of what was
being discussed. Lavrov also said he had been surprised by
Japan's postponement of G8 meetings and hoped they could be
rescheduled soon.
8. (C) Burns said Jeffery would try to call or to talk to
Denisov on the margins of the G20 meeting in Washington and
propose that the two look for a date to meet. The
Jeffery-Denisov dialogue mechanism was useful in light of the
global financial crisis. It was important to have structural
dialogues on economic, as well as security, issues. He noted
there was not much time before the end of the Japanese
chairmanship to reschedule G8 meetings, but said the U.S. was
not opposed to going forward with areas such as the Lyon
Process meetings, non-proliferation, and energy efficiency.
Georgia: Perevi, Abkhazia, November 18 Meeting
-------------- -
9. (C) Noting that there was not much to add to the
discussion between the Secretary and Lavrov on Georgia in
Sharm-el-Sheikh the previous weekend, U/S Burns stressed the
importance of keeping the situation in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia stable, and for Russia to protect the civilian
population in the two enclaves.
10. (C) Lavrov said Russia was trying to protect the
populace. Moscow was concerned about increased tensions in
the town of Perevi. The border had "run down the middle of
the town," and Russia had had a checkpoint on the South
Ossetian side. But when, several days before, groups living
there "rearranged the border," Russian troops had withdrawn.
But the tensions there had risen, and so, Lavrov said, he had
instructed Defense Minister Serdyukov to send approximately
30 troops back in to the checkpoint to supervise the South
Ossetian side. Russia was also working to prevent ethnic
clashes, but the situation required vigilance on both sides
of the border.
11. (C) In Abkhazia, the Georgians were "still active,"
Lavrov contended. Some "unrecognized" groups kept trying to
get into the Russian outpost. Saying all the Georgians who
MOSCOW 00003303 003 OF 003
had wanted to leave the enclave had already left, Lavrov
acknowledged it would be difficult for those who wanted to go
back, and it would take time. But, he insisted, Russia would
be willing to assist them when they did.
12. (C) Lavrov said he had urged the French to focus on
substance at the November 18 meeting in Geneva. If the
participants were hung up on questions of format, or issues
like nameplates and badges, it could fall apart like the
October 15 meeting. He noted that French negotiator Morel
would travel to Moscow after the EU-Russia Summit in Nice on
November 14. He said it was "too bad" that former Georgian
Deputy Foreign Minister Vashadze had become Minister of
Culture as Russia had been able to work with him. But it
might be useful to arrange some cultural exchanges between
the two sides.
Nagorno-Karabakh: Encouraging Signs, but Obstacles Remain
-------------- --------------
13. (C) In response to U/S Burns' question, Lavrov said there
had been "encouraging signs" during the meeting of the
Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents in Moscow the previous
week, but no breakthroughs on Nagorno-Karabakh (NK). The
fact that they had met and signed a joint declaration had
sent a good "political signal," but, Lavrov noted, it had not
been easy getting agreement on the declaration. The main
stumbling block was still Armenia's insistence that the
Lachin Corridor have the same status as NK. Azerbaijan's
reluctance to include any reference to the Madrid principles
had also made it difficult to reach agreement on the
declaration. Still, he said, it was important for the two
Presidents to say that they would continue to meet and to
instruct their Foreign Ministers to meet. Lavrov added that
the Armenian and Azerbaijani Ambassadors to Moscow, both
former Ministers of Culture would do a joint visit to Baku,
Yerevan and Nagorno-Karabakh.
Transnistria
--------------
14. (C) The Transnistria issue was much more difficult than
NK, Lavrov said. Russia had again tried to use Medvedev's
office to restart a dialogue, but Smirnov had undermined the
effort by refusing to let Voronin travel to his native
village. Lavrov stressed that, as with NK, Russia and the
U.S. needed to "act in synch." Moscow was not doing anything
out of line with the "5-plus-2" process, he claimed, but was
concerned when it heard European envoys saying an EU role
would "prevent too much Russian influence," or a NATO
official remarking that NATO needed to think about ways to
stop Russian actions, and to get NATO involved. "We're not
looking for credit," he said, and this "should not be seen as
a fight for territory."
MEPP
--------------
15. (C) Lavrov said the meeting in Sharm-el-Sheikh had been
"not bad." It had reinforced all the parties' desire to keep
the framework going. Livni had been confident she would
become Prime Minister and Abbas had committed to continuing
negotiations. Russia wanted to help Egypt prevent Hamas from
blocking progress until January, when Abbas; mandate expired.
The GOR had sent a "strong message" to Hamas saying it
supported Egypt's proposal and urging Hamas to abide by its
commitment to work constructively.
El Zahabi: Acquiescence
--------------
16. (C) U/S Burns said he hoped the U.S. and Russia were
close to finalizing the transfer of Mohamed Kamal El Zahabi
to Russia. He thanked the Minister for Russia's assurances
that El Zahabi would not be held in detention in Chechnya,
and that while he was in Russian detention, the USG would
have physical access to him. Lavrov nodded, and said "yes, I
think we acted expeditiously on this issue." Post will
follow up to get a cover letter from MFA North America
Director Neverov enclosing the assurance letters previously
provided.
BEYRLE