Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MOSCOW3109
2008-10-22 08:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIA ON CFE POST-GEORGIA

Tags:  PREL KCFE NATO RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #3109 2960853
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 220853Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0461
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003109 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2018
TAGS: PREL KCFE NATO RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA ON CFE POST-GEORGIA

REF: MOSCOW 3059

Classified By: Acting POL M/C David Kostelancik. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d
)

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003109

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2018
TAGS: PREL KCFE NATO RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA ON CFE POST-GEORGIA

REF: MOSCOW 3059

Classified By: Acting POL M/C David Kostelancik. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d
)


1. (C) Summary. The MFA continues to press for the
resumption of meetings between Russia and the U.S. on the way
ahead on the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE).
While acknowledging that the conflict in Georgia has changed
the dynamic for such discussions, the MFA has nothing new to
offer, merely proposing that the question of Georgia and
Russian troop presence at the Gudauta base in Abkhazia be put
aside "temporarily," to allow the sides to focus on the other
outstanding issues. End summary.


2. (C) We met with Counselor Sergey Federyakov of the MFA's
Department of Security and Disarmament (DVBR) October 21 to
elicit GOR views on the way ahead on CFE, following FM
Lavrov's complaint to House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair
Berman (reftel). Federyakov said Russia's goals for bringing
the Adapted CFE Treaty into force had not changed following
the conflict in Georgia, but he acknowledged that it would be
more difficult to resolve the outstanding issues. Since
Russia no longer considered Abkhazia part of Georgia, any
obligation for Russia to withdraw its troops from the Gudauta
base no longer applied. Also, the proposal to document a
transfer of Gudauta to Georgia in exchange for a document
from the GOG authorizing the presence of Russian troops at
the base was no longer possible. He added that Russia was
still willing to consider an alternative proposal to provide
greater transparency on the troops and equipment at Gudauta,
but would now need to discuss such a proposal with the Abkhaz
leadership.


3. (C) Federyakov said he could not confirm that Russia was
likely to use Gudauta as a headquarters for its troops in
Abkhazia, but noted that press reports had so indicated. He
claimed that however many troops Russia deployed to the two
zones (he estimated approximately 3500 for each zone) would
be within the flank limits, but quickly reiterated that
Russia opposed having flank limits anymore. In response to
our skepticism on how we could resolve the issue given
Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, he
suggested using the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh as an
example.


4. (C) Federyakov reiterated that DVBR Director Antonov was
willing to meet with A/S Fried "at anyplace, at anytime," but
admitted, that at present, Russia had nothing new to propose
on how to resolve either the problem related to Georgia or
the other outstanding issues. "If we set a meeting, then we
might have some new ideas," he commented. He suggested
putting aside the Georgia/Gudauta issue for now to focus on
the other issues. He also repeated Russian suggestions to
bring European allies into the talks.
BEYRLE