Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MOSCOW3289
2008-11-13 06:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

DFM KARASIN AND EUR DAS BRYZA DISCUSS GEORGIA AND

Tags:  PREL PGOV GG RS AZ 
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VZCZCXRO9659
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #3289/01 3180651
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 130651Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0687
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003289 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS AZ
SUBJECT: DFM KARASIN AND EUR DAS BRYZA DISCUSS GEORGIA AND
NAGORNO-KARABAKH

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003289

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS AZ
SUBJECT: DFM KARASIN AND EUR DAS BRYZA DISCUSS GEORGIA AND
NAGORNO-KARABAKH

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In a November 1 meeting, Russian Deputy
Foreign Minister Karasin and EUR DAS and U.S. Minsk Group
Co-Chair Matt Bryza discussed Georgia, with Karasin striking
a more constructive tone but insisting that access for
international monitors to Abkhazia and South Ossetia had to
be negotiated directly with the separatists. Both sides
agreed there were prospects for progress going into the
November 2 Nagorno-Karabakh summit talks, but that the sides
had to remain focused on the Basic Principles proposed by the
OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs. Karasin noted both sides were
trying to shape the Basic Principles to their advantage, and
urged Bryza and the other Co-Chairs to allow the Armenian and
Azerbaijani presidents to talk through their differences on
the key principles before proposing any new solutions. On
Georgia, Karasin was non-committal in response to Bryza's
requests that Russia agree not to restrict the participation
of members of the Georgian delegation to Geneva, agree to
allow international monitors into Akhalgori, extend the
security zone patrolled by the EU Monitoring Mission into
South Ossetia, and allow humanitarian aid into Abkhazia and
South Ossetia from Georgia proper. Karasin noted Russian
concerns about the possibility of Georgian aggression in the
security zones, the prospect of new armed conflict, and the
need for substantive discussions on security in Geneva.
Karasin reiterated Russia's version of the Georgian
"aggression" on August 7, suggesting Georgia had duped the
U.S. He called the idea of redrawing the Soviet-era borders
of South Ossetia "dangerous," since it could "create problems
in other regions." End Summary.


2. (C) On the eve of the November 2 meetings between
President Medvedev and the Azeri and Armenian Presidents at
the Maiendorf Castle near Moscow, U.S. Minsk Group co-Chair
Matt Bryza, Conflicts Advisor Michael Carpenter, and
Ambassador Beyrle met with Deputy Foreign Minister (DFM)
Grigoriy Karasin to discuss the prospects for settlement of
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as well as the situation in
Georgia.

--------------
Nagorno-Karabakh
--------------


3. (C) In view of the presidential meetings between
Medvedev, Azerbaijani president Aliyev, and Armenian
president Sargsian, scheduled for the next day, DAS Bryza
warned that the Minsk Group was "drifting" and needed to
propose a solution on the Lachin corridor, in order to keep
the sides from walking away from the table and proposing new
formulations outside the framework of the Basic Principles,
which had already been largely agreed. Bryza noted that
Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Mammadyarov was seeking to amend
the understanding that had been reached on the Basic
Principles to push for Armenia to first remove its troops,
after which Azerbaijan and Turkey would open their borders,
and only then would negotiations take place on NK's future
status. Bryza warned that would not produce a balanced
agreement, as agreed previously, and told Karasin that a
package agreement with step-by-step implementation was the
only option both sides could support. Bryza welcomed the
fact that President Aliyev was now refraining from talking of
using force to resolve the conflict.

--------------
Georgia
--------------

Geneva Process
--------------


4. (C) On Georgia, Karasin outlined three concerns. The
first was the lack of agreement with the EU on the modalities
of the security zones around South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The
second concern was the need to move forward, in spite of the
different positions on the recognition of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, on issues of mutual concern between the U.S. and
Russia. Karasin warned that renewed fighting could break out
if the breakaway regions remained isolated. Georgia might
"cunningly" try to repeat its August 8 "aggression." Bryza
pushed back and told Karasin that the negotiations on Georgia
would continue for a long time, and that Russia's compliance
with the August 12 cease-fire would remain in the spotlight
even as the U.S. and Russia discussed other issues of mutual
concern.


5. (C) Karasin's third concern was that the parties to the
conflict needed to discuss security issues in Geneva without
boycotting sessions. Karasin reiterated Russia's condition

MOSCOW 00003289 002 OF 003


that South Ossetian and Abkhaz representatives must
participate in talks about security issues in Geneva. He
lamented that the separatists walked out of the talks on
October 15 over procedural issues, such as different colored
badges. Karasin also warned that continued "provocations"
such as the inclusion of people like Alan Parastayev -- a
South Ossetian who was serving a term for an attempt on the
life of the republic's "president" Kokoity, but escaped from
the Tskhinvali jail August 8 and now was a Saakashvili
supporter -- or Dmitriy Sanakoyev, the head of the
Tbilisi-backed Provisional Administration in South Ossetia,
or Malkhaz Akishbaya, head of the pro-Georgian
government-in-exile for Abkhazia, could cause the talks to
"freeze up" once again. Karasin welcomed EU Special
Representative for the Crisis in Georgia Pierre Morel's plans
to travel to Sukhumi and Tskhinvali with Finnish OSCE Special
Envoy Heikki Talvitie and UN Special Representative for
Georgia Johan Verbeke, but worried that Georgia would not
accept anything that might be agreed during the trip.


6. (C) Bryza promised to discourage the Georgians from
including persons like Parastayev in the delegation, but
warned that Georgia would not sit across from South Ossetian
and Abkhaz Delegations as an equal. He predicted, however,
that Georgia's position would evolve over several iterations
of meetings. Bryza reported Morel's plans to start the
November 18 Geneva meetings where the October 15 conference
had left off -- with working group meetings, this time using
only the Russian and English languages. Karasin warned that
the South Ossetian and Abkhaz sides would feel "cheated" if
the November 18 conference were to start without their
participation in a plenary session. In response to the
Ambassador's question about reports that Russia wished to see
the Geneva process conclude in December, Karasin said the
talks should be short and productive, without elaborating
further.

Russian stonewalling
--------------


7. (C) Karasin skirted Bryza's requests for Russia not to
veto the composition of the Georgian delegation to Geneva,
allow OSCE monitors into South Ossetia, allow for an OSCE
Office in Akhalgori, extend the security zone patrolled by
the EU Monitoring Mission into South Ossetia, and allow
humanitarian aid into Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia
proper. He only said Russia held no sway over South Ossetia
regarding OSCE monitors, allowed Russia might create
transparent areas to observe in the separatist regions if the
current security zone in Georgia proper proved peaceful, and
advised to talk to authorities in Vladikavkaz regarding
humanitarian access. Karasin repeated Russia's usual
concerns about the monitors' presence: South Ossetia
mistrusted the monitors because they had not warned
Tskhinvali about the impending Georgian aggression; it was
unclear who should provide for the monitors' security; the
observer missions had to be renamed to lose any reference to
Georgia, and maintain regional headquarters, not just in
Tbilisi.

August conflict
--------------


8. (C) Karasin reiterated Russia's version of the August 7
events, saying A/S Fried had told him August 7 that the U.S.
had "turned off the oxygen" on Saakashvili, but that he had
attacked anyway. Bryza recounted his own version of the
events on August 7, in which Georgian FM Eka Tkeshelashvili
called saying Georgia had initiated a unilateral cease-fire,
but later called again to say that South Ossetians continued
shelling Georgian villages north of Tskhinvali while Russian
troops were going through the Roki tunnel, forcing the GOG to
defend its citizens. Karasin said that Russian special envoy
Yuriy Popov called at 8 pm to report that Georgian troops and
special forces were moving on Tskhinvali, whereupon Karasin
called Fried. According to Karasin, Russian troops only
entered the Roki tunnel "at dawn on the 8th." Karasin
claimed the GOR and its military at all levels never planned
to take Tbilisi, even when they were 40 minutes from the
capital. Karasin claimed he had been ridiculed by the Duma
as a "softie" for not pushing recognition of the regions
sooner, which could have "avoided the war."

"Saakashvili got the green light from Washington"
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Bryza rejected Karasin's conclusion that Georgia had
manipulated the U.S. and found willing ears in Washington for
its plans of aggression. Bryza noted that the latest rumor
-- that a VPOTUS aide had allegedly given Georgia the green

MOSCOW 00003289 003 OF 003


light for armed action -- was ridiculous, as it insinuated
Saakashvili listened to an advisor to the VP over the message
of President Bush to avoid being provoked into a war. Bryza
advocated greater transparency on the ground, noting both
sides' accusations that the other side was instigating new
violence, Georgian sensitivities over the Russian presence in
Akhalgori, and the need for Georgian troops at the four bases
near Akhalgori to conduct regular movements without causing
an alarm to go off in Moscow.

"Redrawing borders is dangerous"
--------------


10. (C) Karasin disagreed with Bryza's depiction of the
situation in Akhalgori, saying it had been part of South
Ossetia since 1922, hence the borders could not be redrawn,
as "that would be dangerous and create problems in other
regions."


11. (C) In response to Bryza's question, Karasin discouraged
Bryza from visiting Sukhumi or Tskhinvali, saying officials
there were overwhelmed by humanitarian aid visits now. The
U.S. role was to convince Georgia that military revenge would
be disastrous for Georgia. Karasin said that the Russian
ambassador would arrive before the end of the year and serve
as Russia's coordinator for bilateral relations, while the
GOR was considering stationing liaison officers to maintain
contact with the EU observers in the border areas.


12. (U) DAS Bryza cleared this cable.
BEYRLE