GOR ON TRANSNISTRIA: MORE OF THE SAME

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000190

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2018
TAGS: PREL PINR PBTS MARR OSCE MD RS
SUBJECT: GOR ON TRANSNISTRIA: MORE OF THE SAME


Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reasons 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary. Moldovan President Voronin's January 20-21
visit to Moscow prompted much speculation about an alleged
"Putin plan for Transnistria." Following the visit, GOR
officials denied that any new GOR proposal had been offered
to Voronin and continued to insist that the only way to move
the process forward was to revive face-to-face
Chisinau-Tiraspol talks, rather than have other interested
parties -- the EU, U.S., Russia and Ukraine -- broker the
conflict on their behalf. The MFA confirmed that the
so-called three new conditions reported by the press --
Moldovan neutrality, the continued presence of Russian
peacekeeping forces, and the guarantee of property rights in
Tiraspol -- were not new and remain the essential elements of
the Russian proposal. End summary.

New Year, Renewed Consultations
--------------


2. (C) MFA Transnistria negotiator Nesterushkin told us
January 24 that Voronin and Putin met on January 21 and
discussed bilateral issues, including the Transnistria
conflict. The two presidents met five times in 2007 and the
January 20-21 Voronin visit kicked off this year's
consultations between the two leaders. Nesterushkin lamented
the absence of negotiations on Transnistria and the failure
in November 2007 to convene the 5 plus 2 on the margins of
the OSCE Madrid Ministerial. Nesterushkin claimed that to
this day, no "understandable explanation" had been offered
the GOR for Moldovan FM Shova's "no show," while
Transnistrian FM Litskai had managed to persuade a reluctant
Smirnov and flown to Madrid for the talks. Nesterushkin said
he did not understand why so much talk on the need to resume
the negotiations had not been followed by concrete actions.
He criticized Voronin's "erroneous" belief that Moscow was
the key player and could open or close the door to a
resolution at will. In thinking that obtaining Moscow's
agreement was all that is necessary to solve the
Transnistrian conflict, Nesterushkin said, Voronin continued
the "bad habit" of ignoring Tiraspol and its interests.


3. (C) Nesterushkin argued that Voronin, "encouraged by the
EU and the U.S.," preferred pressure to dialogue, which could
not unlock the current impasse. After 17 years of a separate
existence based on an "independent" economy, Tiraspol would
not simply accept a unitary constitution drafted by Chisinau.
Nesterushkin acknowledged that in the absence of an ethnic
or religious dispute, Transnistria was in principle a simpler
problem (than Abkhazia or South Ossetia) and Russia was
willing to entertain various options as long as the two
directly involved parties agreed on a settlement. He termed
it "grotesque" that the stacks of documents and agreements
signed by Chisinau and Tiraspol had been neither rejected nor
incorporated into a new framework, while the negotiation
mechanism has remained stalled for two years.

No New "Putin Plan"
--------------


4. (C) Nesterushkin denied Russia has added new "conditions"
and said that what the press was calling "the Putin plan for
Transnistria" -- the alleged three new conditions -- had been
the Russian position all along:

--Moldova's neutrality: Although stipulated in the Moldovan
constitution, Russia has always demanded the strengthening of
the neutrality clause via a document signed by the U.S., EU
and Russia.

--Continued presence of Russian troops in Transnistria:
Russia is a "hostage to its own past" and the Russian
military presence is a legacy of the Soviet era. But with no
political settlement to guarantee peace and stability, it
would be "irresponsible" to withdraw. According to
Nesterushkin, the last five years had demonstrated that the
situation is volatile and that the Moldovan side had failed
to engender confidence on the part of Transnistria. He
credited the presence of the Russian peacekeeping forces for
the absence of violence in spite of continued political
clashes.

--Guarantee of property rights awarded through privatization
by Tiraspol authorities: Nesterushkin said that Voronin had
made repeated promises, but the GOR wanted a written
agreement that would preclude backtracking.


5. (C) Nesterushkin repeated that the GOR would agree to the
re-configuration of the peacekeeping forces and the
withdrawal of the Russian military (400 peacekeepers and 800
supporting personnel) after the two "conflict partners" reach
a political settlement. Having rejected the Kozak document,
which had "many good, workable elements," Voronin would now
have to try his utmost if he wants to make a deal before his
term ends in 2009.
BURNS