DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION'S JULY 2, 2008, MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 000751

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EMILY SIEDLAK, EUR/WE
OSD FOR COL PATRICK MCCLELLAND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/04/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR NATO SP
SUBJECT: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION'S JULY 2, 2008, MEETING
WITH MOD SECRETARY GENERAL FOR POLICY LUIS CUESTA

REF: A. MADRID 685

B. MADRID 578

C. 2007 MADRID 1910

D. MADRID 142

E. MADRID 738

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Hugo Llorens, for reasons 1.4(b)
and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Spanish Secretary General for Defense
Policy Luis Cuesta told the DCM on July 2 that U.S.-Spain
defense talks in Annapolis and Washington the week of June 21
had been excellent, well organized, and uncontentious.
Cuesta and the DCM discussed areas for follow-up from the
High-Level Defense Committee (HLDC) Cuesta had attended, as
well as the latter's subsequent meeting with U.S. Under
Secretary for Defense Policy Eric Edelman. In that context
SEGENPOL Cuesta and the DCM discussed Afghanistan, U.S.
Africa Command (AFRICOM),the sale of Tomahawk missiles, and
Spanish views of the KC-45 aerial refueling aircraft contract
under review by the U.S. Air Force. The meeting was
extremely cordial, and characterized by the personal rapport
developed with SEGENPOL during the DCM's nearly two years in
Madrid. Despite the valedictory good feelings, the
discussions flagged a number of issues to pursue with the
Spanish, including, in the near term, our outstanding request
for Spanish police trainers in Afghanistan and, looking
further ahead, potential revisions to the U.S.-Spain
Agreement on Defense Cooperation (ADC) which is in effect
until 2011. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) In offering the DCM his impressions of the 2008 HLDC
in Annapolis, SEGENPOL Cuesta confirmed there were no
contentious issues and the meetings had been substantively
satisfactory for both sides. He informed the DCM he planned
to form a working group within the Ministry of Defense to
consider the Agreement of Defense Cooperation (ADC) between
the United States and Spain. Though the arrangement was
working well, Cuesta said the group would consider potential
"amendments." He mentioned the juridical difference in the
handling of the ADC by each government (Spain manages it as a
treaty) as an area to prepare in 2010 in order to be ready
for 2011. Reiterating Spain was largely satisfied with the
agreement, Cuesta nonetheless mentioned Spanish sensitivities
about Gibraltar and what he perceived as the USG,s lack of
understanding ("desconocimiento") thereof. Cuesta told the
DCM that DASD Dan Fata had offered to discuss Gibraltar with
COMNAVEUR Admiral Fitzgerald the increase in visits by U.S.
ships to Gibraltar. Acknowledging that such visits were few
in absolute terms (only eight so far in 2008) and in
proportion to Spanish port visits (seven percent versus 93
percent),Cuesta said he understood the United States would
reduce to the minimum number possible its warships' visits to
Gibraltar while retaining Gibraltar as an option of
operational reasons. Turning briefly to Kosovo, Cuesta
reiterated Spain's non-participation in new missions (EULEX),
due to the "complicated status" of Kosovo. He noted the
situation was fluid. The DCM expressed U.S. appreciation for
Spain's commitment to KFOR and said the United States
respected Spain's political position. However, the DCM
stressed the importance of the recent enactment of Kosovo,s
constitution and the need to support the people of Kosovo as
they moved forward as an independent nation and free people.
The DCM acknowledged the differences in our approaches to
recognition but stressed the need to strengthen Kosovo and
said he trusted that Spain's engagement stopped short of
lobbying against recognition. Cuesta affirmed Spanish support
for a moderate Serbian government.

//AFGHANISTAN//


3. (C) Cuesta assured the DCM that the Memorandum of
Understanding to formalize Spain's offer to sponsor an Afghan
National Army unit (refs C and D) was "practically ready for
signature" but might require some legal modifications to make
it a treaty between Spain and Afghanistan. (Note: Under
this agreement, Spain will construct a forward operating base
in Badghis Province, to be occupied by the end of 2009. End
note.) Regarding Colombian interest in participating in
Afghanistan, Cuesta said the Spanish were willing to serve as
facilitators and sponsors within NATO and to help finance the
deployment. He recognized it was a sovereign decision and

said the Colombian military would go if and where it wanted.
Cuesta reiterated his interest in the concept of
civilian-military planning cells raised by DASD Fata during
the HLDC and requested terms of reference for further
consideration. Visibly discomfited, Cuesta asked the DCM's
assistance in putting to rest further inquiries into alleged
Spanish wrongdoing in the July 2007 medevac of a U.S. soldier
from Bala Baluk District. (Note: General Norton Schwartz,
Commander, U.S. TRANSCOM informed Ambassador Aguirre in a
letter dated May 19, "Our review of available medical
information and the events surrounding the evacuation do not
indicate the care received prior to arrival at Bagram or any
delay in evacuation were responsible for the amputation."
The Ambassador wrote the CHOD to convey the contents of GEN
Schwartz's letter, and we have shared a copy of the
Ambassador's letter with Cuesta. GEN Schwartz's conclusions
track with those provided previously to the Ambassador in a
letter from the CHOD, which was provided to EUR in April.)


4. (C) Cuesta indicated the subject of police training had
been raised by U/S Edelman. He told the DCM Spain already
had 12 Civil Guards attached to the related EU mission and,
because Spain was working through the EU, it would be
difficult to coordinate separate bilateral Spanish-Afghan
assistance. The proposal would have to be studied (further).
The DCM urged Cuesta to proceed with a formal inter-agency
vetting of the outstanding U.S. request for Spanish National
Police or Guardia Civil members. He stressed the need for
Spain to do something definitive, and he suggested Spain
could send 30 to 40 police, or more. Such training was an
important part of a security strategy for Afghanistan that
would also be in Spain's interest. Cuesta noted the EU had
decided to double its participation through EUPOL and said
perhaps Spain could contribute additional expertise in that
context. When pressed by the DCM, he reluctantly offered to
talk to his counterpart in the Interior Ministry, Secretary
of State for Security Antonio Camacho. He noted, however,
that Camacho was focused on combating internal terrorism.
The DCM stressed that in discussions with senior Ministry of
Interior and Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, including
Camacho, the attitude had been positive about providing
trainers for the Afghan police.

//AFRICOM//


5. (C) Regarding potential Spanish involvement with the
U.S. Africa Command, SEGENPOL noted Spain and the United
States had a common interest in Africa's welfare. The DCM
assured Cuesta the United States wanted Spanish input into
AFRICOM's mission because we recognize that Spain has a major
stake in the continent. Cuesta welcomed the idea of an
increased focus on low-intensity conflicts, responses to
natural disasters, and efforts to fight asymmetrical threats
such as narcotics trafficking and illegal immigration.
Whatever contributes to Africa, he noted, helps Spain, too.
Nonetheless, the idea of a Spanish headquarters for AFRICOM
was "very ambitious." He reiterated the need to present
Spain with a formal proposal, and he remained positively
disposed to sending a Spanish liaison to Stuttgart in the
meantime to improve coordination (ref A). Cuesta further
suggested that AFRICOM's State Department Deputy Commander,
Ambassador Yates, might also coordinate with the EU's Javier
Solana in order to exchange information and seek synergies.

//MINISTER CHACON BEFORE PARLIAMENTARY DEFENSE COMMISSION//


6. (C) Cuesta noted Minister Carme Chacon's desire to meet
with Secretary Gates at the first opportunity, perhaps in
September or October (reftels). The DCM agreed to follow-up.
The DCM asked Cuesta about the new Defense Minister's June
30 congressional testimony and statements regarding Spain's
cap of 3,000 on overseas deployments. During her four-hour
appearance, Chacon was quoted by the media as saying the GOS
"could review some of the limitations it has established,
because they are obsolete and unnecessary." Cuesta confirmed
the Minister's "willingness to eliminate or change" the
ceiling, but noted it was a decision the Minister would have
to discuss with the President. The Organic Defense Law
establishes the limits and allows for their review, but only
President Zapatero could choose to do so. Regarding imminent
changes in military leadership alluded to June 30 and the
subject of subsequent press speculation, Cuesta said the

Minister would review the service chiefs (referred to in
Spanish as the "cupula") "in the normal way." In any event,
Cuesta stressed all the service chiefs had done a great job
for Spain and for the Spanish Armed Forces and, if relived of
their duties, could go happily to their homes. Cuesta was
quick to say not necessarily all four would change. (Note:
The Minister of Defense has the power to name the chiefs of
each branch of the Spanish Armed Forces, while the President
selects the Chief of Defense. General Sanz has been in the
latter position for an unprecedented four years. End note.)


7. (C) Referring to the legacy of Spanish Chief of Naval
Operations Admiral General Sebastian Zaragoza, the DCM
mentioned the sale approved by the U.S. Congress of Tomahawk
Land Attack Missiles (TLAM) to Spain. Stating only the
United States and the UK had this capacity, the DCM noted
just having permission to buy TLAM was important. The Bush
Administration had been faithful to then-SECDEF Rumsfeld's
commitment dating to 2002. The Administration's commitment
signaled the importance the United States placed on the
military alliance with Spain. The DCM said he hoped the
agreement would be sealed soon, especially in consideration
of Spanish budget limitations. Cuesta agreed the budgetary
scenario was more restrictive than it had been previously,
but noted acquisitions were not his area. The division of
labor did not prevent SEGENPOL from mentioning in closing the
USAF aerial refueling tanker contract awarded to Northrop
Grumman, who has partnered with EADS, and is currently under
review by the U.S. Air Force. Cuesta understood U/S Edelman
to have said he hoped the Air Force could reach a solution
that did not require a congressional ruling, for European
interests. The DCM clarified the United States wanted the
best aircraft available and he lauded the prospect of open
competition.


8. COMMENT: The DCM strongly recommended that SEGENPOL
Cuesta maintain contact with the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy throughout the post-electoral transition period.
While noting that the current set of interlocutors enjoyed a
special personal "feeling" (the actual English word the
Spanish use to describe this rapport),both Cuesta and the
DCM were optimistic about the future of the defense
relationship. As Minister Chacon returns from maternity
leave and makes the changes alluded to in the military
leadership, we will seek opportunities to further cement
these ties. The next weeks and months will be critical,
however, for pinning down Spanish commitments, including
their intention to move forward with Tomahawk and the
beginning of the contracting process for the Afghan National
Army base -- and using whatever window of opportunity our own
transitions present to encourage the Spanish to commit police
trainers and do more generally in Afghanistan. The promised
review of the cap on overseas deployments may give the more
outward-looking elements within the MOD just the breathing
room they need to increase their presence -- and with it,
their credibility and stature within NATO and the EU.
LLORENS