SPAIN/CUBA: TOUGH ROAD ALONG TWO TRACKS TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 MADRID 000467

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PLEASE PASS TO WHA A/S TOM SHANNON, DAS KIRSTEN MADISON,
AND CTC CALEB MCCARRY
HAVANA FOR PO MICHAEL PARMLY
WHA/CCA FOR STERLING TILLEY
EUR/ERA FOR NICOLE OTALLAH
EUR/WE FOR ELAINE SAMSON
NSC FOR TOBY BRADLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM CU SP EUN
SUBJECT: SPAIN/CUBA: TOUGH ROAD ALONG TWO TRACKS TO
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

REF: A. PRAGUE 246


B. MADRID 346

C. MURRAY-OTALLAH E-MAILS

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Hugo Llorens, for reasons 1.5 (b
) and (d).


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Cuba Transition Coordinator (CTC) Caleb
McCarry met Spanish divergence from U.S. Cuba policy with
considerable diplomacy; pressed Spain not to allow its
growing policy of engagement with the GOC to leave behind the
importance of supporting Cuban civil society and political
prisoners; and stressed the need for real political change in
Cuba. During his April 16-19 visit to Madrid, McCarry met
with Spanish officials and parliamentarians as well as a
conservative opposition thinktank, other NGOs, and
representatives of the Cuban community to discuss USG views
on recent adjustments and possible future developments in
Cuba, in an effort to bolster Spanish and European support
for Cuban civil society and human rights, try to develop
partnerships working together on areas of convergence, and
urge the Government of Spain to support maintaining the EU's
Common Position when EU Foreign Ministers meet to review Cuba
policy in June 2008. McCarry emphasized the USG's desire to
see Raul Castro release all of the remaining political
prisoners, and sought support in articulating this goal in
more pronounced ways, including an upcoming event involving
political prisoners including but not limited to Cubans. Our
Spanish interlocutors were cautiously optimistic about the
transition from Fidel to Raul Castro, and seemed inclined to
view recent policy changes as openings to democracy -- or
excuses to advocate eliminating the Restrictive Measures
imposed by the EU in 2003 and suspended in 2005. Not
surprisingly, most officials welcomed conversation on areas
where USG and European policies toward Cuba are in agreement
-- namely, on human rights, the plight of Cuba's political
prisoners, and the need for engagement with the opposition --
but nonetheless favored continued and increased engagement
with the Cuban Government. Opportunities for Mr. McCarry to
meet with Cuban human rights activists and recently released
political prisoners in Madrid balanced frank discussions with
Spanish parliamentarians and policy makers. Cuban exile
groups in Spain support the Transition Agenda announced April
10 by dissidents in Havana and plan to present it formally to
the European Parliament in May in the lead up to the EU's
June review of the Common Position. End Summary.

//"El Abanico" -- The Spanish Fan of Hispano-Cuban Civil
Society//


2. (SBU) Immediately upon his arrival April 16, Mr. McCarry
met with the self-described "trio" at the head of the Spanish
Federation of Cuban Associations (FECU),an umbrella
organization founded in 2007 in an effort to unite various
Cuban organizations behind shared goals for democratic change
in Cuba. FECU President Elena Larrinaga, Secretary General
Ernesto Gutierrez Tamargo, and Blanca Reyes, the European
Representative of the "Damas de Blanco," warmly received
McCarry and EUR/ERA's Nicole Otallah and regaled them with
their efforts and those of other activists from across the
broad spectrum or "fan" of Cuba human rights organizations in
Spain. Beyond an abiding love for Cuba, they said, there
were differences in preferred tactics. Gutierrez, a lawyer,
called for an approach based in the rule of law, an overhaul
of Cuba's legal system and new European legislation related
to Cuba. Gutierrez explained he had declined to sign the
manifesto of Dialogo Si (www.dialogosi.org),among a number
of dissident documents in circulation, because it did not go
far enough in demanding legal action. Mrs. Reyes expressed
grave concern over the release and subsequent expulsion from
Cuba of prisoners of conscience such as her husband, Raul
Rivero. She worried that Cuba's internal opposition was
endangered, and that the GOC's latest concessions were part
of an effort to rid the island of dissident voices. All
three of the activists spoke of the difficulty -- and the
indispensability -- of reconciliation without violence or
rancor. McCarry agreed reconciliation would not be easy, but
insisted that dialogue was essential and assured Larrinaga,
Reyes, and Gutierrez that the United States suffered with
them.


3. (SBU) As of April 16, FECU was promoting the presentation

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to the EU of a document entitled "Cuba: A Path for the
Future" which would operationalize an earlier "Accord for
Democracy in Cuba" dated February 1998. In particular, the
FECU officers briefed the USG team on activities planned for
May to bring together dissidents from Cuba, representatives
of the Cuban-American community, and Cuban exiles from across
Europe to advocate for basic liberties on neutral ground:
Switzerland. FECU members subsequently advised Mr. McCarry
of their intention to sign the internal dissidents' minimum
agenda (ref C). They support the call led by Martha Beatriz
Roque for 1) liberation of all political prisoners, 2)
immediate cessation of governmental repression of the
political opposition, 3) an end to the "embargo" imposed by
the Regime on the fundamental freedoms of the Cuban people,
and 4) substitution of the totalitarian state with a
democratic one. Gutierrez clarified to PolOff the FECU
leadership's intention to travel with other Cuban exiles to
Geneva on May 11 and on to Brussels, May 12-13. The
dissident community plans to convoke the media for a highly
publicized "family reunion" of exiles from outside of Cuba
with dissidents permitted to travel from the island, and will
formally present the Transition Agenda as a non-legal
proposal without political debate May 13 to the Presidency of
the EUROLAT in the European Parliament.

//Ambassador's Perspective and Leadership//


4. (C) Ambassador Aguirre met the morning of April 17 with
McCarry and Otallah and later hosted an off-the-record lunch
at the Residence with select Spanish-Cuban notables and two
journalists. During the office call, the Ambassador said he
had told Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos, who is
interested in meeting with Secretary Rice, that one way for
Spain to get closer to the United States is to change course
in Cuba. During these early days of President Zapatero's
second administration, as personalities and policies continue
to settle, we must continue to press the Spanish for three
simple things relative to Cuba: free the prisoners, respect
human rights, and open up the democratic process. The
Ambassador wondered aloud whether dialogue with the Cuban
Government was effective. But if the GOS must talk to the
Castro regime, he hoped Spain would balance those efforts by
"giving oxygen" to the Opposition. Ambassador Aguirre
thanked CTC McCarry for the Department's continuous direction
on Cuba policy priorities, and estimated we had a 10-month
window of opportunity to "think outside the box." Mr.
McCarry noted there was little disagreement between the
United States and European Union member states on the nature
of the problem in Cuba. He told the Ambassador he would be
pressing the Spanish on prisoner releases, important for
removing fear, and the importance of dialogue with all Cubans
-- including the opposition. The EU's so-called "two-track
policy" of political and economic engagement while insisting
upon human rights reforms was acceptable in theory but had to
include civil society and opposition groups.


5. (C) During a high-spirited lunch at the Residence, the
Ambassador's guests debated specific strategies for
engagement but agreed on the incremental and non-political
nature of Raul Castro's elimination of certain prohibitions.
Carlos Alberto Montaner, of the Union Liberal Cubana,
suggested Raul calculated he had about five years to make his
mark, based on familial life expectancy. Two journalists, a
former International Visitor with conservative Daily ABC and
his ideological opposite from left-of-center El Pais, argued
from opposite ends of the table, leaving little
conversational space for other participants, who included
Cuban notables Leopoldo Fernandez Pujals, the Fundacion
Hispano Cubana's Guillermo Gortazar, and Raul Rivero.
Rivero, who has been in ill health since his arrival in Spain
in 2006, made a special effort to attend the event in honor
of Caleb McCarry. He shared the concerns expressed by his
wife, Blanca, April 16 regarding the survival of Cuba's
internal opposition, and he and others spoke disparagingly of
the current Spanish Ambassador to Havana, Carlos "Charlie"
Alonso Zaldivar. During a private conversation with McCarry,
Rivero called the Spanish envoy the "head of the Committee to
Defend the Revolution," echoing widespread concerns among
dissident groups that he acted independently of even forward
leaning Spanish policies.

//GOS Expresses Flexibility . . . Toward Castro Regime//

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6. (C) Mr. McCarry's interactions with Spanish Government
officials were characterized by the thinly veiled suggestion
that the U.S. ease up on Raul Castro and the alarmist
suggestion that violence that could accompany too swift a
change in Cuba. GOS officials agreed on the end goal of a
democratic transition in Cuba, but seemed equally determined
to advocate easing restrictions imposed by the EU after the
Cuban regime's 2003 crackdown on dissidents, in light of what
the Spanish perceived as democratic "openings." As National
Security Advisor Carles Casajuana told CTC McCarry,
referencing the elimination of some prohibitions and the
authorization for Cubans to purchase cell phones, "Your work
is almost done in Cuba!" The comment was made in jest, but
reveals the spirit with which the Spanish are viewing the
small changes announced in Havana, and the attitude they hope
to promulgate within the EU in the lead up to May and June
meetings.

--------------
The Presidency
--------------


7. (C) In the Office of the Presidency at Moncloa on April
17, foreign policy advisor Maria Solanas Cardin admitted Cuba
had a special place in Spanish emotional and political
history. Cuba evinced such passion, she conceded, that
sometimes it would be more convenient to take the passion out
of the discussion. Cuba had been a part of Spain, its "last
colony," and had become a political battleground. NSA
Casajuana seemed distracted by other matters, including the
appointment of Bernardino Leon as Secretary General of the
Presidency, and made reference to handovers that are likely
to include his own domain. Nonetheless, he seemed to share
U.S. frustration over the opacity of the Cuban system. It
seemed clear the transition had begun, he said, but it was
difficult to know to what extent Fidel Castro had initiated
the changes and why, or whether Raul Castro was acting more
or less independently. The Spanish had no idea who within
the GOC might lead the transition. The Cuban people,
Casajuana agreed, are asking for change. Spain and the
United States must support them, must assume that people
within the GOC also want change, and must push for it. Up to
that point, Casajuana, acknowledged, Spanish and U.S. views
were similar. On the practical side, however, Spain did not
want the democratic process to fail for being precipitous.
Casajuana called to mind China's 1989 crackdown on student
protesters in Tiananmen Square. What kind of transition do
we want to encourage? We want to arrive at full democracy,
that Cubans can direct their own future, with stability. And
that, per Casajuana, "can be very dangerous."


8. (C) CTC McCarry insisted the "adjustments" announced by
the Cuban Government were neither significant nor political
and would not change the nature of the system or dismantle
the GOC's control. These minor modifications, barely equal
to economic privileges enjoyed in the former Czechoslovakia
prior to 1989, along with small signs of Cubans' willingness
to complain and to speak up for civil rights, were all the
more reason to encourage Cuban civil society. Not only must
the vital Opposition sector promote its own ideas, but youth
and students could play and were playing a role. McCarry
agreed there were probably elements within the Regime that
wanted change. For there to be an effective dialogue, those
elements must feel supported and must know they could think
and act independently.


9. (C) Casajuana focused again on the dynamics within Raul's
team and the make-up of the leadership "cupola" at the very
top of the Cuban government. It was important, Spain
thought, to get closer, to convince the leadership they would
not be removed. He summarized the main difference between
Spain and the United States on Cuba by calling to mind the
same cultural ties of which Maria Solana had spoken, nearly
defining the two-track policy. The people of Spain want Cuba
to be a democracy, and they want Spain to have a close
relationship with Cuba regardless. Mr. McCarry concluded the
discussion by reminding Casajuana that the two-track policy
had a human rights component, reiterating the steps the USG
believed would lead to real change. Political prisoners
should be allowed to return to their families, and the
international community must engage with civil society.

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Personalities, he said, were not as important as an overall
commitment to democracy.

--------------
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
--------------


10. (C) At the Foreign Ministry, McCarry attempted to engage
counterparts on the importance of finding points of
convergence and helping Cubans to create a dialogue.
Director General for Iberoamerica Javier Sandomingo was
perhaps preoccupied by the shuffling of leadership positions
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He alluded to his own
transition within a few months to Lima, where he would serve
as Spain's ambassador. He noted without remorse that the
April 18 meeting would be his last brush with Mr. McCarry on
Cuba policy. Asking McCarry how his work as "pro-Consul" was
going, Sandomingo gave a peek at his own recent itinerary:
Prague, Warsaw, and Berlin in addition to engagement with the
Italians and French to revise the EU's Common Position on
Cuba. Joined by Human Rights Director Fernando
Fernandez-Arias and Sub-Director General for Cuba Jorge
Romeu, Sandomingo articulated the optimistic Spanish view of
recent changes and perceived relaxation of GOC control,
saying repeatedly that these small steps had "potential."
Cuba's signing of two international human rights covenants in
February was a similarly good sign, and Spain's February 11
Cuba Human Rights Dialogue was a positive process aimed at
broadening communication. To achieve the liberation of more
prisoners, it would be important to reduce tensions
("diminuir la crispacion") so that the Cuban leadership did
not feel too "stressed." Sandomingo noted that instead of
confronting the Cuban Government, Spain and other Europeans
should recognize that many of their aims had been achieved,
including the liberation of some of the 75 prisoners. "We
will need to do away with the 2003 measures," he stated,
because to do so would be in the interests of the Cuban
people. Besides, the Spanish added later at seeming odds
with their contentions about positive changes, the past five
years had "accomplished nothing."


11. (C) Sandomingo reiterated Moncloa's warning about the
potential repercussions of a failed reconciliation process.
Spain recognized the importance of opening space, making
contacts, and encouraging dialogue. Sandomingo's clear
priority, however, was reducing the Regime's own fear of
change, so as to avoid a collapse of control that could end
in either a military government or anarchy. Spain did not
want to force the Government to take forceful steps.
Prefacing his comments somewhat disingenuously by saying "we
are not fooling ourselves that we know better than the Cuban
people what they want," Sandomingo nonetheless seemed certain
the Cuban people did not want a sudden and potentially
dangerous change. During the February 11 dialogue,
Fernandez-Arias noted Cuban interlocutors had been nervous
and uncomfortable at the mention of dissidents. They had
reacted strongly but eventually agreed to release Francisco
Chaviano and a few others. MFA officials contended there had
been a noticeable change of Cuban attitude in international
fora, as evidenced by the signing now of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as well as the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights -- both pacts they could have signed 30 years ago.
The change was more evident in Geneva than in New York, where
Cuba still felt threatened. Even as the Spanish insisted the
time was right to ease up on Raul Castro, they were unable to
respond when Caleb McCarry pressed the Spanish to define what
the GOC had said it would concede in exchange for the lifting
of the EU's Restrictive Measures. Defending Spain's
engagement with the Regime, Sandomingo stated they saw "no
utility" to increased cooperation with Cuban civil society
without the agreement of the Cuban government. Mr. McCarry
called his Spanish colleague on the idea of closer ties to
the opposition "with the knowledge of" the Government,
insisting that Spain could not give Cuba a "veto" over open
democratic dialogue. Ms. Otallah urged the Spanish to think
hard about legitimacy and the political signal that the
lifting of Restrictive Measures would send to the Government
of Cuba.


12. (C) All across Europe, participants agreed privately,
there was support for a democratic transition in Cuba.

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McCarry and Otallah pressed for including the word
"democracy" (up to now excised by the Spanish) in the joint
declaration of the June 10 U.S.-EU Summit. As to whether the
Summit could be a good opportunity to mention human rights,
the Spanish agreed halfheartedly to make a note of the idea.
Regarding possible events with political prisoners to put a
face on the problems of Cuba's prisoners of conscience and
those of other human rights violators, Jorge Romeu expressed
Spain's clear preference for Geneva over New York as a venue.
Wherever the event could be organized, McCarry reminded the
Spanish that others in Cuba, even within the Cuban
Government, hear what the United States and the Europeans are
saying.

--------------
Casa de America
--------------


13. (C) Mr.McCarry was invited to exchange views the evening
of April 17 with a small group of representatives of
institutions and foundations active in Latin America policy.
At an off-the-record roundtable hosted by the public-private
Casa de America, which receives funding from the Spanish MFA,
the discussion touched on everything from the "China model"
to anticipated changes in U.S. policy after the November
2008 elections. Attendees across sectors also asked about
the role of countries such as Brazil, monetary remissions,
the U.S. embargo, the likelihood of U.S. congressional travel
to Cuba, the importance of Venezuelan petro-dollars,
corruption, and the risks and benefits of foreign direct
investment. Asked by a university student what role
institutions of higher education might play in real
democratic change, McCarry returned to one of the visit's
main themes: helping the people of Cuba by getting closer to
civil society. When McCarry spoke of planning and preparing
for significant change in Cuba, a development agency official
asked what the U.S. plan was for the day after. At that
point, another Spanish attendee asked him pointedly, "Why do
you ask as if it is up to the U.S.? Why is it not a shared
task?"


14. (C) McCarry met separately April 18 with Casa de America
Director Miguel Barroso, who is a close confidant of
President Zapatero. Like Casajuana, Barroso ventured that
with the disappearance from political life of Fidel Castro,
it was all over "but for the paperwork." Still, Barroso
opined Raul was unlikely to make "irreversible" changes as
long as Fidel lived, despite the impossibility of the elder
Castro's return. Barroso echoed other publicly voiced GOS
views and commonly held Spanish perspectives on Cuba. He
suggested the release of political prisoners on condition of
exile freed Raul Castro of a "molestia" or nuisance, even if
the dissidents did not present a threat, per se. McCarry was
unwavering in his assertions that Cuba is listening and that
democracy, sovereignty, and reconciliation are essential.
When McCarry reiterated USG calls to release political
prisoners and include them in an open dialogue, Barroso in
effect told him the U.S. could not understand ("cuesta
entender") and did not "get" Spain's special considerations.
He referred to Spain's complicated relationship with Cuba as
a "war without hate." Even though President Zapatero
personally found the Cuban government "repugnant," it was
vital to have contact with them.

//No Surprises from Parliamentarians: Europe Knows Best?//


15. (C) Foreign policy experts from Spain's two predominant
political parties joined Mr. McCarry for coffee at the
Embassy earlier on April 18. Socialist deputy Fatima Aburto,
past PSOE spokesperson for foreign affairs, took a hard-line
view against U.S. Cuba policy and in favor of Zapatero's
increased engagement with the Castro Regime. Guillermo
Mariscal, a Partido Popular parliamentarian who had met with
Cuba watchers in Washington and traveled to Havana, felt
strongly that the internal opposition should be allowed to
"pilot the transition." The PP shared the USG view that the
latest "modifications" to GOC policies, including travel
permits announced April 17, were positive for Cubans but
would not lead to essential institutional changes. Mariscal
noted that the tourism industry, including several Spanish
interests, was refinancing the Castro Regime. While both
Aburto and Mariscal agreed with McCarry on the importance of

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a democratic outcome and the need to free prisoners and open
democratic space, and the futility of making the Cuba debate
a forum for airing PSOE-PP differences, the similarities
ended there. Aburto said the U.S. embargo prevents Cubans
from seeing the rest of the world as it truly is,
unemployment and all; as a result, Cubans believe the rest of
the world is a "marvel" where "everything is easy." She
spoke of Spain's emotional interests in Cuba and made
conspicuous references to "European" viewpoints, suggesting
indirectly that Spain should elaborate the EU's Common
Position and knows better than the United States what is best
for Cubans. Continuing the "last colony" thread, she said
the Cuban opposition was not well organized and she stressed
the importance of reaching a consensus in June even as she
said the EU should "propose, not impose" policies. Above
all, the PSOE representative called for a slow, "prudent
transition." All agreed that the people of Cuba seemed to
want change and should feel that they are the protagonists,
but Aburto's final word was that the issue was "very
European."

//Partido Popular Offers to Help//


16. (C) At a working lunch hosted April 18 by the Foundation
for Social Studies and Analysis (FAES),a conservative
thinktank affiliated with the Partido Popular (PP),Mr.
McCarry explored concrete ways to encourage and support the
opposition's messages regarding democratic change in Cuba.
PP and FAES secretary General for International Relations
Jorge Moragas and his colleagues recognized the importance of
finding and maintaining commitments to the explicit support
of Cuba. Moragas offered to cooperate as needed with the
Government of Spain. He noted one of the PP's demands, in
exchange for supporting president Zapatero's foreign policy
initiatives in the new Spanish Congress, had been the removal
of the current Spanish Ambassador to Havana, noting Zaldivar
was a member of the United Left (IU) party and echoing
widespread concerns among dissident groups that the
Ambassador acted independently of even forward leaning
Spanish policies. At one point FAES Director for
International Policy Rafael Bardaji dismissed U.S. efforts to
partner with the GOS on Cuba, saying there was "no point" in
dealing with Zapatero's government. The Deputy Chief of
Mission shared Bardaji's overall criticism but was quick to
insist the U.S. needed to stay engaged and attempt to
influence Spain on Cuba. He stressed the importance of
maintaining a dialogue and exchanging perspectives on what
was happening on the island. Mr. McCarry mentioned May 21
activities planned for Cuba Solidarity Day, and FAES agreed
to work with us. The DCM urged FAES to become active in
lobbying the GOS to include language on democracy in Cuba in
the U.S.-EU Summit Declaration. Ms. Otallah told them they
could help by talking to open minds within the MFA about
moving forward on the joint political prisoners event, which
would highlight the plight of such prisoners worldwide, not
just in Cuba.

//Putting a Face on the Plight of Cuban Dissidents//


17. (C) To conclude the official portion of his visit,
McCarry met the evening of April 18 with Jose Gabriel "Pepin"
Ramon Castillo and Alejandro Gonzalez Raga, two of four
political prisoners released the week of February 17 and
allowed to seek medical treatment in Spain (ref B).
Alejandro's wife Bertha, herself a Dama de Blanco, attended
as well. They told McCarry the story of their release and
travel to Spain, and described the political and
administrative treatment they were receiving in Spain through
the offices of the MFA and the Red Cross. Pepin has
requested political asylum and, with the guidance of the Red
Cross is seeking work in Spain as well as affordable housing
and medical care. Both the dissidents expressed their
appreciation to Secretary Rice and the U.S. Government for
their solidarity with the people of Cuba, in particular
President Bush's support for political prisoners. In the
spirit of helping lower-profile fellow prisoners of
conscience still incarcerated by the Regime, Ramon Castillo
and Gonzalez Raga provided the names of some who were not
receiving any economic assistance, and shared additional
contact information by e-mail.


18. (C) COMMENT: The Cuba Transition Coordinator noted it

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was heartening, after a series of predictably less
encouraging meetings, to be reminded of the importance of
U.S. efforts to defend human rights in Cuba. His visit
served likewise as a "shot in the arm" for the Cuban human
rights activists and newly arrived dissidents with whom he
met. Though Mr. McCarry expressly did no media or public
outreach, his visit was followed closely by Spanish
journalists who cover Cuba, and received some coverage April
19 in ABC. A hard-line leftist blog suggested his "secret"
meetings were part of a "new imperialist offensive against
the people of Cuba." Our Spanish interlocutors seemed less
open to an exchange of views than in previous encounters, and
sent strong signals that they value easing tensions with Raul
Castro over creating space for democratic dialogue with all
Cubans. Time will tell whether Cuban civil society and
active exile groups can reverse the current Spanish-driven
trend in the EU toward lifting restrictive measures -- and
whether the will to turn the page in broader bilateral
relations with the United States is strong enough to cause
Spain to change its course in Cuba.
AGUIRRE