OCTOBER 12 AMCONSULATE MONTERREY EAC MEETING

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MONTERREY 000459

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC KCRM PINS SNAR MX
SUBJECT: OCTOBER 12 AMCONSULATE MONTERREY EAC MEETING

REF: CONSULATE MONTERREY DS SPOT REPORTS

MONTERREY 00000459 001.2 OF 002



1. (SBU) The evening of October 12 post's Emergency Action
Committee (EAC) met to review secure posture and preparations in
light of the gunshot/grenade attack on the Consulate building
midnight October 11. While unknown assailants fired 6 to 10
shots at the building and threw a grenade (which did not
explode),no one was injured. The grenade, which was
discovered early the morning of October 12 in a subsequent
daylight search of the grounds, did not detonate because the
assailants did not remove the pin arming device. In the
October 12 EAC, DHS ICE Assistant Attache reported that he had
detected persons unknown conducting surveillance of him that
very morning as he departed the residence of the DHS ICE
Representative.



Greater Security Measures

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2. (SBU) Meeting participants included CG, Acting RSO, DEA,
DHS-ICE, ATF, OPAD, Legatt, IMO, PAO, and GSO. Acting RSO
related the steps already in train to bolster security at the
Consulate, including redoubled police presence on the part of
Nuevo Leon state, Monterrey city, and San Pedro city law
enforcement. (While the Consulate is not in San Pedro, that is
the municipality where Consulate direct-hires reside.) The City
of San Pedro is also increasing police patrols near the
residences of Consulate direct hires. CG reported that the
Governor of the State of Nuevo Leon had telephoned to offer any
assistance that the Consulate might need in terms of security
and investigation follow-up. FBI and ATF briefed on evidence
collection efforts to date, including examination and analysis
of recovered shell casings and bullet fragments and impoundment
of a suspect vehicle. ATF stated that an AFI (Mexican federal
law enforcement) canine bomb detection team would arrive from
Mexico City to verify that there were no more explosive devices
in the Consulate compound. (This search was done later that
evening and again repeated early the morning of October 13;
results were negative.)



Employee and Public Outreach

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3. (SBU) CG described telephone outreach efforts already
undertaken to inform Consulate employees of the incident, many
of whom had traveled out of town for the holiday weekend. A
Country Team meeting was set for the morning of October 14, the
first morning back at work, and Section/Agency supervisors
agreed to meet with their employees early October 14 to brief
them on events over the weekend. A town hall meeting will take
place later in the week. Post released a press statement that
night -- which was given prominent play in the October 13
Monterrey morning newspapers -- and a warden message was sent
out October 13.



Next Steps in Terms of Physical and Personal Security

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4. (SBU) RSO personnel noted that given the assailant's
approach to the premises, avoiding our video cameras, it
appeared that they had conducted prior surveillance of their
target. EAC recommended increased activity on the part of our
Surveillance Detection team. EAC also undertook to come up with
a package of physical security measures which could mitigate the
impact of this type of attack in the future. Most immediate
items include wire mesh for the highway-side facade of the
building to ensure that any future thrown grenade did not get
trapped by the latticework, new mylar for windows, and spikes
for the sub-standard fence. Post will request immediate funding
for these items from DS (approximately US$5,000 to US$8,000),
with a request for another US$15,000 for additional measures in
short order. In addition, ATF stated that it would seek to
advance the ATF Explosive Threat Vulnerability Assessment of the
Consulate programmed for November 2008 to an earlier date.
Construction of an anti-scale fence had already been scheduled
for FY 09. Given its location approximately 5 meters from a
busy superhighway, however, Consulate building's main deficiency
remains its glaring lack of setback. The October 14 visit of

MONTERREY 00000459 002.2 OF 002


Embassy Mexico RSO will prove helpful in integrating these
various strands into an effective package.




5. (SBU) Overall, EAC members agreed upon the need to
reinforce strong personal security practices on the part of
Consulate direct-hires and LES. Acting RSO reminded supervisors
to stress the importance of varying routes and departure/arrival
times, planning ahead, and being security-conscious.
(Kidnappings for ransom have risen substantially during recent
months). EAC also discussed the need to review trip-wires in
terms of the Consulate's overall presence.



Possible Motives of the Assailants

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6. (SBU) As no group or person had taken responsibility for
the incident, EAC discussed possible motives behind the attack.
EAC consensus was that it was in response to either USG, and/or
specifically Consulate-initiated, anti-drug law enforcement
efforts, and that the late-night timing and the manner of the
attack (i.e., the failure to remain the pin from the grenade)
was intended to send a message. Post's law enforcement reps met
with local contacts October 14 to begin sifting through this and
other possible theories. CG and law enforcement team plan to
keep in close touch with federal (Monterrey-based),state, and
local counterparts to emphasize the need for progress in the
investigation of this incident. A meeting with the Nuevo Leon
state Attorney General is set for the afternoon of October 14.




7. (U) Post will continue to monitor developments closely.
WILLILAMSON