RUSSIA ON COUNCIL OF EUROPE REFORM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000268

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2018
TAGS: PREL COE RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA ON COUNCIL OF EUROPE REFORM

REF: STRASBOURG 1

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. Summary. (C) The GOR told us Russia supported the
January reforms to PACE's presidential election process,
stressing that it did not perceive the resulting delay until
2010 of Federation Council Deputy Margelov's presidency as a
slight against Russia, although recognizing that some
member-states had spun this as a political decision. MFA
officials maintained that GOR opposition to Saakashvili's
speech in PACE had no connections to the reform process, but
was prompted by worries his presence might inhibit debate on
Georgia's December elections. During his January 17 visit to
Moscow, outgoing PACE president Rene van der Linden in
encouraging Russia to ratify the 6th Protocol on the
Convention on Human Rights, dealing with the death penalty,
and the 14th Protocol, dealing with reform of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR),was unsuccessful. End Summary.


2. (C) In a January 23 meeting, MFA PACE Section Head
Alexander Kurmas affirmed Russia's strong relationship with
PACE and the Council of Europe (CoE). Although there are
differences -- Russia remains the only one of the 47
countries that has not ratified Protocols 6 and 14 of the
Convention on Human Rights -- Kurmas stressed that Russia
valued its membership and was willing to work with other
members towards consensus on contentious issues, although it
would continue to speak its mind. Media sources reported
that new PACE president Luis de Puig of Spain emphasized
publicly that Russia was a "full and important member" of the
CoE. Dutch diplomats told us that van der Linden had
commented during his Moscow visit that Russia seems more
willing to accept criticism from the CoE than from the EU and
the OSCE, although when van der Linden expressed his hope
that Russia would avoid the defects in its parliamentary
elections in the upcoming presidential campaign, Putin only
"nodded politely."

No Hard Feelings: Russia Supports PACE Leadership Reform
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3. (C) Kurmas told us that Russia fully supports reforms to
PACE's presidential election procedure adopted at a January
10 meeting in Paris of the leaders of PACE's five political
groups. The new arrangement would allow for rotation among
all five political groups, instead of the four that existed
when the agreement originated. The first presidency of the
new agreement was given to the largest group, the Socialists,
headed by Spain's de Puig.


4. (C) Kurmas noted that it was only "by chance" that
Chairman of the Federation Council International Affairs
Committee Margelov happened to be next in line under the
previous process when the reforms went into effect.
According to Kurmas, most of the "horse-trading" that went
into this deal was completed in December, well before the
deal became public in mid-January, and he noted that the GOR
never accused PACE of discrimination. He said it was
"disappointing" that some member states had tried to paint
this as a political decision and "play the Russia card." The
GOR felt that the reforms were presented to the public in an
"ugly and unacceptable way." The GOR continued to support
Margelov for the PACE presidency in 2010, but Kurmas said it
would wait for him to be invited by Europe -- it would not
demand recognition. Dutch diplomats said that according to
van der Linden, there was general support of parties and
countries for Margelov in 2010.

Saakashvili at PACE
--------------


5. (C) Saakashvili's invitation to speak at PACE on January
24 was not an issue in the December negotiations on
leadership reform, Kurmas told us. He said that the GOR did
not object to Saakashvili's invitation in principle, noting
he had spoken there in 2000 and 2004, and stressed that
Russia welcomed the chance to discuss human rights with
Georgia whenever possible. However, Kurmas maintained the
GOR had opposed Saakashvili's appearance in January because
PACE would be discussing the Georgian elections, and the GOR
worried his presence might "inhibit" an open discussion.

The 6th Protocol: "The Public Isn't Ready"
--------------


6. (C) During his farewell visit to Moscow, Van der Linden
entreated Putin to sign the 6th Protocol, which would abolish
the death penalty in Russia. The death penalty was abolished
three times, and reinstated four, in Russia in the 20th
century, and is currently in moratorium. According to Dutch
diplomats, Putin declined, citing a reopening of public
discussion on the matter after the 2004 Beslan attack, which

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still infused public opinion. Putin said that the GOR would
follow public opinion on the matter, which was not yet ready.
He told van der Linden that it was "only a matter of time."

The 14th Protocol: Lacking Trust in the ECHR
--------------


7. (C) Van der Linden also discussed Russian ratification of
the 14th Protocol, which deals with reform of the European
Court of Human Rights. (Note: The 14th Protocol was signed
by Putin in 2006 and sent to the Duma, but the Duma did not
ratify it -- the first time in post-USSR Russia an executive
agreement was not authorized by the legislative, with the
ruling party-dominated Duma clearly following instruction
from the Kremlin.) Konstantin Kosachov, Chairman of the Duma
International Affairs Committee stated publicly that Russia
doubted the court's "impartiality" and accused it of being a
political tool. Kurmas claims that the GOR believes there
are not enough "checks and balances" against "spurious"
cases, citing the Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia
case (reftel). He also complained about Baltic countries
suing Russia for its "occupation" of their territories, which
the GOR believes fell outside of the court's jurisdiction.
He also noted the GOR's concern that the 14th Protocol, which
would reduce chambers from three judges to one, invited more
subjective decisions. However, he claimed that Russia still
supported the court, pointing to the three million euros the
GOR spent clearing backlogged cases during its Council of
Ministers presidency, and a proposed "Protocol 15" with
alternative reforms. He said Russia's willingness to move
forward on court reform depended on the "integrity" of new
judges, almost a third of whom were elected this year.


8. (C) With Russia winning only about 5% of its cases, and
Russian citizens making up 26% of the court's workload in
2007, Dutch diplomats noted that Russian citizens favored the
ECHR as an impartial alternative to their judicial system.
They noted that when Russia lost, it paid restitution
promptly, but reiterated the complaint that Russia tended to
ignore the court's suggestions for systemic reform.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) While the MFA painted its relationship with the CoE
in brighter tones than the corresponding relationship with
the OSCE, it remains sensitive to Russia's disproportionate
caseload in the CoE. Russian media were quick to draw a line
between European unhappiness over Russia's human rights track
record and Margelov's deferred candidacy.
BURNS