DAS MERKEL'S MEETING WITH DUMA CHAIRMAN KOSACHEV

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001770

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM UP GG MD RS
SUBJECT: DAS MERKEL'S MEETING WITH DUMA CHAIRMAN KOSACHEV

Classified By: Charge d'Affares Daniel A. Russell. Reasons 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) In a June 19 meeting, DAS Merkel and Duma
International Affairs Committee Chairman Konstantin Kosachev
discussed missile defense, NATO enlargement, Ukraine,
Georgia, Moldova, Russia and the EU, and Russia's foreign
policy structure. DAS Merkel briefed Kosachev on the status
of missile defense talks. NATO dominated the discussion,
with Kosachev arguing that it added little to existing
security cooperation against common threats such as Iran,
North Korea and Afghanistan, but would damage Russia's
bilateral relations with Ukraine and Georgia. He criticized
Saakashivili's failure to address the needs of the Abkhaz.
Kosachev was more positive on the Transnistria conflict,
praising Voronin for his willingness to take Russia's
interest in Moldovan neutrality into account. For the
upcoming Russia - EU summit, Kosachev urged all EU states to
put collective interests before their bilateral grievances
against Russia. Kosachev shed no light on the state of the
foreign policy decision making process with Medvedev at the
helm. End summary.

Missile Defense and Information Sharing
--------------


2. (C) Duma International Affairs Committee Chairman
Konstantin Kosachev opened a June 19 meeting with DAS Merkel
with the latest press "sensation;" the report of Lithuania's
offer to host facilities for U.S. missile defense deployment,
and asked about the status of negotiations on missile
defense. DAS Merkel replied that there had been no
breakthrough but the talks had become more focused and
concrete. He emphasized an open and transparent process,
with a role for all parties, especially those where
facilities might be located. Kosachev warned against any
form of "game playing" and urged regular information sharing.


3. (C) Kosachev lamented that the Russian public and
parliamentarians remained unaware that the U.S. and Russia
cooperate well in areas such as counterterrorism. The result
was a widespread anti-U.S. sentiment, that affected the
bilateral relationship. DAS Merkel underscored the need for
GOR representatives to articulate the value of cooperation
with the U.S. He urged Kosachev not to lose important time
during the transitional period in the U.S.


4. (C) DAS Merkel noted that with a long "to-do list" such
as the 123 agreement, WTO negotiations, and the Jackson-
Vanick Amendment, ahead, Kosachev's recent Washington
consultations were well-timed and contributed to Foreign
Affairs Committee Chairman Berman's deeper understanding of
bilateral issues. Kosachev agreed, saying that a steady
dialogue with no surprises would be of paramount importance.
Kosachev said that Berman and he had agreed on a joint
mission to Iran. DAS Merkel did not comment on a
Berman-Kosachev trip, but recalled his early June meeting
with former PM Primakov, and thought that concrete
discussions on the Iranian issues were helpful.

Ukraine: All About NATO
--------------


5. (C) Kosachev criticized the U.S. for "pressuring Ukraine
to join NATO." According to Kosachev, the GOR was also at
the mercy of certain domestic forces. The result, Kosachev
said, was a "dangerous game," which could create another
mistake, as in 2004 when the U.S. and Russia rallied behind
two different political groups in Ukraine. Noting that
Ukraine was deeply divided on NATO, and that Ukrainian
leaders could not even agree on a referendum, Kosachev
thought that Ukraine should be "left alone" to decide its own
fate. If Russia were "provoked" by U.S. meddling, it would
have little choice but to get involved, Kosachev added. DAS
Merkel maintained that there was no reason why Ukraine's NATO
membership would close the door to cooperation with Russia.
Instead, Ukraine could be a bridge between Europe and Russia.
DAS Merkel noted that Germany's interpretation of MAP as the
last door to NATO was not shared by the U.S. In sum, NATO
members should be exporters, not consumers of security, and
the MAP process was the toll to make them more stable, secure
and, over time, more acceptable NATO applicants.


6. (C) DAS Merkel urged the GOR to undertake an effort to
portray NATO as an alliance of shared values, not just a
military alliance. Overemphasis on the military aspect of
NATO vis-a-vis Ukraine and Georgia and aggressive rhetoric by
Russian officials including FM Lavrov's speech at the Duma
and the Duma debates only forced Ukraine and Georgia to take
a precipitous decision. Kosachev admitted that Russia felt
left out when more and more countries were admitted while
Russia was excluded. Clearly, Russia would never be part of
NATO, Kosachev said. Kosachev lamented that even in areas
where the U.S. and Russia should and could cooperate well,
such as Afghanistan, NATO was in the way. NATO limited
cooperation rather than promoting it. NATO added little to
efforts to promote joint security in Iran and North Korea
while it "damaged" the overall atmosphere of cooperation.
"Eighty percent of Ukrainians are against NATO membership,
yet you pursue it. Doesn't that violate your principles of
democracy?" Kosachev asked.


7. (C) Kosachev termed Ukraine, "a special case." Citing
an example of a small border town near Rostov, where many
residents cross the unmarked border daily, Kosachev asked,
"What's going to happen to this town once Ukraine joins NATO?
According to him, border disputes will flare up and the
bilateral relationship would be further damaged. Ukrainian
firms that produce military materiel for the Russian military
would suffer. Furthermore, the CFE would disappear once
Ukraine enters NATO, Kosachev warned. The U.S.'s repeated
argument that NATO enlargement was "not about Russia" simply
was not convincing, especially for the Russian military, he
added. DAS Merkel responded that nothing would happen in
that small town unless Russia took action because Russia is
not a threat to NATO, and NATO is about projecting force and
addressing instability, not border protection. In response
to DAS Merkel's question on Medvedev's reference to a
European security structure in his June 5 Berlin speech,
Kosachev said that the U.S. could not be excluded in any kind
of a new structure. The only pan-European organization, the
OSCE, does not function well on the two main issues of the
day: energy security and Kosovo.


8. (C) Kosachev defended Moscow Mayor Luzhkov who claimed
Russia's right to the Sevastopol naval base during his May 12
speech and was subsequently barred from entering Ukraine.
Luzhkov was simply responding to pressure from the local
population who greeted him with " Why do you leave us on our
own?" "Sevastopol does not want to belong to Ukraine"; and
"Crimea does not want to be part of NATO," Kosachev said.

Georgia: NATO and More
--------------


9. (C) Kosachev was not happy with what had happened in
Russia - Georgia relations, terming the 80 percent support
for the Georgian referendum on NATO membership "a defeat for
Russia's foreign policy." After Kosovo's declaration of
independence, keeping Russia - Georgia relations rational was
not possible. Kosachev maintained that many Duma deputies
supported an even more aggressive policy against Georgia.
After Kosovo, many thought there was no need to abide by
international law.


10. (C) Kosachev argued that the biggest mistake made by the
Georgian leadership was to deny the existence of the conflict
itself and blame Russia for all of its ills. For the
majority of the Abkhaz, Georgia's territorial integrity does
not include Abkhazia. Kosachev warned that the worse
scenario -- Georgia seeking a military solution -- would
certainly bring Russia's intervention. Kosachev hoped that
the railroad battalion would leave in 2-3 months; if not he
would be disappointed at Russia's "inconsistency." He said
that Russia had been a much better observer of international
laws, considering that "you ignored UNSC resolutions in
invading Iraq and did what you wanted to do in Kosovo."

Moldova
--------------


11. (C) Kosachev said that unlike Saakashivili, Voronin was
ready to address the conflict itself and consider Russia's
interests, including Moldova's neutrality. In response to
DAS Merkel's question on whether the guarantee of neutrality
in the Moldovan Constitution and the new National Security
Strategy were sufficient, Kosachev said that it was
acceptable as long as a mechanism prohibiting the amendment
of the Constitution was instituted.

Russia-EU Summit
--------------


12. (C) Kosachev warned against attempts by EU member states
to promote their bilateral issues with Russia through the EU.
Despite the EU Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner's promise
of no more surprises during her recent Moscow visit, Kosachev
felt that some member states were not "adult enough" to put
the collective interest before their bilateral grievances.
In response to DAS Merkel's query on whether Russia sought
common interests or common values with the EU, Kosachev
concluded that the EU itself was divided on values, lacking
commonality on such issues as prostitution, national
minorities, drug use, and freedom of expression.

Foreign Policy Making in the New Structure
--------------


13. (C) DAS Merkel invited Kosachev to elaborate on the role
of PM Putin and his new foreign policy advisor, former U.S.
Ambassador Ushakov, in foreign policy decision making.
Kosachev answered, "Read our Constitution," saying that
President Medvedev would lead, but quickly added that,
"Nobody knows, yet." Kosachev said that he once had
Ushakov's position, which was purely administrative in
nature. Presidential Administration Foreign Policy Advisor
Prikhodko had suggested Ushakov's appointment, Kosachev said.
RUSSELL