Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MOSCOW2580
2008-08-28 06:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

KOSOVO DEVELOPMENTS IN LIGHT OF GEORGIA

Tags:  PREL PGOV SE RS 
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VZCZCXRO0254
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #2580/01 2410602
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 280602Z AUG 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9739
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002580 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV SE RS
SUBJECT: KOSOVO DEVELOPMENTS IN LIGHT OF GEORGIA

REF: A. SECSTATE 90978

B. MOSCOW 2545

C. MOSCOW 1564

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Alice G. Wells: reasons 1.4
(b, d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002580

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV SE RS
SUBJECT: KOSOVO DEVELOPMENTS IN LIGHT OF GEORGIA

REF: A. SECSTATE 90978

B. MOSCOW 2545

C. MOSCOW 1564

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Alice G. Wells: reasons 1.4
(b, d).


1. (C) Summary: In an August 26 meeting immediately prior
to Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, MFA
Special Envoy for Kosovo Aleksandr Botsan-Kharchenko
justified the independence of the territories, arguing that
the "genocide" of Ossetians exceeded the suffering of
Kosovars in 1999. Serbian diplomats, reiterating Belgrade's
strategy of "strategic silence," took issue with GOR efforts
to depict Serbian support for actions in Georgia.
Botsan-Kharchenko described a compromise-seeking Belgrade on
all but the issue of Kosovo's recognition. He expressed
disappointment with the UNSYG's handling of the transition of
UNMIK to EULEX. Underscoring Russian support for continuing
the OSCE mission in Kosovo, he urged U.S. endorsement of the
Swiss candidate, taking into account Belgrade's opposition to
the Austrian nominee. Botsan-Kharchenko questioned U.S.
opposition to the ICJ ruling, arguing it provided cover to
Tadic to make compromises elsewhere. On Bosnia, he
downplayed RS PM Dodik's rhetoric, asserting the RS
leadership remained loyal to the state, if not at the expense
of the entities. End Summary

Kosovo Precedent for Georgia
--------------


2. (C) In an August 26 meeting that immediately preceded
Russia's announcement of its recognition of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, MFA Special Envoy for Kosovo Aleksandr
Botsan-Kharchenko underlined that the GOR considered Kosovo a
precedent for Russian actions, but stressed that it Russia
had taken "no initiative to put Abkhazia and South Ossetia on
the path of independence." Over our objections (Ref A),
Botsan-Kharchenko continued to draw parallels between Kosovo
and Georgia, arguing that the "genocide" experienced by the
Ossetians outstripped the suffering of Kosovars in 1999. The
only difference in the situation, he maintained, was that the
Serbs were not responsible for bombing Kosovo, in contrast to
Saakashvili's violence. Noting the August 25 parliamentary
debate over extending recognition, Botsan-Kharchenko
expressed his approval for statements made by representatives

that South Ossetia and Abkhazia had more of a right to
independence and self-determination than Kosovo (Ref B).

MFA Twists Belgrade's Position
--------------


3. (C) Serbian Charge Yelitsa Kuryak confirmed to us on
August 25 that Belgrade sought a low profile in this
conflict, given the obvious shift in Russian position on the
"primacy of international law" and the parallels between
Kosovo and the Georgian territories: "we are silent." Kuryak
stated that "we must support the territorial integrity of
Georgia" and that Russian recognition of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia would be "a very bad step." She was quick to dispel
Russian media reports of Serbian humanitarian assistance to
South Ossetia, noting that the news had been planted by a
Serbian businessman resident in Moscow, who had close ties to
former President Kostunica. While Serbia would not issue a
denial, Kuryak said there were in fact no shipments of
assistance to South Ossetia. The MFA also had gone silent,
Kuryak noted, and had held no consultations with the Serbian
Embassy over the consequences of Russia's policy in Georgia
for its support for Serbian territorial integrity. There was
continued pressure from Russian officials for Belgrade to
ratify the energy agreement, with Kuryak questioning Russian
good faith over the long-term, noting that there was no
similar Russian ratification planned.

Russia On Changing Stance in Belgrade; UNSYG
--------------


4. (C) In response to our concerns that a complete transition
to EULEX was required in order to prevent efforts at de facto
partition, Botsan-Kharchenko observed that Belgrade had
reduced its rhetoric on Kosovo due to its desire to work with
the EU. While Belgrade could not recognize Kosovo,
Botsan-Kharchenko argued that the Tadic government was
looking for reasons to work with the international community.
He assessed that Belgrade could ultimately accept EULEX, as
long as there was some figleaf of UN cover.
Botsan-Kharchenko predicted firmer opposition to EULEX among
Kosovar Serbs, and pushed for the officers to be posted under
an UNMIK umbrella. While welcoming the dialogue between
UNMIK and Belgrade, Botsan-Kharchenko stressed Russian
disappointment that UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon agreed to a transfer of

MOSCOW 00002580 002 OF 002


authority from UNMIK to EULEX without receiving approval of
the broader UN.

OSCE
--------------


5. (C) Botsan-Kharchenko said that Russia believed the OSCE
had a continuing role to play in Kosovo, but stressed the
need for Belgrade's approval of the OSCE mission head, since
it was the "host-country" (Ref C). While acknowledging our
objections, Botsan-Kharchenko argued that on "purely
technical grounds" it made sense to support the Swiss
candidate, who was acceptable to Belgrade, over the new
candidate from Austria, who would not be acceptable. Russia
would continue to urge international consideration of
Belgrade's interests, and believed that U.S. support for the
Austrian sacrificed the larger goal of an effective OSCE
operation in Kosovo.

Taking the Case to ICJ
--------------


6. (C) Botsan-Kharchenko said Russia had difficulty
understanding U.S. objections to Belgrade's proposed review
of Kosovo's independence by the International Court of
Justice (ICJ). He argued that Russia supported the proposal
for "practical reasons," since the adoption of a resolution
at UNGA would enable Tadic to demonstrate to domestic
constituencies that "he has done all he can."
Botsan-Kharchenko said it was in the West's interest to ease
pressure on Tadic and provide him room to maneuver. Any ICJ
decision, he argued, would be "years in the making" and was
unlikely to be clear-cut in the final analysis. For tactical
reasons, the ICJ was worthwhile as a pressure valve.

Bosnia: Don't Overestimate Dodik
--------------


7. (C) Noting our concerns over continued statements and
actions by the RS PM to weaken the Bosnian Federation,
Botsan-Kharchenko urged the U.S. to not overestimate the
importance of Dodik's pronouncements. In a change of tone,
Botsan-Kharchenko argued that neither Russia nor Dodik saw in
Kosovo a precedent to be applied to Republika Serbska.
Dodik, Botsan-Kharchenko asserted, supported the Dayton
Accords, but would continue to oppose efforts to strengthen
the center at the expense of the entities' continued
survival.
BEYRLE