Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MOSCOW2844
2008-09-23 14:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

NESTERUSHKIN CONFIRMS IMMINENT 2 PLUS 1 TALKS ON

Tags:  PREL PGOV MD RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9503
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #2844 2671400
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231400Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0091
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002844 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MD RS
SUBJECT: NESTERUSHKIN CONFIRMS IMMINENT 2 PLUS 1 TALKS ON
TRANSNISTRIA

Classified By: PolCouns Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002844

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MD RS
SUBJECT: NESTERUSHKIN CONFIRMS IMMINENT 2 PLUS 1 TALKS ON
TRANSNISTRIA

Classified By: PolCouns Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Russian Special Negotiator for the
Transnistria Conflict Valeriy Nesterushkin confirmed that
Moldovan President Voronin and Transnistrian leader Smirnov
would meet the week of September 22 in 2 plus 1 talks, with
Russia mediating, though a specific time and date had not yet
been agreed. Nesterushkin described the 5 plus 2 format as
"senseless," arguing the leaders should negotiate directly,
without need for observers. Negotiations would involve
elements from previous proposals, such as the Kozak or
Moldovan package. He projected a possible five to six-year
presence of peacekeepers and the closing of the munitions
base within six months. End Summary.

--------------
Time and format
--------------


2. (C) Russian Special Negotiator for the Transnistria
conflict Valeriy Nesterushkin on September 22 confirmed that
Moldovan President Voronin and Transnistrian leader Smirnov
would meet the week of September 22, as reported by daily
newspaper Kommersant. Nesterushkin expressed frustration
with the inability of the leaders to actually agree on a time
and venue for this week's talks. Nesterushkin said the
parties hoped to finalize an agreement by December. He
explained the deadline as driven by desire to avoid delays
that could allow the settlement to unravel.


3. (C) Nesterushkin criticized the 5 plus 2 format as
"useless" in the current context, as it was unimaginable how
the two leaders should sit and discuss issues while five
observers looked on. Nesterushkin said the format had been
useful to bring parties to the negotiating table, and could
provide other assistance, if the conflict parties so wished.
He did not discount the possibility that the 5 plus 2 could
witness the signing of a final agreement, and acknowledged
Voronin's insistence that any decision be agreeable to the 5
plus 2 members.

--------------
No pre-agreed points
--------------


4. (C) Nesterushkin was cautious about confirming that
certain aspects of a deal had already been pre-agreed, such
as Transnistria's willingness to forego talk of independence.
On the possibility of Moldova's agreement to guarantee
neutrality, Nesterushkin expressed doubts about Voronin's
sincerity, and envisioned a clause in the final agreement
allowing Transnistria to veto or opt out of any decision
affecting Moldova's neutrality. On Transnistrian calls for
independence, Nesterushkin confirmed that the GOR had
"brought Transnistria down to earth" by urging Smirnov to
decide whether he "wanted an agreement, or for the conflict
to go on," as "not all political solutions were possible."

--------------
Russian peacekeepers stay
--------------


5. (C) Nesterushkin expected the parties would draw elements
from existing settlement plans, including the Kozak plan and
the Moldova package, but insisted that a system of "checks
and balances," as provided by the Kozak plan, was necessary.
When pressed on the Russian peacekeepers, he said they would
continue to guarantee peace between the sides, and the
overall number of peacekeepers would remain at current
levels--335 Russian, 453 Moldovan, 490 Transnistrian and 10
Ukrainian peacekeepers. Rather than remaining for the 20
years envisioned in the Kozak plan, he projected their
mission to last five to six years. Similarly, Nesterushkin
sounded conciliatory about the presence of the Russian
munitions at Colbasna, saying "everything can be resolved"
and that the munitions could be withdrawn within five to six
months, if a resolution to the conflict was found.

--------------
Comment
--------------


6. (C) The difficulty in setting the meeting may reflect
that the Russian push for a 2 plus 1 format is more difficult
than Nesterushkin was willing to concede. Russia would like
to present a breakthrough on Transnistria as a counterpoint
to its use of military force in Georgia.
BEYRLE