GOR SPECIAL ENVOY'S OUTLOOK ON KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000302

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2018
TAGS: PREL EU KV SR RS
SUBJECT: GOR SPECIAL ENVOY'S OUTLOOK ON KOSOVO

REF: A. MOSCOW 235


B. BELGRADE 142

Classified By: M/C for Political Affairs Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4
(b/d).


1. (C) Summary. In a February 6 meeting, MFA Special Envoy
for the Balkans Alexander Botsan-Kharchenko laid out the
GOR's view of splits in the Serbian government, emphasizing
that Russia believed the EUDP mission was illegal without
UNSC approval, but that it did not object to Serbia's closer
ties to the EU. He predicted that in the event of a CDI,
Serbia would protest -- with GOR support -- in international
fora and initiate a series of administrative and economic
measures against Kosovo, but would not cut electricity
supplies. Botsan-Kharchenko said that Russia's reaction
would be only "political and diplomatic," and batted away
press rumors of a GOR military response. The Russian
presence in Kosovo after a CDI would depend on the Kosovar
government's willingness to host a mission still attached to
Belgrade, as well as to the security situation.
Botsan-Kharchenko repeated that Russia would not "initiate"
recognition of Abkhazia, but stressed that it will need to
reexamine the situation after the "precedent" set by the CDI;
separately, Moscow analysts predicted "semi-decisions" but no
immediate recognition. The MFA believed the contact group
was still a useful forum for the exchange of information, and
hoped a meeting could be called in a few months after the
"sharp backlash" subsided. End Summary.

Russia's Views on the Serbian Government Crisis
-------------- --


2. (C) In a February 6 meeting, Russian Envoy for Kosovo
Alexander Botsan-Kharchenko highlighted the political split
that had appeared between Tadic and Kostunica since the
Serbian election and noted that "things are changing rapidly
in Belgrade," but stopped short of predicting the collapse of
the government. During their January 25 visit to Moscow
(reftel A),Botsan-Kharchenko characterized Kostunica as very
negative towards the deployment of the EUDP mission, with his
support contingent on a new UNSC resolution premised on a
"compromise" on the status of Kosovo.


3. (C) Botsan-Kharchenko said he believed that Tadic's views
towards an EUDP mission in general were more flexible, and
noted the GOR supported Tadic's view that Serbia's European
orientation would not detract from a strong relationship with
Russia. In Moscow, Botsan-Kharchenko said Tadic backed
Kostunica's position towards the EU because he needed
Kostunica's support in the February 3 election, and perceived
unity was critical. With election alliances past, the
Serbian government was "close to splitting," and a decision
by Tadic to sign the EU political agreement without
Kostunica's support would shatter the coalition.


4. (C) Bostan-Kharchenko told us that while in Moscow, Tadic
hinted that he would agree to an EUDP if the EU were open to
continuing negotiations on Kosovo's final status, a position
the GOR would also support. We stressed that the EUDP
mission would ensure stability of the neighborhood, and that
EU integration was important for Serbia and should not be
tied to Kosovo's CDI. Botsan-Kharchenko emphasized that the
GOR could not dictate to Serbia to unlink the two, and said
that the GOR would continue to support Serbian opposition to
the EUDP, reiterating that the EU had tried "in vain" to find
a legal basis for the mission, and failed.

How Serbia Will React to a CDI
--------------


5. (C) Botsan-Kharchenko claimed that the GOR was not aware
of all of Belgrade's plans, but stressed that Belgrade did
not want to create a humanitarian crisis in the region. That
said, Botsan-Kharchenko outlined for us the likely elements
of Serbia's response:

-- FM Jeremic confirmed to Lavrov in a January 24 meeting
that Serbia would call for a Security Council meeting after a
CDI to protest the violation of 1244 and call on UNSC members
to pressure Pristina to withdraw the declaration. Russia
will support this call.

-- Belgrade would likely block transportation routes and the
administrative border.

-- Serbia would use the Berlin Mechanism in the OSCE to call
an emergency meeting of the Permanent Council, where it would
assert that Kosovo's CDI represents a threat to the Helsinki
Final Act.

-- Jeremic also told Lavrov that Belgrade would take economic
measures against Kosovo, but clarified that for technical

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reasons, Belgrade cannot stop electricity to Kosovo without
also affecting Kosovar Serb areas and even areas of Southern
Serbia, and was therefore very unlikely to do so.


6. (C) In its conversations with the GOR, Belgrade
officials emphasized that they were not pushing the Kosovar
Serbs towards taking an assertive position, Botsan-Kharchenko
told us. We replied that actions on the ground belied these
assertions, from the pressure placed on Kosovar Serbs not to
participate in parliamentary elections to that applied on
Kosovar Serb police not to cooperate with UNMIK.
Botsan-Kharchenko argued that Kosovar Serbs held a hard line
towards international organizations and would not cooperate
with the incoming EUDP mission because they saw it as part of
a CDI. With UNMIK, he said, there were two possibilities:
either there would be no cooperation at all from the Kosovar
Serbs, or they would maintain cooperation only with UNMIK
contacts whose countries have not recognized Kosovo. We
stressed that Belgrade could not hide behind Kosovar Serb
rhetoric, but had to take responsibility for a peaceful
transition that was essential to safeguarding the interests
of Kosovo's minority communities.


How Russia Will React
--------------


7. (C) Botsan-Kharchenko stressed that all measures Russia
has prepared in response to a CDI were political and
diplomatic, and ruled out press rumors that Russia would
respond militarily to a CDI in Kosovo, including the
possibility of setting up a Russian military base in Serbia.


8. (C) Russia's diplomatic representation in Pristina would
depend on Kosovar willingness, Botsan-Kharchenko told us.
Former Kosovar Prime Minister Ceku had assured the GOR that a
Kosovar government would not demand Russia's withdrawal from
Pristina after a CDI, but he was not sure what Thaci's
decision would be. He noted that because the mission was
considered part of the embassy in Belgrade, the Kosovars may
ask the Russians to leave. Botsan-Kharchenko pointed out
that the security situation on the ground would contribute to
the GOR's decision, and praised local and international
authorities for their support to date.

Ambiguous Abkhazia
--------------


9. (C) Referring to Lavrov's January 23 press conference,
Botsan-Kharchenko told us that Russia would not
"automatically" recognize Abkhazia in response to a CDI, and
the GOR wished to avoid the "challenges and risks" that
recognition would bring. He stressed the GOR would not
initiate recognition of Abkhazia, but a CDI from Kosovo would
set a precedent, and the GOR would need to revisit the
situation under those circumstances and in light of the
actions of Abkhaz leadership.


10. (C) Separately, Moscow analysts told us that Russia was
unlikely to recognize Abkhazia in the near future, for
several reasons. Carnegie Center's Dmitry Trenin noted that
he GOR has already de facto recognized Abkhazia, citing the
proliferation of Russian passports in the region, relaxed
border crossing rules, and the primacy of the Russian ruble
in Abkhazia as evidence. He also noted that if it were the
only country, or one of very few to recognize Abkhazia,
Russian diplomacy would look "weak." Finally, Trenin argued
that Russia was not looking for a fight with the U.S., which
he viewed as a distinct possibility if Georgia declared war
against Russia in response to its recognition of Abkhazia.
The Institute of Euro-Atlantic Security's Alexander Nikitin
added that he expected "semi-decisions" on frozen conflict
regions, but that the GOR desire to protect territorial
integrity was very real.

Have Your People Call My People: Hope for the Contact Group
-------------- --------------


11. (C) Botsan-Kharchenko told us that through a "fortunate
misunderstanding," a Russian Embassy diplomat had passed a
message to DAS DiCarlo that was interpreted as initiating a
contact group meeting. While the GOR had no intention of
initiating a meeting at this time, Botsan-Kharchenko told us
that the MFA believes the contact group meeting may be a good
mechanism to exchange information, "even with a deep divide."
He suggested the contact group could meet "in a few months,"
after the "sharp backlash" subsides.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) In public, Botsan-Kharchenko has denounced the
"blatant pressure" by the U.S. on the EU and UN to secure

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Kosovo's independence. In private, he is resigned to a CDI
and pragmatic about the clash that will play out, as Russia
and Serbia take every step possible to challenge the legality
of Kosovo's independence. His purposeful ambiguity on
Abkhazia reflects both the Russian efforts to keep the stakes
high, and the reality that decisionmaking on this issue does
not rest with the MFA.
BURNS