CUBAN-MEXICAN MOU ON MIGRATION: GOOD NEWS, BAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 003102

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2028
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF KMIG KCRM CU MX
SUBJECT: CUBAN-MEXICAN MOU ON MIGRATION: GOOD NEWS, BAD
NEWS

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Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Charles V. Barclay. Reason
: 1.4 (b),(d).


1. (C) Cuban Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque will sign an
MOU with Mexico today that could have Cuba taking back
significantly greater numbers of the illegal Cubans detained
en route to the U.S. each year by Mexican immigration
authorities. He will also extend an invitation to President
Calderon to visit Cuba. As part of the deal on migration
issues, Mexico has agreed to join Cuba in making a joint
declaration at today's signing ceremony placing public blame
on U.S. unilateral policies for stimulating the flow of
Cubans through Mexico and complicating efforts to confront
this problem. Mexican officials were uncomfortable with
making this declaration on the eve of Secretary Rice's visit
on October 22-23 and took pains to explain it intended no
offense to the U.S. Deputy PolCouns stressed the importance
the U.S. attached to Mexico's addressing human rights
concerns in its relations with Cuba including in the context
of repatriating greater numbers of the illegal Cubans it
detains in Mexico. End Summary.


2. (U) The Mexican Foreign Ministry's (SRE) Deputy Director
General for Latin America, Victor Arriaga, called Deputy
PolCouns October 19 requesting a meeting with him, Edgar
Aroldo Rodriguez Rudich, the Coordinator of Advisors to
Geronimo Gutierrez Fernandez (SRE's U/S for Latin America and
the Caribbean),and Enrique Rojo Stein, the Chief of Advisors
to Carlos Rico (SRE's U/S for North America),to discuss the
MOU on migration matters that Mexico planned to sign on
October 20 with Cuba's visiting Foreign Minister Felipe Perez
Roque.


Leaving the Past Behind
--------------


3. (U) To provide some context for Mexico's decision to
normalize relations with Cuba and, in particular, pursue an
MOU with Cuba on migration issues, Rodriguez recalled
Mexico's strained relations with Cuba at the end of the Fox
administration that had produced a significant drop off in
commercial trade. As a separate consequence, Cuba had
provided little to no cooperation on the repatriation of
illegal Cubans detained in Mexico. In 2007, Cuba had taken
back only 5 percent of the 3000 illegal Cubans detained by
Mexican authorities; thus far in 2008 it had only taken back
about 20 of the 1,800 Cubans detained in Mexico. Rodriguez
stressed GOM concern about Mexico becoming the preferred
route for the movement of Cubans into the U.S. and the rising
involvement of organized criminal groups in this activity.


4. (U) Seeking to better commercial ties and cooperation on
a host of issues including migration, President Calderon had
decided to pursue improved relations with Cuba leading
directly to FM Espinosa's visit to Cuba in March. As part of
this process of normalization, Cuba and Mexico initiated
talks in the context of seven of the country's ten most
important mechanisms for cooperation including migration. To
the GOM's view, on the economic side, Mexico had already seen
the fruits of this new approach with an increase in
commercial trade by upwards of 70 percent during the period
April to October 2008 compared to the same period last year.

Tackling the Repatriation Issue
--------------


5. (U) Mexico and Cuba commenced negotiations on migration
issues in April focusing on three components: improving
cooperation in combating criminal organizations trafficking
in people, repatriation of illegal Cubans detained in Mexico,
and facilitating travel for tourists and businessmen. SRE's
U/S Gutierrez led the Mexican side in the course of four
negotiating sessions, which included GOM representatives from
the Interior Ministry's (SEGOB) National Institute for
Migration (INM) and National Intelligence Center (CISEN),the
Attorney General's Office (PGR),the Public Security
Secretariat (SSP),the Transportation and Communication
Secretariat (SCT),the Army (SEDENA) and the Navy (SEMAR).


6. (U) According to Rodriguez, resolving differences over
repatriation proved the most contentious issue in the
negotiations given the lack of an existing legal framework.
Further, the majority of the illegal Cubans detained in
Mexico enter through Central America and historically Cuba
has refused to take back Cubans entering Mexico via a "third"

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country ) any country other than Cuba directly. In that
respect, Rodriguez conveyed GOM satisfaction with having
secured from the GOC an agreement on terms for processing the
repatriation of illegal Cubans detained in Mexico that GOM
authorities believe could have Cuba taking back some 70
percent of the Cubans detained by Mexican officials.

What Cuba Gave Up
--------------


7. (SBU) Under the agreement, Mexico would have up to 15
working days to notify the GOC of its detention of illegal
Cubans and its request that Cuba agree to their repatriation.
Cuba, in turn would have up to 15 working days to respond.
According to Rodriguez, the GOC has agreed to take back
illegal Cubans in the following categories:

-- those that enter Mexico illegally directly from Cuba (by
sea);
-- those that enter Mexico illegally via Central America and
have been detained within 11 months (the normal time Cuba
grants its citizens for legal travel overseas) of their
departure from Cuba;
-- and those that overstay their visas for travel to Mexico.

Cuba apparently reserves the right to refuse Cubans it deems
pose a "danger" to Cuba though Rodriguez remarked that the
GOM would challenge objections to repatriation on that
grounds. Provided GOC approval of repatriation, the GOM is
obligated to give the GOC at least 72 hours advance notice of
its plans to physically repatriate the individuals in
question.


8. (SBU) Rodriguez was pleased the two sides were agreeable
to sending back individuals on commercial airlines at GOM
expense on a space available basis instead of flights
chartered by the Mexican Federal Police which had proven
expensive in the past. He noted the agreement allows for
Mexico's Navy and Cuba's Coast Guard to work out the details
of their cooperation on dealing with the detention of Cubans
at sea. Rodriguez acknowledged that a MOU carries less
legal weight than a legal agreement but suggested Mexico
opted for the former over the latter to avoid the politically
contentious ratification process in the Mexican Congress. He
acknowledged that it remains to be seen to what extent the
GOC complies with the terms of the MOU. He conceded that if
the GOC does not comply with established time periods, Mexico
will be forced to revert to its present practice ) the
release of detainees with the payment of a $500 fine and an
"oficio de salida" (an order to leave the country in 30 days
which most detainees use to continue onward north to the
U.S.)

What Cuba Gets
--------------


9. (SBU) Rodriguez explained regretfully that the GOC's
"concessions" on the question of repatriations did not come
without a price. Initially, the GOC had insisted on
preambular text in the MOU that would have blamed the U.S.
for the migration problems the two countries are seeking to
address. He maintained Mexico had refused on grounds it
would be inappropriate to draw attention to a third country
in a bilateral MOU. As a compromise, though, Mexico had
agreed to issue a joint declaration upon signing the
agreement that 1) rejects U.S. unilateral policies including
U.S. trade sanctions against Cuba and the Helms Burton Act
and 2) blames U.S. immigration polices ) wet foot/dry foot
policy ) for stimulating the problem the two countries face
and complicating efforts to address it. Rodriguez stressed
GOM efforts to separate out these two issues noting that the
GOM had insisted on mention of the first only in the context
of the existing UN resolution that Mexico had always
supported which condemns the U.S. blockade. As the two
foreign ministers would hold a press conference at the
Foreign Ministry before the MOU signing and the release of
the joint declaration at the Interior Ministry, he hoped FM
Espinosa would be spared addressing this declaration directly
with the press.


10. (SBU) Rodriguez took pains to convey the GOM's
discomfort with making this declaration, particularly on the
eve of Secretary Rice's visit October 22-23. He understood
Arturo Sarukhan, Mexico's Ambassador to the U.S., was
reaching out to A/S Shannon to inform Washington authorities
similarly about this declaration. He stressed U/S Gutierrez

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viewed the U.S. as a "close friend" and that it was important
for us to understand Mexico had little choice but to accept
this declaration as a condition for getting this agreement
with Cuba.

Don't Forget Human Rights


11. (C) Deputy PolCouns stressed the importance the U.S.
attached to Mexico's raising human rights concerns in its
relations with Cuba. This applied to Mexico's MOU with Cuba
as well as it would be important for Mexico to take pains and
ensure that none of those it repatriated faced potential
political persecution. Rodriguez assured Deputy PolCouns
that Mexico had addressed human rights issues with Cuba last
April in the context of its bilateral consultations but
conceded those discussions did not/not enter into specifics
pertaining to political prisoners. Arriaga maintained that
in Mexico's experience the illegal Cubans Mexico regularly
detained were economic migrants. Rodriguez, however,
recognized that once Cuba started taking back greater numbers
of detainees, more would claim potential persecution. He
conceded the MOU with Cuba did little to address this issue
and that Mexico may have to look at how better to address it
independently.


12. (C) Comment. Mexico clearly views its MOU with Cuba
establishing terms upon which Cuba would agree to take back
significantly more illegal Cubans detained in Mexico as a
major advance. If Cuba complies with the agreement ) which
remains to be seen ) the GOM hopes fewer Cubans will seek to
use Mexico as a bridge to the U.S. Some Mexican officials
have expressed some skepticism the MOU will produce a
significant increase in the repatriation of Cubans. Mexico
took pains to explain it was not keen to foist blame on the
U.S. for this problem, particularly in a public forum on the
eve of Secretary Rice's visit. Nevertheless, it stressed its
success in keeping this language out of the MOU and making
the point about "unilateral" U.S. policies in the context of
prior UN resolutions. As Mexico looks to discourage Cubans
from using it as a bridge to enter the U.S. in the future, we
will need to stress the importance we attach to its
exercising due diligence not to return detainees who risk
facing political persecution. Roque's visit was postponed
from earlier in the month, making the current sequence of
events a coincidence that highlights the difficulty Mexico
has managing its schizophrenic foreign policy with the U.S.
and Cuba.



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