KEEPING EMBASSY MINSK IN OPERATION: POST'S CURRENT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MINSK 000190

SIPDIS

NOFORN

SIPDIS
STATE FOR P, M, EUR, DS, CA, DGHR, R, L
STATE ALSO FOR AID

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2033
TAGS: PREL AMGT ASEC ODIP APER CMGT BO
SUBJECT: KEEPING EMBASSY MINSK IN OPERATION: POST'S CURRENT
VIEWS ON EXPULSION THREAT

REF: A. MINSK 163

B. MINSK 168

C. MINSK 181

D. STATE 26143

E. MINSK 174

Classified By: Charge Jonathan Moore for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This message has been reviewed by the full country
team and cleared by section chiefs and agency heads (Charge,
A/DCM, CONS, PAO, A/POL/ECON, MGT, RSO, DATT, RAO, AID) and
is submitted in advance of the interagency meeting to discuss
the subject issue at 10:00 local time in Washington on Monday
March 17.

Background
--------------


2. (S) The GOB lashed out in response to the U.S. Treasury
Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control March 6
statement providing guidance on existing economic sanctions
against the Lukashenko-controlled/state-owned Belarusian
energy conglomerate "Belneftekhim." The initial response,
presented both verbally (ref A) and in a diplomatic note (ref
B),merely "suggested" that 1) the Ambassador be recalled for
consultations and 2) the Embassy reduce its staffing to that
of the Belarusian Embassy in Washington. As events unfolded,
including the return to Minsk from Washington of Belarusian
Ambassador Mikhail Khvostov on March 8, the regime ratcheted
up the pressure on the Ambassador on March 11 to leave within
24 hours or be declared persona non grata (PNG). On that
basis, and in consultation with Washington, the Ambassador
left post March 12.


3. (S) While escorting Ambassador to the border March 12,
DCM was called by Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor
Valentin Rybakov, who refused to speak to the Ambassador and
indicated to the DCM that the Ambassador's departure
mitigated only the GOB's threat to PNG her. Rybakov noted
that a similar threat -- to PNG Embassy staff -- would follow
no later than Monday March 17 if the Embassy did not move to
do so voluntarily and follow up with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. As reported ref C, Charge delivered the State
Department-drafted diplomatic note (ref D) March 13. The MFA
has not yet contacted the Embassy to respond to the questions
posed in the note.

State of Preparedness
--------------


4. (S/NF) It is important to note that we have taken full
opportunity of the time we have had since March 12 to prepare
for any necessary contingency, including the threat of
forcing the departure in 24 hours of any combination of USDH
employees. Appropriate briefings have taken place with all
American staff, adult family members, and local Belarusian
staff. We have reduced our classified information and
equipment holdings to meet "critical" levels (two-hour burn
time).

Current View: Expulsions Likely But Embassy Must Remain
-------------- --------------


5. (S/NF) We have a strong and experienced team here, adept
at reading the sparse signals that offer indications of the
regime's next steps. Given a baseline where we are one of
only four embassies in the world rated by State's Bureau of
Diplomatic Security as "Critical" for both human and
technical intelligence threats, the increasing level of GOB
harassment directed at both American and Belarusian staff --
including intense surveillance of certain American personnel
and a flurry of requests from the Belarusian KGB to meet with
our locally-employed staff -- is of particular interest.
Getting rid of foreign diplomats seems to be the GOB's new
favorite game: Lithuanian Ambassador Edminas Bagdonas
reported to Charge March 14 that the regime is preparing to
expel the Polish Ambassador over the upcoming introduction of
ethnic Polish identity cards. We encourage as much support
as can be raised from European friends and allies; in Minsk
(and, we understand, in some EU capitals) there is a high
level of indignation and some messages have already been

MINSK 00000190 002 OF 002


passed to the GOB arguing against this kind of move.


6. (S) However, although the indiscriminate tossing out of
American diplomats may be condemned in third country
capitals, we have no reason to believe that the regime will
not carry out this threat. Lukashenko is not merely Europe's
last dictator: if he is consistent in anything, it is his
instability and unpredictability. Since he became head of
state in 1994, he has made many other outrageous acts and
statements: two U.S. citizens in a hot-air balloon were shot
down and killed by the Belarusian military on Lukashenko's
orders; key democratic opposition leaders have been murdered,
and others jailed for years at a time; he abolished the
legitimately-elected parliament; the residences of several
Ambassadors (including ours),were seized on his orders;
Lukashenko has praised Hitler's leadership qualities,
publicly admitted falsifying elections, and made scurrilous
anti-Semitic remarks; and he has pursued close personal and
financial ties with Chavez, Castro, and Ahmedinejad.


7. (S) Post emphatically supports the view of Ambassador
Stewart that the USG must retain a presence in Belarus. As
key opposition leaders told the Ambassador just minutes
before her March 12 departure (ref E),it is essential that
we be here to "stand up for the truth." To meet that goal,
which post believes is also supported throughout the USG,
Embassy Minsk needs as many opportunities as possible to
impose logic and reason on this situation.

Proposed Reaction
--------------


8. (S) To bow to Lukashenko before his regime ups the ante
would serve no purpose. However, if post is contacted by the
MFA and told that PNGs are imminent, we need to have a solid,
comprehensive response (recalling that their "suggestion" has
been to match their staffing levels in Washington); based on
information from OFM, the Belarusians have 20 positions at
their embassy in Washington and two at their consulate
general in New York.


A. If the Embassy is informed that we must reduce within 24
hours to Belarusian staffing levels in the U.S., we offer to
reduce to 22 plus/plus 6 MSGs, leaving 28 USDH.


B. If told to reduce to a total of 22 USDH, the six-person
MSG detachment would remain. Other agencies may need to
reduce staffing as well.


C. If told to reduce to a number of 21 or lower, the balance
of staffing in relation to USG policy priorities -- including
the protection of U.S. citizens and the projection of U.S.
policy -- may dictate post moving to unclassified operations,
meaning that the Marine Security Guard Detachment and
agencies that require classified processing would depart
post. In that instance, Embassy Minsk would be forced to
rely on a neighboring post, perhaps Embassy Vilnius, for
limited classified access.

In any case, we ask the interagency not to consider these
steps to be a bureaucratic exercise; we have carefully
assembled lists of what positions would remain under the
scenarios above -- shared with the State Department -- based
on the needs of the mission. Efforts to use this turn of
events to craft our staffing from a distance would not be
useful.

Conclusion
--------------


9. (S) In any case, all of us in Minsk are grateful for the
support we have already received from headquarters in
Washington and colleagues in the region, most notably
Ambassador John Cloud and his distinguished team in Vilnius.
We defer to Ambassador Karen Stewart, who will be present at
the March 17 meeting, to adjust any aspect of this message.
MOORE