DAS BRYZA'S MEETING WITH GENERAL BUZHINSKIY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002297

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR NATO KCFE GG RS
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA'S MEETING WITH GENERAL BUZHINSKIY

Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Alice G. Wells.
Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. Ministry of Defense Lt. General Yevgeniy
Buzhinskiy told visiting EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary
Matthew Bryza August 1 that Russia shared the U.S.'s desire
to avoid an armed conflict in Abkhazia. If there were such a
conflict, Russia would likely not become directly involved,
he said, but the GOR would be unable to prevent floods of
"volunteers" from the North Caucasus from going to the region
to help the Abkhaz. Noting that he was not responsible for
monitoring Caucasus issues within the Ministry of Defense, he
agreed to pass on the proposal to pull back the CIS
peacekeeping forces near Abkhazia's Gali District to the
Kodori River. He expressed doubts over the feasibility of
major IDP return. He questioned why the U.S. pressed for
NATO membership for Georgia, noting that it could lead to a
Russia-NATO military confrontation, and said the GOR wanted
an acknowledgment that there was no "base" at Gudauta; it was
merely a "logistic installation." End summary.


2. (C) EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew Bryza discussed
the situation in Abkhazia with First Deputy Chief of the
MOD's Main Directorate for International Cooperation
Lieutenant-General Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy August 1. Bryza
expressed the concern that as the tension in the region
increased, the ability of the parties to make good decisions
would lessen. He urged Russia to consider a proposal to have
the CIS peacekeeping forces in the Kodori Valley pull back to
the Kodori river. This would make the Abkhaz feel more
secure by positioning the PKF at the end of the Kodori
Valley, thereby mitigating the perceived threat of Georgia
launching an attack from the Upper Kodori Valley.
Repositioning behind the Kodori River would also be a more
efficient line to defend in comparison with the current
deployment of the PKF on both sides of the Enguri River,
maintaining the integrity of the defensive line, while
opening up the possibility of lessening the Georgian
presence. Such a move could prove crucial in eliciting a
Georgian non-use-of-force pledge. It might then be possible
to reach an intermediate deal and lower the potential for an
explosive incident. He emphasized that the U.S. and Russia
needed to use our respective influence to move the parties
away from an armed conflict.


3. (C) Bryza said he had discussed four types of security
Georgia needed to ensure to make the Abkhaz feel secure: 1)
military, specifically a non-use of force agreement, which
would be part of an overall package; 2) economic, including
CBMs, and opening up trade with the EU, Turkey, but most
importantly, with Georgia; 3) political; and 4) cultural.
These last two reflect Abkhaz worries that if a large number
of Georgian internally displaced persons (IDPs) returned,
Abkhaz' political rights and cultural identity could be
threatened. Still, to get Georgia to the negotiating table,
we needed to give them enough on IDP return and security to
start the process, and then seek to lock them into the
negotiations.


4. (C) Russia putting railroad troops in Abkhazia had undone
efforts to calm the tensions, Bryza stressed. The action had
come the day after Georgia had de-escalated by announcing it
was ending its UAV flights over Abkhazia and asked Russia to
consult prior to any new actions in Abkhazia. Instead,
Russia had sent in the railroad troops with no warning and no
consultation. This had rattled the Georgians and strengthened
the hand of those who foolishly favored a military "solution"
in Abkhazia. Bryza stressed how bluntly U.S. officials
warned the Georgians at the highest level that there was no
military solution in Abkhazia; but these sorts of Russian
moves made it harder for such U.S. arguments to maintain
traction in Tbilisi.


5. (C) Buzhinskiy noted initially that he did not have
responsibility for Georgian-Abkhaz issues in the MOD, and
said he would pass on the proposal to pull back the
peacekeepers to the Kodori river. He stated that the forces'
high mobility and the small area of Abkhazia's territory made
this a minor issue militarily, and agreed that it was
important to try to prevent a conflict in the region. He
said if there were, he doubted that there would be direct
Russian involvement, but noted that the GOR would be unable
to stop "volunteers" from other parts of the Northern
Caucasus from flocking to help the Abkhaz. He stressed that
the decision on increasing the numbers of Russian
peacekeepers in Abkhazia was a political one, not an MOD
decision.


6. (C) Buzhinskiy said that negotiations should be initiated
and economic deals should be strengthened, but expressed
doubts about the feasibility of IDP return, especially to
Central Abkhazia. German FM Steinmeier's package proposal
had been okay, but the withdrawal of peacekeepers was not the
principal issue; it was the return of refugees. But
Buzhinskiy commented that he did not see how Bagapsh could
ever agree. He noted that 3 1/2 percent of the Abkhaz
population had died in the conflict, as compared to 1 percent
in Kosovo, where refugee and IDP return was still a difficult
issue. Picking up on Bryza's reference to the conflict in
Cyprus, Buzhinskiy said just as the Turkish Cypriots had
worried that a deal to allow the Greek Cypriots to buy land
in the North, over the long term would lead to the Greek side
owning most of the property in the North, the Abkhaz were
similarly concerned. If large numbers of IDPs were allowed
to return, although the situation might be fine for 5-10
years with UN or Western guarantees, eventually with 100,000
Abkhaz and 400,000 Georgians, the dynamic would change.


7. (C) Buzhinskiy confirmed that all of Russia's railroad
troops would be withdrawn from the region by August 4. He
said the reconstruction of the railroad may have been
partially motivated by the desire to have infrastructure in
place for the Sochi Olympics, but stressed that Russia had
made clear from the beginning that the troops were only there
for a limited purpose and a limited time. They were
rebuilding the railbed, the bridges and the tunnels, and when
their work was completed, they left. They had never posed a
threat to Georgia. Perhaps for Georgia, he said, it would be
better for Abkhazia to be in economic ruin, but Russia was
interested in Abkhazia's economic revival.

Gudauta, CFE and NATO Enlargement
--------------


8. (C) Buzhinskiy opined Georgia did not want a compromise on
the Gudauta base. Russia was willing to facilitate an
inspection, but did not want a repeat of the experience with
the French inspectors in 2004, when Russia had showed them
that there was no base in Gudauta, but the French had then
told the Joint Consultative Group they had no mandate to
report that there was no base. The GOR wanted it recognized
that there was no "military base" at Gudauta within the
understanding of the 1999 Istanbul commitments, that it was
merely a "logistical installation with peacekeepers."


9. (C) Buzhinskiy asked why the U.S. was pressing for
Georgian membership in NATO, expressing his concern that it
could bring Russia and NATO into direct military
confrontation. This was the last thing he wanted, Buzhinskiy
said. Bryza replied that we believed NATO membership would
help stabilize the entire region, including Russia's southern
border, and advance political and economic freedom.


10. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this cable.
RUBIN