Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MEXICO614
2008-02-29 22:19:00
SECRET
Embassy Mexico
Cable title:  

MEXICO-IRAN RELATIONS: A LOT OF TALK BUT NOT MUCH

Tags:  ENRG MX PARM PEMEX PGOV PINR PREL PTER 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0706
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHME #0614/01 0602219
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 292219Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0729
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RHMFISS/CDR USNORTHCOM
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
S E C R E T MEXICO 000614 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SECSTATE FOR WHA/MEX, S/CT, DS, NEA, INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2018
TAGS: ENRG MX PARM PEMEX PGOV PINR PREL PTER
SUBJECT: MEXICO-IRAN RELATIONS: A LOT OF TALK BUT NOT MUCH
ACTION

Classified By: Political Counselor Charles V. Barclay for reasons 1.4 (
b)(d)

SUMMARY
-------

S E C R E T MEXICO 000614

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SECSTATE FOR WHA/MEX, S/CT, DS, NEA, INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2018
TAGS: ENRG MX PARM PEMEX PGOV PINR PREL PTER
SUBJECT: MEXICO-IRAN RELATIONS: A LOT OF TALK BUT NOT MUCH
ACTION

Classified By: Political Counselor Charles V. Barclay for reasons 1.4 (
b)(d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) More than a year after a dynamic new Iranian
Ambassador hit the ground running in Mexico, bilateral
relations between the two countries have yet to move beyond
the symbolic. Economic ties remain limited and soft-power
projections by Iran in Mexico have had little public impact.
Mexican officials pay a certain amount of lip service to
expanding cooperation with Iran, but circumstances offer
little fertile ground for doing so. Moreover, the provocative
stance taken by the new envoy has caused some Mexican
officials to take notice and may have alienated some in
Mexico's small Muslim community.

COOPERATION LIMITED MOSTLY TO SYMBOLIC AGREEMENTS
-------------- --------------

2. (U) Ambassador Mohammad Hassan Ghadiri Abyaneh arrived in
Mexico in July 2007 and has been making waves since. In
interviews and public statements, he freely shares his
opinions and ignites controversy by discussing, among other
things, a possible US invasion of Iran, US domination of
Latin America, and Iran's nuclear program. He is actively
working to increase Iran's presence in Mexico for political
and religious ends, attempting to build Mexican support for
Iran in the international arena and to exert control over
Mexico's small Muslim community. He is trying to convince GOM
to make it easier for Iranians to obtain visas for travel to
Mexico, a change that would allow him to attempt to increase
Iran's cultural, religious, and political influence in Mexico
on a greater scale.


3. (U) In January 2008, the Ambassador orchestrated a visit
to Mexico by Ali Reza Sheikh Attar, the Iranian Foreign
Minister's First Deputy, who discussed bilateral economic
cooperation with a variety of executive and legislative
branch officials. While here, the Deputy Foreign Minister

said that enhancing ties to Latin America is a foreign policy
priority for Iran. Such ties stand to serve Iran politically
by increasing international support for its government and
its policies as well as religiously by allowing Iran to
exercise influence over Latin America's Muslim communities.
According to press reporting, the Iranian president
instructed Tehran's Latin American ambassadors last month to
present Iran's potential cooperation to Latin American
governments and to emphasize that Iran is opposed to the
"domination" imposed by the "empire" (the United States).
Iran has already established close ties with Cuba, Venezuela,
Bolivia, and Nicaragua.


4. (U) Despite some encouraging noises from Mexican
officials, however, the country offers little fertile ground
for significantly expanded ties. Concrete economic
cooperation between Mexico and Iran is quite limited. The two
governments have made several symbolic pledges to hold
meetings and focus on increasing economic cooperation and
trade -- which stands just below $40 million, three fourths
of which is Mexican exports to Iran. The most specific
proposal involves sharing information about the Iranian
experience of opening its oil sector to private investment --
an issue of great interest to Mexico as discussion of energy
reform gets underway.


5. (U) Deputy Minister Sheikh Attar's Mexican interlocutors
ventured that energy cooperation might be a possibly fruitful
area. Deputy Foreign Minister Lourdes Aranda said that the
GOM would be willing to learn about Iran's experience of
allowing private investment in its oil sector. Likewise,
Chamber of Deputies President Ruth Zavaleta described
Iranian-Mexican cooperation as very important and called for
drawing on Iran's experience in energy as Mexico attempts to
address the issues facing Pemex, Mexico's state-owned oil
company.


6. (U) However, there has been no indication that the GOM
seriously intends to plumb Iranian expertise as a model for
its own halting efforts to reform the energy sector here.
Mexican officials are more interested in learning from the
successful experiences of Brazil and the Nordic countries as
they seek to find a politically acceptable reform package.



7. (U) Apart from economic issues, Mexican officials have
said the cultural arena offers possibilities for expanding
ties with Iran. These gestures are mostly symbolic and are
backed by limited substance. In her January meeting with Ali
Reza Sheikh Attar, Deputy FM Aranda stressed cooperation
between the two countries in the field of culture and history
and called the 2007 display of Persian artifacts at Mexico's
National Anthropology Museum a successful experience in
cultural cooperation. Additionally, Luis Ortiz Monasterio
Castellanos, Mexico's Ambassador to Iran, told the Iranian
Foreign Minister that Mexico's great fondness for Iranian
culture and art is an asset for strengthening bilateral ties.
Such soft cooperation is not new; cultural exchanges also
took place under President Fox. However, Mexican appetites
for such exotica are growing only slowly and there is little
evidence of keen appreciation among the public for a steady
diet of Farsi films and artifacts that would soften the turf
for its closer identification with Iranian political and
diplomatic interests.

CALDERON'S STANCE TOWARD IRAN
--------------


8. (U) Calderon too has made occasionally positive-sounding,
but largely empty, gestures toward Iran. In December 2007,
he met former Iranian President Mohamed Khatami and agreed
with the latter (who made a thinly veiled assessment of the
U.S.-Iran face off) that dialogue and negotiation were the
way to deal with differences between countries. Last year,
while receiving Ambassador Ghadiri Abyeneh's credentials, he
noted his interest in expanding relations and said Mexico was
ready to promote ties with a variety of regional and
international actors.


9. (U) However, unlike Venezuela's Chavez and Nicaragua's
Ortega, who have offered truly warm welcomes to Iranian
overtures, it is obvious that Calderon is not inclined to
actively pursue the relationship. His pragmatic approach to
foreign policy issues and desire to focus on Mexico's
relationships with Latin American, the United States, and
other important economic players will keep Iran from the top
of the list of countries his administration actively courts
in an effort to enhance ties.

IRAN PLAYS TO MEXICO'S SENSITIVITIES
--------------


10. (U) Mexico's longstanding foreign policy mantras --
"sovereignty and self-determinism" -- offer Iran its most
useful leverage here. Iranian officials understand Mexico's
cold-war era non-alignment fundamentals and its sensitivities
surrounding living in the shadow of the United States. They
play to these in seeking better ties and concrete Mexican
support for Iran's positions on issues such as its nuclear
development program. In their public statements, Iranian
officials have said pointedly that Iran trusts that Mexico's
premium on autonomy and even-handedness in its foreign
relations will permit expanded bilateral projects with Iran
-- notwithstanding its close relationship with the United
States. (Comment: Post's contacts with SRE on Iran, in
particular, have been colored by that institution's
traditional diplomatic defaults. SRE has typically
demonstrated little concern with Iran's push to shore up ties
in the region and its nuclear ambitions. End Comment.)


11. (U) Ambassador Ghadiri Abyaneh is especially adept at
playing to Mexico's sensitivities and framing issues
involving Iran -- no matter how fanciful -- in ways that make
GOM support for Iran seem natural. In a December interview
with La Jornada, he said he was confident Mexico would
support Iran's right to develop a nuclear program with
peaceful ends. He also said calling Latin America the United
States' backyard was an insult to the region, adding that
Iran is waiting for the day when Latin America will break
free and discover the falsehood of the "American dream." He
insisted that Latin America is underdeveloped and its people
are forced to emigrate because of a history of US dominance
in the region. Finally, Ghadiri Abyaneh said that because
Mexico spoke out against US intervention in Iraq, he expects
that Mexico will maintain that commitment to non-intervention
in the future, noting that silence on the part of other
countries in the face of a US attack on Iran would amount to

participating in the war.


ISRAEL'S INTEREST IN CONTAINING IRANIAN INFLUENCE
-------------- --------------


12. (C) Israel has an interest in Iranian influence in Latin
America. A high-ranking Israeli official urged Mexican
authorities in November to keep their eyes open and prevent
Iranian citizens from penetrating Mexican territory,
stressing that Iran is a strategic enemy of Israel that had
committed terrorist attacks against Israeli centers and
embassies in foreign nations.


13. (S) The Political Counselor met recently with the Israeli
DCM to discuss Mexico-Iran relations. He said Israel believes
CISEN, Mexico's intelligence service, has a handle on any
security issues related to the increased Iranian presence in
Mexico. He also said that the Israelis themselves are
watching for the entrance of Iranians who could be coming to
Mexico for questionable reasons. He said they have not yet
seen evidence of any such activity but will continue to focus
on it here and in the region. He noted his government's
concerns that Iran's attempt to increase its influence in
Latin America, if successful, could provide a beachhead or
network for future activities against Israeli interests.


14. (S) While he signaled concerns with Iran's intentions
and the energy being put into furthering them by its
Ambassador here, the Israeli DCM also said Ghadiri Abyaneh
may have been too bold in his public posture and activities.
He has drawn the attention of Mexican officials, both within
SRE and CISEN and may also have alienated at least some
members of Mexico's small Muslim community, who shy away from
associating with him out of fear that his presence and
activities will do more harm than good. (Comment: We too have
been told by officials at both organizations that they are
monitoring the Ambassador's activities carefully. End
Comment.)

COMMENT
--------------


15. (C) We suspect that much as it would like to cultivate
Mexico as part of a regional strategy, Tehran probably
recognizes that even its ambitious and energetic Ambassador
faces an uphill battle. Ghadiri Abyaneh is no doubt operating
under the same set of marching orders given to all of Iran's
envoys in Latin America. While he's made a bit of headway,
the Mexican government and public remain focused elsewhere
and not particularly receptive.


Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
GARZA