Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MONROVIA476
2008-06-20 12:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Monrovia
Cable title:  

LIBERIA'S PRS: PEACE AND SECURITY PILLAR - A

Tags:  PRGOV ASEC MARR MASS CJAN KJUS LI 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4261
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHMV #0476/01 1721242
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201242Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0119
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0034
RUFGCIN/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUFGAID/USCINCEUR INTEL VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MONROVIA 000476 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2015
TAGS: PRGOV ASEC MARR MASS CJAN KJUS LI
SUBJECT: LIBERIA'S PRS: PEACE AND SECURITY PILLAR - A
SECURITY STRATEGY IS SLOWLY EMERGING

Classified By: Ambassador Donald E. Booth for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MONROVIA 000476

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2015
TAGS: PRGOV ASEC MARR MASS CJAN KJUS LI
SUBJECT: LIBERIA'S PRS: PEACE AND SECURITY PILLAR - A
SECURITY STRATEGY IS SLOWLY EMERGING

Classified By: Ambassador Donald E. Booth for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The Liberian National Security Strategy,
upon which the security section of the Poverty Reduction
Strategy (PRS) is based, has not yet been made public, but
the GOL is moving ahead on the basis of the strategy. The
PRS process has forced the Liberians to begin to plan
long-term, and while progress has been made, more effort and
resources are needed to make the Liberia National Police a
viable force. The Liberians are working to strengthen the
greatest weakness of the security section of the PRS -- the
costing -- but that should not detract from the overall
success of the process so far. End Summary.


2. (C) Liberia's Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) paper on
Consolidating Peace and Security is based primarily on the
National Security Strategy of the Republic of Liberia
(NSSRL),which has been approved by President Sirleaf, but
has not yet been published or made public. However, the PRS
text was drawn from the draft NSSRL, and the Priority Action
Matrix is closely aligned with the NSSRL Implementation
Matrix (NSSRL-IM).


3. (C) The relative ease of preparing the security sector
portion of the PRS compared to the other pillars was the
result of months of work of the Security Sector technical
team. Originally, the task of writing a national security
strategy was given to the Governance Commission (GC),and
after months of delay, the GC produced an essentially
unusable document. The UN brought in a British security
expert to work on the strategy, who worked with the Liberian
technical team to draft a second strategy paper, with direct
engagement by Ambassador and by former SRSG Doss, the team
developed a strategy that reflects the proposals contained in
the Rand report "Making Liberia Safe: Transformation of the
National Security Sector." The technical team then "merged"
the two drafts, using much of the text of the GC draft, but
keeping the actual strategy of the team's draft.


4. (C) Of greatest contention was the decision to make part
of the strategy to streamline the law enforcement and
intelligence functions. The merged draft eliminated the
Ministry of National Security, merging those functions with
the National Security Agency, with the NSA becoming the lead
intelligence agency. It also planned for the elimination the
National Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement
Agency, and folding those functions into the Liberia National
Police (LNP). The GC argued that competing agencies would
limit the power of any one agency, and in any event, more
discussion was needed. However, consolidation of these
organizations made it into the NSSRL and the PRS.


5. (SBU) During the county consultation phase of the PRS
process, roads, education and health were the main focus of
discussions. However, underpinning those discussions was an
assumption the GOL would provide for security, especially the
ability of the LNP to enforce the law without abusing human
rights or corruption. The Liberians participating in the
discussions made clear their safety was crucial to their
well-being.


6. (SBU) The Security Pillar includes several agencies and
services. The USG has played a major role in three of those,
with a leading role in The Armed Forces of Liberia and the
Special Security Service (SSS -- the President's protective
service),and a contributor to the LNP, and especially a
leadership role in the formation of a new SWAT-like Emergency
Response Unit (ERU). Other agencies include the National
Security Agency, the National Fire Service, the Bureau of
Immigration and Naturalization, and the Corrections Service.

-- AFL: The PRS does not single out contributions of
individual donors, and therefore does not note the central
role the USG has played in developing the new AFL. It does,
however, keep to the timeline of creating a 2,000 soldier
force by 2010, and calls for the creation of a Coast Guard
within the three-year PRS period.

-- LNP: The PRS calls for the creation of a police Civilian
Oversight Board by December 2008 as well as the formation of
the ERU by December 2009.

-- SSS: The PRS does not provide for any specific goals for
the SSS, but the agency is included in several initiatives to
streamline operations and reduce overlapping functions.


7. (C) The Security Pillar has moved forward on a costing
exercise based on the NSSRL-IM, and will present the results
at the Liberia 2008 Poverty Reduction Forum in Berlin. The

MONROVIA 00000476 002 OF 003


recently completed exercise shows a three-year costing of the
security sector of nearly $376.8 million, which is
substantially above the $252.4 million projected in the PRS.
The new costing exercise, while much more thought out than
the one-line figure in the PRS, is as much a wish list as an
analysis of priorities given expected budgetary constrains
and limits in donor support, or a reflection of existing
donor commitments, such as for training and equipping the
AFL. For example, the National Fire Service costed for six
fire engines and 10 ambulances, none of which are presently
funded.


8. (SBU) The stark contrast of the two figures should not
lead one to assume that to PRS itself is flawed. The PRS and
NSSRL processes were running in parallel, but in harmony and
that the Security Pillar was not able to meet the PRS
deadline is not fatal.


9. (C) Several initiatives, such as the consolidation of
agencies and the creation of a Coast Guard, require
legislative actions, and both the National Security and
Intelligence Act and the National Defense Act remain stuck in
the Legislature. Several lawmakers have told us they wish to
see the NSSRL before acting on any legislation, and we
understand that the Legislature is not happy with some
aspects of the National Defense Act.

CHALLANGES AHEAD


10. (C) The withdrawal of UNMIL is linked to Liberia's
ability to assume its own security. Further donor support is
needed to avoid a longer than anticipated high level UNMIL
presence, or a departure of UNMIL that results in
instability. The NSSRL and PRS processes have been good
catalysts for planning within Liberian security agencies for
the next three years. After the Forum in Berlin, the
Liberians will need to move forward in their planning.
Specific issues needing to be addressed are:

-- Legislation: The Legislature needs to move forward
quickly on security legislations. Its inaction is holding up
our ability to begin assistance on creating a new Coast
Guard. Efforts to streamline intelligence and law
enforcement services are also stymied.

-- Prioritization: Agencies will need to accept that the
funding for their proposals will not be limitless, so they
will need to prioritize their needs, and perhaps find ways to
share resources, such as vehicle repair and communications.
Capacity building is another area that can be shared. Some
skills, like financial management, can be taught through
existing civil service institutes.

-- Keep the pace up, but do not rush: Initial Entry
Training will be completed for all 2,000 AFL soldiers in
December. There is some pressure to accelerate the process
to justify a more rapid UNMIL drawdown. Moving timelines at
this point will be only counterproductive.

We see some positive signals these last few weeks that UNMIL
and the GOL are serious about creating fundamental change in
the LNP. Discussions are going on now (that frankly should
have taken place a while ago) about the way forward. The UN
is organizing a workshop in July to follow on the Berlin
Forum, that should be a good opportunity to begin building a
strategy. At the same time, we are cautioning our partners
not to make hasty decisions that could in fact worsen the
situation. All agree that the basic problem is command and
control, both within the LNP command structure and in tasking
to the field. This must be corrected immediately. We are
about to arm a highly trained unit of police without the
requisite command and control to ensure their proper use.

-- Increase Liberian ownership: The Liberians naturally
look to partners for assistance in building their security
apparatus. They then naturally complain of the powerlessness
of their position. The PRS and NSSRL processes, though slow
and with less than perfect results, is pushing the Liberians
to think out their own destiny. We must continue to
encourage this.


11. (U) ERC Pillar

Ministry of Defense (Chair)
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of National Security
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Internal Affairs
Ministry of State

MONROVIA 00000476 003 OF 003


Special Security Service
National Security Agency
Office of the National Security Advisor
Liberia Reconstruction
MOJ/Liberia National Police
MOJ/Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization
MOJ/Corrections Service
MOJ/National Fire Service
MOD/COIC

U.S. Embassy (Co-Chair)
UNMIL SRSG (Co-Chair)
AU
ECOWAS
Nigerian Embassy
Ghanaian Embassy
EC
UK
France
BOOTH