Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MADRID7
2008-01-03 12:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
Cable title:  

SPAIN/AL-KASSAR: EXTRADITION ON TRACK, BUT

Tags:  PTER PREL PGOV SP 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHMD #0007/01 0031228
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 031228Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHNA/DEA HQS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4036
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0339
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 3227
RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/DEA BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000007 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT COORDINATOR DAILEY AND EUR/WE
NSC FOR JUAN ZARATE
DEA FOR MICHAEL BRAUN AND THOMAS HARRIGAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2018
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN/AL-KASSAR: EXTRADITION ON TRACK, BUT
GOVERNMENT WILL WAIT FOR APPEALS PROCESS TO END

REF: A. MADRID 2251

B. MADRID 2041

MADRID 00000007 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Eduardo Aguirre, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000007

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT COORDINATOR DAILEY AND EUR/WE
NSC FOR JUAN ZARATE
DEA FOR MICHAEL BRAUN AND THOMAS HARRIGAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2018
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN/AL-KASSAR: EXTRADITION ON TRACK, BUT
GOVERNMENT WILL WAIT FOR APPEALS PROCESS TO END

REF: A. MADRID 2251

B. MADRID 2041

MADRID 00000007 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Eduardo Aguirre, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. The extradition process of Syrian arms
dealer Monzer al-Kassar continues to move forward and we are
increasingly confident that he will end up in U.S. custody.
Foreign Minister Moratinos and Interior Minister Rubalcaba
have both told the Ambassador in recent days that the
judicial process has been settled in favor of the U.S., and
they agree Al-Kassar is a bad man who should be extradited.
However, they also cautioned that Al-Kassar will have a final
opportunity to appeal his case to the Constitutional Court,
and the GOS therefore will wait for the appeals process to
wrap up before carrying out the extradition. They want to do
everything "by the book" to ensure that their handling of
this high-profile case holds up to public scrutiny. Although
there remains the possibility that the Constitutional Court
could find for Al-Kassar and deny the extradition, top GOS
officials have told us that they believe Al-Kassar's appeals
case is extremely weak. Our contacts in the Spanish legal
community believe Al-Kassar will make his formal appeal
during the middle of January, and the Constitutional Court
will then have 30 days to render its decision. If the
Constitutional Court rules against Al-Kassar, the Spanish
Council of Ministers will then give its final approval for
the extradition. Many elements of the USG interagency and
our Mission team have worked closely with Spanish authorities
for several months to convince them of the need for Al-Kassar
to stand trial in the United States, and we will continue to
do all we can to make his extradition a reality. We will
probably be in a holding pattern for a few more weeks while
the judicial appeals process plays out. END SUMMARY


//A LONG CRIMINAL HISTORY//


2. (C) Monzer al-Kassar is a reputed international arms

dealer and accused terrorist with a long alleged criminal
history. He is alleged to have sold arms in 1985 to the
hijackers of the Achille Lauro cruise ship and then flown the
group's leader, Abu Abbas, to safety on one of his private
planes. In 1992, Al-Kassar made arms sales in the millions
of dollars to Croatia, Bosnia, and Somalia, violating United
Nations arms embargoes to all three countries. Later that
year, the Spanish government arrested him for his alleged
earlier involvement in the Achille Lauro hijacking and
charged him with document falsification and possession of
illegal weapons and vehicles. He spent more than a year in
jail before being released on bail. The charges were
eventually dismissed in 1995 after several prosecution
witnesses changed their stories before the trial began. One
prosecution witness fell to his death from a fifth-story
window in what the coroner called an "alcoholic coma," and
another witness's children were kidnapped by Colombian drug
traffickers shortly before he was to testify. Current
Spanish Justice Minister Mariano Bermejo and investigative
magistrate Baltasar Garzon were both involved in prosecuting
that trial and have told the Ambassador in the past that they
regret not being able to win a conviction. In the summer of
2006, the Iraqi government placed Al-Kassar on their most
wanted list and called him "one of the main sources of
financial and logistics support" for the Iraqi insurgency.
In June 2007, the Spanish government again arrested
Al-Kassar, this time on behalf of the USG, which charged him
with conspiring to kill Americans, supplying terrorists,
obtaining anti-aircraft missiles and money laundering.


3. (C) Many elements of the USG interagency (primarily the
DEA, US Attorneys in NYC, and the Embassy Madrid Country
Team) were involved in the operation and investigation that
ultimately led to Al-Kassar's arrest at Madrid's Barajas
Airport on June 7. A number of Spanish government officials
were aware of the USG investigation, and Al-Kassar's arrest
was a victory for U.S.-Spanish law enforcement cooperation.

MADRID 00000007 002.2 OF 003


In the immediate aftermath of the arrest, the Ambassador and
DCM thanked GOS officials for their work and both Interior
Minister Rubalcaba and his deputy Antonio Camacho assured us
that Al-Kassar's extradition was a priority for the Spanish.
They cautioned however that Al-Kassar would need to go
through a lengthy and involved judicial process before his
extradition could become a reality. All knew that Al-Kassar
was a dangerous and ruthless man with good attorneys, and we
expected him to fight the extradition every step of the way.
In addition, he has served in the past as an informant of
Spanish intelligence and law enforcement and maintains
contacts in those services.


4. (C) Al-Kassar contended that his arrest had been the
product of "entrapment" by DEA officers who posed as
brokering agents for the Colombian terrorist group FARC. As
"induced" crimes are not admissible in Spain, Al-Kassar
argued that all charges should be dropped, or that if he was
deemed to have committed any crimes, then he should be tried
only in Spain. DEA Madrid and our Embassy legal advisor
worked closely with the investigative magistrate and the
office of the National Court Chief Prosecutor throughout the
entire judicial process, and fully answered all requests for
additional information. Assistant U.S. Attorneys visited
Madrid to work with Spanish prosecutors to ensure they
completely understood our case for extradition and to prepare
them for probable defense arguments. Ambassador Aguirre also
held several meetings with high-level Spanish officials,
including the Vice President and Minister of Justice, to
outline the charges against Al-Kassar and to explain our
request for his extradition. The Spanish officials all said
they were familiar with the case and knew very well what kind
of individual he was. They also cautioned that we needed to
wait for the Spanish judicial system to run its course.


//THE EXTRADITION HEARING AND REVIEW PROCESS//


5. (C) The extradition hearing took place on October 4 before
a three-judge panel and with Embassy officers in attendance.
The hearing lasted over four hours and featured passionate
arguments from both the prosecution and defense. The defense
predictably attacked DEA and accused them of entrapment. The
prosecution replied that Al-Kassar had been caught not in a
"provoked" offense, but rather in a "detected" one, and laid
out the Syrian's long alleged criminal history. On October
26, the Fourth Section of the Criminal Division of the
Spanish National Court made public its 2-1 vote to accept
Al-Kassar's extradition to the U.S. (REFTELS) Judge Teresa
Palacios, who presided over the extradition hearing, voted
against remanding Al-Kassar to U.S. custody, while her two
deputy Magistrates voted in favor of the prosecution.
Shortly after the verdict was announced, Ambassador Aguirre
released a statement thanking the National Court for
"striking a blow against international terrorism," and said
that the verdict highlighted yet again that Spain and the
United States remain united in the fight against terrorism.


6. (C) Al-Kassar then appealed his case to a 12-member panel
headed by Judge Javier Gomez-Bermudez, who was the chief
judge of the March 11, 2004, Madrid train bombings trial. On
December 13, this panel upheld and approved Al-Kassar's
extradition, with only Gomez-Bermudez voting against. The
decision stated that Al-Kassar could be sent to the U.S.,
provided that he not be sentenced to death by a U.S. court,
and provided that he not be sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of parole. Following the appeals
ruling, Embassy Madrid's legal advisor and the DEA Madrid
Country Attache met with National Court Chief Prosecutor
Javier Zaragoza to examine any hurdles that may remain in the
way of the extradition. Zaragoza said that two steps
remained, receiving official approval from the Council of
Ministers, and Al-Kassar's final appeal to the Spanish
Constitutional Court on the grounds that his human rights had
been violated. Due to the holidays, Zaragoza said these two
events would likely take place in mid-January. Our contacts
in the Spanish National Court told us on January 2 that they

MADRID 00000007 003.2 OF 003


will receive the panel's formal written decision on January
15, and at that time Al-Kassar will be able to make his
appeal to the Constitutional Court. That Court will then
have 30 days to render its decision.


//GOS WANTS TO DO EVERYTHING BY THE BOOK//


7. (C) At a December 28 dinner hosted by the Ambassador,
Interior Minister Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba said that the
Spanish government supported the extradition of Al-Kassar,
who he described as a "bad man" who needed to face justice.
He noted however that a few steps still needed to be
completed, and described again the role the Constitutional
Court and Council of Ministers would play. Rubalcaba also
noted that his Ministry had come under intense pressure from
the Syrian government not to extradite Al-Kassar (placed
mostly on the office of his deputy Camacho),but added that
the Syrian actions only stiffened Spanish resolve to see
Al-Kassar in U.S. custody. These comments echoed what Deputy
Justice Minister Julio Perez-Hernandez had told the DCM a few
days earlier, that the GOS would proceed deliberately and do
everything by the book, and would wait until the completion
of Al-Kassar's appeals process before physically transferring
him to the U.S. He said the Spanish government did not want
to be seen "putting Al-Kassar on an American aircraft at
three o'clock in the morning," and therefore wanted to make
sure that everything was carried out in an open and
transparent manner. Perez-Hernandez expressed confidence
that Al-Kassar would ultimately be extradited to the U.S.


8. (C) The Ambassador also discussed this case with Foreign
Minister Moratinos on December 27. Moratinos said he was
confident that the Council of Ministers would ultimately
approve the extradition, but bureaucratic reasons impeded the
case from appearing on the agenda of the final Council
meeting of 2007. Moratinos also said a December 24 story in
right-leaning El Mundo (alleging Syrian threats against Spain
if they carried out the extradition and claiming that
Moratinos had once given his word to Syrian authorities that
Al-Kassar would not be extradited) was a complete
fabrication, and suggested that Al-Kassar had paid off the
journalist. Moratinos noted that he spoke to the Syrians
probably more than any other European official, and that
while Syrian authorities had raised the extradition with his
chief of staff, the level and tenor was not as high as
alleged in the news article. He then said that bilateral
relations with Syria would certainly survive this case.


//COMMENT - THE ROAD AHEAD//


9. (C) Spanish government officials at all levels are aware
of the importance for the USG to see Al-Kassar face trial
before a U.S. court and have assured us that it is a priority
for them as well. Over the past several months, we have
enjoyed excellent cooperation from GOS authorities on this
case, and the Ambassador, DCM and members of the Country Team
have had ready access to relevant Spanish officials and have
been able to discuss all issues freely. Although the Spanish
have made the political decision to respect the judicial
rulings granting the extradition, the Spanish judiciary is
fiercely independent, and there remains the possibility that
the Constitutional Court could find for Al-Kassar and deny
the extradition. However, top GOS officials have told us
that they believe Al-Kassar's appeals case is extremely weak.
For our part, the Ambassador and members of the Country Team
will continue to work on a priority basis to ensure that
Al-Kassar is extradited and brought to justice in the United
States, but we should be patient for a few more weeks to
allow the judicial appeals process to play out.
AGUIRRE