SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ)

S E C R E T MONTEVIDEO 000049

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DS/IP/ITA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2018
TAGS: ASEC PTER UY
SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ)
- SPRING 2008

REF: 07558

Classified By: PHARDING, DCM, REASONS 1.4 (C)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The spring 2008 Security Environmental
Profile Questionnaire (SEPQ) reflects continued lack of
police resources and EAC concern over a very porous border.
The Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) between
Uruguay and the U.S., and the visit of POTUS/SECSTATE in
March 2007 also spawned protests.

END SUMMARY

Post EAC provides the following numbered responses to the
questions posed in Reftel.

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Political Violence
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1. (SBU) Demonstrations

1-A. Are there any ethnic or religious communities in country
capable of carrying out significant anti-American
demonstrations?

A: (S/NF) No, there are no ethnic or religious communities
capable of carrying out significant anti-American
demonstrations. There are union and political groups that
have conducted significant anti-American protests but they do
not represent a single ethnic or religious community.

(S/NF) An ethnic/religious group with the potential for
anti-American sentiments are the Muslim communities located
along the Uruguayan/Brazilian border such as Hizballah, and
in the Uruguayan departments of Rivera and Rocha. Some
individuals have links to groups in the tri-border region of
Argentina/Brazil/Paraguay. However, the diminutive Uruguayan
Muslim community maintains a low profile and would be
unlikely to conduct public protests in Montevideo against the
U.S. They have however conducted protest marches in the
border town of Chuy.

1-B. Have there been anti-American demonstrations in the
country within the last 12 months?

A: (SBU) Yes, several. Most recently there have been
protests against the TIFA, the war in Iraq, and the
POTUS/SECSTATE visit.

1-C. Have demonstrations taken place near or in front of U.S.
diplomatic facilities?

A: Yes.

1-D. What is the average size of an anti-American
demonstration?

A: (SBU) Average size 200. Protests range from 50 to 200
with a high of 5,000. The 5,000 person protest took place in
March 2007 in opposition to the POTUS visit to Uruguay.

1-E. Are anti-American demonstrations usually triggered by
U.S. foreign policy initiatives, military actions, or by
domestic issues?

A: (SBU) The main anti-American demonstrations were
triggered by the signing of a TIFA between Uruguay and the
U.S. There has
also been speculation by some that the U.S. is trying to
build a military base in Uruguay. This had lead to "joint"
demonstrations against the TIFA and a "Yanki" military base.
Other foreign policy initiatives as well as domestic politics
also lead to demonstrations. Protests reached their peak
during the 2007 POTUS visit.

1-F. Are demonstrations generally violent or peaceful?

A: (SBU) Generally peaceful with graffiti, minor property
damage, burning posters or effigies and/or throwing bottles,
paint bombs, or fireworks. A small splinter protest, of 200
protesters vandalized some U.S. affiliated businesses
(McDonalds) during the March 2007 POTUS visit. In the weeks
prior to the POTUS visit, as a form of protest, a Bank of
Boston ATM was damaged by an explosive device at 3:00 a.m. No
one was injured in this incident.
1-G. If violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage
to USG property or injuries to USG employees?

A: (SBU) No injuries and no significant damage to USG
property yet, because police manning barricades prevented
protesters from accessing the Chancery perimeter.

1-H. If violent, have any demonstrators ever penetrated our
perimeter security line?

A: (C) Improvements have been made to the chancery
perimeter, but protestors can get close enough to harass us
with paint bombs and similar nuisances. It is nearly
impossible to close off all the streets surrounding the
Chancery.

1-I. Have there been anti-government demonstrations in the
country within the last 12 months?

A: (SBU) Numerous protests against both the city and the
national government have taken place.

1-J. Have demonstrations taken place near or in front of U.S.
diplomatic facilities?


A. (SBU) Yes, protests often take place about a mile from
the Chancery, near City Hall and one of the main avenues. An
obelisk, soccer stadium, and city park across the street from
the COMRES are often used as rally points for crowds of
thousands. Anti-American protests that take place in the
center usually march on the chancery.

1-K. What is the average size of an anti-government
demonstration?

A: (SBU) Approximately 50-500.

1-L. Are demonstrations generally violent or peaceful?

A: (SBU) Generally peaceful with graffiti, minor property
damage, and some throwing of paint bombs and fireworks.
During some protests masked demonstrators engaged in
property crimes, smashing windows, throwing bottles, throwing
large fireworks, attempting to provoke the police, burning
tires in the street, etc.

1-M. If violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage
to USG property?

A: (SBU) No damage to USG property yet, because police
manning barricades prevented protesters from accessing the
Chancery perimeter.


2. (SBU) Macro Conflict Conditions

2-A. Is the host country engaged in an interstate or
intrastate conflict? (This may include battles between
organized and violent drug cartels.)

A: (SBU) No. However, Uruguay and neighboring Argentina have
a serious dispute over the construction of wood processing
plants on the shared Uruguay River. Greenpeace and Argentine
protest groups continue to block bridges and trucks for many
weeks at a time. While this is unlikely to evolve into
intrastate conflict the situation is serious and problematic.

2-B. If an intrastate conflict, is it an insurgency limited
to a specific region or is it a countrywide civil war?

A: (SBU) N/A

2-C. If limited to a specific region, are any U.S. diplomatic
facilities located in this region?

A: (SBU) N/A

2-D. Have any of the factions involved in intrastate
conflicts signaled or demonstrated an anti-American
orientation?

A: (SBU) N/A


3. (SBU) Host Country Capabilities

3-A. Are law enforcement agencies professional and well
trained?

A: (S/NF) The Uruguayan National Police are well trained.
However the EAC classifies them as minimally professional
because severe resource constraints translate into limited
effectiveness on the street. The police do not have a
sufficient number of patrol vehicles to conduct patrols
and/or pursue criminals. Most police officers moonlight from
40-60 hours a week to supplement their marginal salaries of
$150- $ 200 USD per month. The police have minimal funds for
maintenance of existing vehicles, equipment or facilities,
and due to endless moonlighting the police are often
exhausted.

(C/NF) We do not yet know the exact root cause, but the
police are becoming less and less dependable in their manning
of previously agreed upon police posts protecting our USG
facilities.

(C/NF) Current law heavily favors criminals, making
prosecution difficult, and often resulting in same-day
release with no charges pressed.

3-B. Have they been trained by U.S. agencies? If so, please
elaborate on effectiveness of training.

A: (C/NF) Uruguayan Customs, Immigration, and selected police
units (Intelligence, Drugs) have received training from U.S.
agencies, however the training has been limited to relatively
small groups. We received no INL funds in 2006 or 2007.

3-C. Are law enforcement agencies confronted with serious,
widespread corruption inside their agencies?

A: (C/NF) There is some petty corruption at the street
level, but the level of known corruption in Uruguay is
relatively low when compared with the rest of South America.

3-D. Are the intelligence services professional and capable
of deterring terrorist actions?

A: (C/NF) The Uruguayan Intelligence agencies (military and
police) are professional and are cooperating with the USG to
deter terrorist actions. The police intelligence service is
particularly effective and works closely with us and
neighboring intel services on intel sharing.

3-E. Have the intelligence services been cooperative with
U.S. Embassy requests for information and support?

A: (C/NF) Yes in general.

3-F. Assuming there have been significant terrorist threats
in recent years, have host country security services been
able to score any major anti-terrorism successes?

A: (SBU) There have been no significant threats.

3-G. Has host country been responsive (re: timeliness and
allocation of resources) to embassy requests for protective
security?

A: (SBU) Yes.

3-H. How does the embassy assess the overall security at
major airports in the country? (excellent, very good,
good/average, or poor)

A: (C/NF) Good/Average in Montevideo, poor at small airports
in the interior. Since 9/11/01 the Uruguayan government has
enlisted the support of Uruguayan Air Force security
personnel to screen passengers. They are moderately effective
in screening passengers. U.S. carriers also have their own
baggage screening programs. However, U.S. carriers have
reported deficiencies in screening airport vendors, screening
airport personnel and controlling ramp access. Small airports
in the interior have minimal to zero security.

3-I. How effective are customs and immigration controls
agencies? (effective, average, or ineffective)

A: (SBU) Average at the airport and seaport in Montevideo.
Ineffective or non-existent outside of Montevideo. Most of
the 985 KM land border between Uruguay and Brazil is
completely open.

3-J. How effective are border patrol forces? (effective,
average, or ineffective)
A: (SBU) Ineffective. The Uruguayan government controls only
major land and sea border crossings.
Most of the 985 KM long land border with Brazil is wide open
with only sporadic attempts at control and
easily avoided fixed checkpoints.

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Indigenous Terrorism
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4. (SBU) Anti-American Terrorist Groups

4-A. Are there indigenous, anti-American terrorist groups in
country?

A: (SBU) No. The only former domestic terrorist group, the
Tupamaros, are now affiliated with the ruling political party
the "Frente Amplio" or Broad Front.

4-B. If yes, how many? Please name groups.

A: (SBU) N/A

4-C. Have groups carried out anti-American attacks within the
last 12 months?

A: (SBU) No.

4-D. Were any of these lethal attacks?

A: (SBU) N/A

4-E. Have groups attacked U.S. diplomatic targets?

A: (SBU) N/A

4-F. Have groups attacked U.S. business, U.S. military, or
U.S. related targets?

A: (SBU) Not since the early 1970's when they kidnapped and
killed an American Citizen U.S. Embassy employee.

4-G. Have groups limited their attacks to specific regions or
do they operate countrywide?

A: (SBU) N/A

4-H. If attacks are limited to regions, are there any U.S.
diplomatic facilities located in these regions?

A: (SBU) N/A


5. (SBU) Other Indigenous Terrorist Groups

5-A. Are there other indigenous terrorist groups (not
anti-American) in country?

A: (SBU) No.

5-B. If yes, how many? Please name groups.

A: (SBU) N/A

5-C. Have groups carried out attacks in the capital or in
areas where U.S. diplomatic facilities are located?

A: (SBU) N/A

5-D. Were attacks lethal and/or indiscriminate?

A: (SBU) N/A

5-E. Have any Americans been killed or injured in these
attacks?

A: (SBU) N/A

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Transnational Terrorism
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6. (SBU) Transnational Terrorist Indicators

6-A. Are there any foreign terrorist groups that have a
presence in country? Provide names.

A: (S/NF) Hamas and Hizballah do not have a presence in
Uruguay but they do have a permanent presence on the
Brazilian side of the Uruguay/Brazilian border and in the
tri-border region of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. Some ETA
members and many sympathizers reside in Uruguay. Several ETA
members have been arrested in Uruguay over the last few
years.

6-B. How does post assess this presence? Is it an operational
cell? Financial cell? Support cell?
Propaganda cell?

A: (S/NF) Post is not aware of functioning operational
terrorist cells in Uruguay. However Hamas and Hizballah
conduct fundraising and financial operations on the Brazilian
side of the Brazil/Uruguay borders.

6-C. Is the host government sympathetic to these groups?

A (C/NF) Post is not aware of the government's views toward
foreign terrorist groups. However the Uruguayan government is
partially sympathetic to the governments of Cuba, Iran,
Russia and Venezuela, and perhaps China in the future.

6-D. Are there suspect non-governmental organizations
(NGOs)in the country that have a relationship with any of
these groups?

A: (SBU) No.

6-E. Are there any ethnic or religious communities in country
that are sympathetic to these groups?

A: (S/NF) Yes, there is a small Muslim community located
along the 985 KM Uruguayan/Brazilian border, in the
Uruguayan departments of Rivera and Rocha. Some estimates put
as many as 9 million persons of Middle Eastern extraction
living in Southern Brazil. Some may have links to other
groups in the tri-border region of Argentina/Brazil/Paraguay.

6-F. How does post assess the level, intent, and scope of
hostile intelligence services (Iran, Cuba, Russia, China,
Syria, Venezuela, Sudan, et. al.) in country relative to
potential anti-American terrorist acts?

A: (S/NF)Venezuela, Cuba, Russia, China and Iran all have a
relatively large embassy presence in Uruguay. Some of the
officers in these embassies are known hostile intelligence
officers. The EAC is aware of the presence of the Iranian
Embassy as a potential operations platform for Hizballah
activities in the region. The EAC believes that Cuban and
Venezuelan intelligence operatives may become more active in
the near future. China is possibly making political inroads
in Uruguay through donations of technical equipment. The EAC
has no known indications of planning for terrorist acts.

6-G. How does post assess the availability of weapons and
explosives in country or from nearby countries for hostile
terrorist elements?

A: (C/NF) Weapons and explosives are readily available due
to the porous 985 KM land borders with Argentina and Brazil.
Both Argentina and Brazil manufacture weapons and explosives.
Montevideo has a sizable seaport which serves neighboring
countries. Small shipments of weapons have been discovered
mixed in with legitimate cargo. The potential for weapons or
explosives transshipment through Uruguay to/from Paraguay is
high. Furthermore Uruguay is a largely agricultural country
that utilizes both fertilizers and explosives for farming and
mining. These readily available elements have the potential
to be used to construct an IED.

(C/NF) Since Paraguay is landlocked almost all container
traffic comes through the port of Montevideo, Uruguay. If
illegal arms shipments, drugs, counterfeit merchandise are
going to or from Paraguay via container odds are that they
transited the ports of Colonia and/or Montevideo.


7. (U) Point of contact is RSO William A. Maxwell at
Commercial Tel (011) 5982-418-7777 ext. 2319, IVG
818-223-0000, STU x 2190.
Baxter