RECOMMENDATION FOR CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 000609

SIPDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR AGUIRRE FOR PM AA/S MULL, EUR A/S FRIED,
AND H A/S BERGNER, OSD FOR DASD FATA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2018
TAGS: MASS PREL SP
SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATION FOR CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF
TOMAHAWK SALE TO SPAIN

Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDUARDO AGUIRRE, JR. REASONS 1.4(B),(D).


1. (C) First, many thanks to PM, EUR, H, and our colleagues
at DOD, especially DSCA, for their steadfast support over
many months on the sale of the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
(TLAM) to Spain. This has been a long process, and we are
grateful for the personal and focused attention it has
received from senior personnel. While we appreciate the
strong support, we believe the Administration needs to take
the next and final step of moving forward expeditiously to
meet its commitment to Spain. Specifically, we strongly
recommend the Department push ahead and formally notify
Congress of the sale.


2. (C) We understand representatives from the Departments of
State and Defense again briefed Senate Foreign Relations
Committee staff May 22. Unfortunately, it appears we are
back to square one. Some staff members remain unconvinced --
despite repeated assurances -- regarding Spain and the
integrity of the Missile Technology Control Regime.


3. (C) We recognize there may be other equities involved
here. We can only speak to the bilateral issues, and there
we fear that failure to do all we can to consummate this sale
could have serious negative consequences. The Spanish Navy
is staunchly pro-American. Spanish officers still talk
warmly of the Eisenhower Administration's decision to enter a
defense relationship with Spain and what that meant to their
navy. Spanish officers who have served in operations with
the U.S., either in NATO or bilaterally, are proud of that
association and quick to brag about it. Despite the growth
in European defense industries, including in Spain, and the
pressure to buy at home, the Spanish Navy has a distinct
preference for U.S. equipment. They believe it is the best,
and they see it as the key to being able to operate with the
world's premier navy. That is in part why Spain acquired the
AEGIS system for its newest class of frigates and why they
want TLAM. Make no mistake about it: all the Spanish
military services are well disposed to the U.S. and committed
to NATO, but it is the Spanish Navy with which we achieve the
greatest resonance. Despite changes in the political
climate, that military-to-military relationship remains a
cornerstone of our interests in Spain. We should not take
that relationship for granted. In fact, TLAM is a long-term
strategic investment for Spain with the U.S. and a way for
both countries to strengthen military ties for decades to
come. We would not go so far as to suggest that our military
relationship depends on this sale, but failure to make every
effort to deliver after five years and after the then
Secretary of Defense let it be known he supported the sale
will be received very negatively in Spain. They are a
completely trustworthy partner when it comes to proliferation
concerns and will deeply resent any implication to the
contrary. Were they denied the chance to purchase TLAM, it
would only be natural for the Spanish Navy to question their
own procurement philosophies and reconsider their strong
interest in projects such as the Joint Strike Fighter.
Longer term, this only feeds the perception here that the
U.S. is not a reliable partner and does not value or fully
trust Spain as an ally. The Spanish would never suggest a
connection, and we do not assert a direct link, but failure
on TLAM cannot help our cause on issues such as maintaining
our access to the bases at Rota and Moron (due for
renegotiation in 2011); increasing port access for our
warships (the U.S. Navy is interested in gaining access to
the Canary Islands); cooperation with AFRICOM, possibly
including hosting some of its elements; an increased effort
in Afghanistan; or a host of other issues. We need to take
care of our friends, and the Spanish Navy is our friend.


4. (C) We have been careful to explain to the Spanish the
sale cannot go forward if our Senate objects. Spanish
officials and military officers have a strong commitment to
democracy and understand and respect the separation of powers
and the Senate's prerogatives. However, as a matter of
principle they will be expecting the U.S. Administration to
push this commitment to the limit. On May 29 the head of the
Spanish Navy, Admiral Sebastian Zaragoza, told the Ambassador
and Deputy Chief of Mission that he had fought hard for TLAM
and invested a great deal of personal credibility in this
over the years. Zaragoza said that, in part due to budget
allocation issues, he preferred a definitive "no" from the

Senate to continued uncertainty. Our assessment is that if
the Administration notifies the sale and the Senate blocks
it, the Spanish Navy will be deeply disappointed, but at
least they will know the Administration did everything
possible to get the sale through. If we do not take that
final step, this is going to be a bitter experience for them
and one that may plant lingering doubts about our seriousness
when it comes to our military relations with Spain.
Aguirre